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I. Acknowledgement
It all started when I was on my first ski trip to the Alps as a kid. Frankly, it did not start 
too well. The skies were long, the lift was scary, and the slopes felt very steep. But, with my 
mother's relentless effort, I slowly began to master the art of skiing. One winter in my mid-
teens, I spent a winter in the Alps and was introduced to alpine ski touring. Soon I spent all 
my time in the mountains skiing with friends. One of my friends had lots of experience and 
even had some training through the Alpine Club. He taught me some basic avalanche 
assessment and companion rescue, and off we went on our adventures. I remember he used to 
offer me the first track on those steep slopes. At that time, I thought it was a very generous 
gesture. Little did I know that the avalanche is triggered by the first person that enters the 
slope in most cases. In retrospect, my friend used a clever strategy. Despite his experience and 
knowledge, he could not be certain that the slope would not avalanche, so he used a test pilot.  
My passion for mountains and skiing eventually lead me to become a professional 
mountain guide. During my guide training, I met the legendary Nils Faarlund and the 
Norwegian mountain guide community. The Norwegian "friluftsliv" tradition heavily 
influenced the Norwegian approach to avalanche decision-making at that time. It would take 
another thesis to explain the profound influence this has had on backcountry skiing in 
Norway. Briefly summarized, Norway's focus was on understanding snow and generally 
avoiding avalanche terrain on layered winter snow. This stood in sharp contrast to the alpine 
ski touring culture and risk-calculation approach that emerged in the Alps. I was puzzled. 
How could two cultures differ so much in how they understand and cope with the same 
problem? I spent two years at the Norwegian university of sports, trying to understand this. 
During this period, I met Swiss mountain guide Werner Munter, the developer of the 
reduction method, and the late German mountain guide Martin Engler who created the snow-
card and factoren check. Inspired by our discussions and their written work, I wrote a master 
thesis implementing their thoughts in a Norwegian setting. A few years later, I wrote the first 
book on avalanches in Norwegian that targeted those who wanted to ski in avalanche terrain. 
The book caused a lot of fuss and revealed major contradictions between those in favour of 
the traditional approach and those who looked to the Alps and North America for inspiration. 
Years went by, I was guiding and teaching full time. Practicing decision-making in avalanche 
terrain and teaching others to do it the same way as me. Looking back, it is interesting for me 
to reflect on the difference between what I taught and believed in then, compared to what I 
practice today. 
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In 2009 The Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Directorate (NVE) was assigned 
the responsibility for avalanches on a governmental level. I applied for a job at NVE and got 
the opportunity to be a part of the team that eventually launched the Norwegian Avalanche 
Warning Service (NAWS) in 2013. In my job, I have been involved in a wide range of tasks 
related to avalanches, from avalanche forecasting and observer training to public avalanche 
risk communication, emergency assessments, and app development. The NAWS is part of the 
European Avalanche Warning Services (EAWS) and cooperates with North American 
warning services. Through this collaboration, I have had the opportunity to discuss with and 
learn from the world's foremost avalanche experts. My job at NAWS boosted my overall 
avalanche competence, but it also made me painfully aware of our current knowledge's 
limitations.   
Four years ago, I was asked if I was interested in doing a Ph.D. on avalanche decision-
making at the Center for Avalanche Research and Education - UiT The Arctic University of 
Norway. My superiors at NVE and the management in CARE/UiT had faith in me and agreed 
to finance a Ph.D. position. Eventually, it became clear that the best supervising capacity for 
the type of research that I was interested in was found at the Department of Psychology.  
In retrospect, I see that I probably did not fully understand what it meant when I said yes 
to doing a Ph.D. For someone who primarily identifies as a practitioner, learning to do good 
research has been both exciting and challenging. Nevertheless, starting on my Ph.D., I was 
very motivated to solve one of the big questions in avalanches: what is the best way to make 
slope specific decisions in avalanche terrain? I still do not know the answer, but I do have 
some well-founded ideas now. 
Before I start pursuing these ideas, I must thank everyone who has helped me in various 
ways. Without the effort of others, this Ph.D. would be impossible.    
I want to thank the hundred avalanche experts who took part in the study on factors and 
methods used by experts. It was a comprehensive survey that required effort and patience. 
Hopefully, each expert had some personal benefit from reflecting on their decision-making in 
addition to providing me with invaluable data. This study's results have formed the basis for 
other studies and will do so for future studies.  
 I also want to thank all the participants at avalanche seminars who took part in our 





I have been fortunate to have three supervisors that have complemented each other. Gerit 
Pfuhl, my main supervisor, has the credit for providing a good balance between learning, 
reflection, and progress all the way. I have always had a feeling that she has an overall plan 
that I only fully understand in hindsight. Her love for all aspects of science, her ability to 
acquire new knowledge, and her working capacity are both impressive and truly inspiring. 
She has a built-in bullshit filter that has proven to be useful in meeting someone who has a lot 
on his mind. Most of all she has taught me the art of doing quality science and the importance 
of a stroll.  
My second supervisor is Audun Hetland. He has served as an overpressure valve and 
lifeline at the same time. When things have felt a bit hard to cope with, he has always 
encouraged and made me refocus. Me being a novice in academia, Audun eventually made 
me believe that I have the skills to contribute to avalanche research. I have learned a lot from 
his talent in research communication and his ability to formulate well-worded sentences. I am 
going to miss our discussions and exchange of ideas.  
The third and final supervisor is my boss at NVE, Rune Engeset. It was he who suggested 
that I should apply for a Ph.D. project in the first place. He probably had more faith in me 
than I did. Rune has a unique ability to dive into a topic, understand it, and come up with an 
explanation that makes others understand. His contribution in all phases of my different 
studies has been invaluable.  
I want to thank my colleagues at NVE, who has had to endure a somewhat absent 
colleague at times. I also want to thank all the skiers, mountain guides, and avalanche experts 
worldwide who have taken their time to discuss different aspects of avalanche decision-
making with me. These meetings may seem insignificant at the time but have been very 
important.  
Finally, I want to thank my family. You did not ask for this. Thanks for putting up with a 





II. Abstract  
Few things are as beautiful as snow-covered mountains. Along with this beauty comes 
a threat – the threat of avalanches. Backcountry recreationalists face this threat whenever they 
travel in avalanche terrain. To make a qualified decision of whether a particular slope is safe 
to ski or not is a complex task that can have fatal consequences. This thesis's overall goal is to 
improve the decision quality of avalanche risk assessments, aiming to reduce avalanche 
incidents and accidents. Three aspects of avalanche decision-making that are important for 
decision quality are studied in five separate studies. These aspects are the decision basis, the 
decision competence, and the decision process. 
The core of avalanche decision-making lies in the decision basis, the factors that are 
assessed, which ultimately lead to a decision to ski or not ski a specific slope. Several 
decision-making frameworks (DMF) have been developed to structure and aid decision-
making in avalanche terrain. A literature review describing the most commonly used DMFs 
led to identifying the frameworks' assessment factors in Study I. This first-ever 
comprehensive review of assessment factors is crucial to understand the structure of existing 
frameworks and makes it possible to compare their decision basis and provides a foundation 
to improve the decision quality. In Study II, an expert panel revealed a large discrepancy 
between familiarity with and actual use of the DMFs. The systematic snow-cover diagnosis, 
an analytical approach, was the only DMF that experts also used in the field. Further, the 
survey showed that experts use more and emphasize other factors than most DMFs do and 
provided an insight into which factors are relevant for avalanche risk assessment from an 
expert opinion. To provide the basis for teaching an analytical approach, over 1200 
recreationalists were asked to rate how well they can assess a risk factor and its relevance. A 
factor's relevance did not depend on avalanche education, but so did how precisely the factor 
could be assessed. Thus, Study III substantiates that even non-experts could apply analytical, 
knowledge-based decision-making given the proper education.  
Avalanche decision-making is done in phases with an increasing degree of precision 
from phase to phase. An avalanche forecast provides decision basis elements and serves as the 
starting point in the decision-making process. Study IV showed that the Norwegian forecast 
meets the end user's needs and identified ways to improve the information. The fifth study in 
this thesis studies the influence of frame selection on risk perception and how it affects 




encouraged to ask, "why is it safe?" instead of "why is it dangerous?" because it results in 
more cautious, conservative judgments.  
When asked about their last good decision, people tend to focus on the outcome, not 
the decision's quality. In an uncertain environment, the best decision does not necessarily lead 
to a wanted result and vice versa. Improving decision quality is about increasing our chances 
of good outcomes, not guaranteeing them. This thesis has improved our understanding of the 
decision-basis for decision-making in avalanche terrain. All existing DMFs follow a structure, 
which is how the user should ideally make decisions in the developer's opinion. However, 
future studies on decision-making in avalanche terrain should rather consider how people are 
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Backcountry skiing involves a continuous battle between two conflicting interests: 
maximally accessible ski terrain versus the desire for maximal safety. The challenge is to 
balance this to the best possible extent. The following real-life story tries to convey what 
skiing in steep terrain is all about while at the same time giving a picture of the complexity of 
decision-making and what is at stake. 
The mountain has put on her finest white dress. Deep powder snow is covering all her 
different features. The sky changes from red and orange to deep blue as the sun rises. It is 
cold, calm, and the snow is sparkling. To the three skiers breaking trail, it seems like a perfect 
day to visit this very mountain. Today's destination was decided after consulting the 
avalanche forecast and a short chat on the phone the day before. All three are skilled skiers 
who have been skiing in the backcountry for years. They know what good skiing is, and the 
conditions seem promising. There is no exact plan for where to ski, just different possible 
options. As they approach the lower parts of the mountain, they get an overview of some 
relevant alternatives. They decide on a route that starts with a big, open face at the top and 
ends in a narrow couloir with steep rock walls on both sides in the lower part. None of them 
have skied this route before, but it looks like a perfect challenge for a skilled skier. A stable 
old snowpack with half a meter of dry, loose powder on top provides seemingly perfect 
conditions. The skiers ascend the mountain by moving in a gentler terrain than the route they 
plan to ski down. Occasionally they stop to enjoy the view and discuss conditions. So far, 
they have not observed any signs of instability, and they continue as planned. Towards the 
top, the terrain steepens, and they mount the skis on their backpack. Up here, the snow is 
more wind affected, making it easy to walk on feet without sinking too deep into the snow. 
The ascent continues without problems. Perfect timing, the sun just hit this side of the 
mountain. After a quick break, they are standing on top of their decent, trying to get an 
overview of the whole route. From here, the upper part looks quite steep and a little scary. Not 
only is it a no-fall zone. An avalanche release would most likely be fatal. They discuss 
conditions for a while. Eventually, the first skier puts on his goggles, checks the bindings one 
last time, and starts skiing the planned descent. To me, the question is not why he decides to 




1.1 Recreational backcountry skiing and avalanche accidents 
Backcountry skiing is becoming increasingly popular in mountainous regions in the 
western world. From being reserved for relatively few enthusiasts, it has become something 
many skiers want to learn and experience. Avalanche experts agree on this increase of 
backcountry recreationalists, even if available data confirming it are sparse (Winkler, Fischer, 
& Techel, 2016; Zweifel, Raez, & Stucki, 2006). Despite an increase in backcountry 
recreationalist in the last decade, the number of accidents has not increased correspondingly 
(CAIS, 2020; NVE, 2020; Techel, Jarry, et al., 2016). Avalanche researchers explain this with 
improved avalanche prevention measures such as avalanche forecasting, avalanche education 
(Etter, Meister, Zweifel, & Pielmeier, 2008; D. McClung & Schaerer, 2006), and improved 
avalanche rescue technology (Brugger et al., 2007; Techel & Zweifel, 2013). However, one 
should not disregard the fact that a favourable snow cover can significantly limit the number 
of accidents in a given season. Some avalanche problems, such as persistent weak layers, 
recur in many accidents but are not as prominent every winter (J. Aasen, 2019; J Aasen, 2020; 
Techel & Winkler, 2015). Still, on average, 150 people lose their life in avalanches every year 
in Europe and North America (CAIS, 2020; Techel, Jarry, et al., 2016). The number of near-
misses, both registered and unregistered, is much higher (J. Aasen, 2019), indicating 
considerable potential for severe or fatal accidents. The difference between an avalanche 
release leading to a fatal accident or a minor incident depends on the size of the avalanche and 
the location of the victim in relation to the avalanche, and terrain features that might cause 
severe traumatic injuries on impact (Brugger, Durrer, Adler-Kastner, Falk, & Tschirky, 2001; 
B.  Jamieson & Jones, 2015). 
Most recreational avalanche accidents are not random events. They result from 
someone willingly placing themselves at risk when doing something they love - skiing in the 
backcountry. They are "accidents of choice". Most recreationalist are aware of the risk they 
expose themselves to, but some are not (Björk, 2007; Gunn, 2010; Sole, 2008). Even though 
risk itself is not a motive in any adventure or extreme sport (Brymer, 2010) it is seen as 
central in creating a challenge (Collins & Collins, 2013). Avalanche terrain is different. Here, 
risk of avalanches is not tied to the challenge of skiing, but rather an abstract risk that limits a 
skier’s availability of potential terrain to ski. At the same time, it is important to emphasize 
that avalanche risk does not increase the value of the skier's skiing experience. Skiers do not 
ski because of the thrilling risk of avalanches. They do it despite the risk. The skiing 




so, they expose themselves to an unwanted risk of avalanches. Besides the physical effort of 
ascending and descending, a cognitive effort is put into finding great skiing, avoiding 
avalanches, and making decisions to achieve that. Sometimes decisions lead to an avalanche 
release. Indeed, in most avalanche accidents, the avalanche is triggered by the victim or 
someone in the victim's group (D. McClung & Schaerer, 2006; Schweizer & Lütschg, 2000). 
Hence, available information may have been overlooked, misinterpreted, or not considered 
(Arnott, 1998; I. McCammon, 2004; D. M. McClung, 2011; Mersch, Trenkwalder, Semmel, 
& Stopper, 2007).  
1.2 Avalanche research 
Traditionally avalanche researchers have focused their research on improving our basic 
understanding of avalanche formation, including fracture propagation and slab avalanche 
release (J. Gaume & Reuter, 2017; Heierli, 2008; D. M. McClung, 2013; D. M. McClung & 
Borstad, 2017; van Herwijnen, Schweizer, & Heierli, 2010), slope stability and spatial 
variability (J. Gaume & Reuter, 2017; J. Gaume et al., 2014; Reuter, Schweizer, & van 
Herwijnen, 2015; Schweizer, Kronholm, Jamieson, & Birkeland, 2008), comparison of 
(in)stability tests (Techel, Winkler, Walcher, van Herwijnen, & Schweizer, 2020; Winkler & 
Schweizer, 2009), slab properties (Schweizer, Reuter, Van Herwijnen, Gauthier, & Jamieson, 
2014) or the effect skiers have on the snowpack (Habermann, Schweizer, & Jamieson, 2008; 
Monti, Gaume, van Herwijnen, & Schweizer, 2016; Schweizer & Lütschg, 2000; Schweizer, 
McCammon, & Jamieson, 2008). Others have investigated what can be learned from 
accidents and from analysing recurring avalanche risk factors (Grímsdóttir & McClung, 2006; 
Schweizer & Lütschg, 2001; Techel, Jarry, et al., 2016; Techel & Zweifel, 2013; Winkler et 
al., 2016). There is also research that is targeted directly at backcountry skiers, such as 
suggestions for in field risk calculations (B. Jamieson, Schweizer, J., Shea, C., 2009), 
methods for analysing the snowpack (I. McCammon & Schweizer, 2002; Reuter & Semmel, 
2018; Schweizer & Jamieson, 2007) or how to use field observations to determine avalanche 
danger (Schweizer, 2010). Although not all findings from avalanche research can be applied 
directly in the field, practitioners have benefitted from it and improved their ability to make 
good decisions in avalanche terrain.  
In later years there has been an increased recognition of the role of human factors in 
avalanche decision-making. This has led to studies focusing on other aspects of avalanche 




taking behaviour (P. Haegeli, Rupf, & Karlen, 2019; Mannberg, Hendrikx, & Johnson, 2020; 
Mannberg, Hendrikx, Landrø, & Ahrland, 2018), cognitive processes (L. Maguire & Percival, 
2018; L. M. D. Maguire, 2019) and learning (Adams, 2005a; Conger, 2005; Stewart-
Patterson, 2005).  
1.3 Concepts and terminology 
Next, I will describe relevant concepts and clarify terminology regarding avalanche 
decision-making. I start with two core concepts from the natural science part, followed by 
concepts from the social science part of avalanche risk assessment.  
1.3.1 Avalanches 
An avalanche is a mass of snow (more than 100m3) rapidly moving down an inclined 
surface a minimum of 50 meters (EAWS). In a recreational setting, avalanches can be divided 
roughly into two; slab (dry or wet cohesive plate of snow) and loose (dry or wet snow with 
little or no bonding). Their characteristics differ in terms of how fast the snow stabilises, 
possibility of remote triggering, typical release zone steepness, release characteristics and 
destructive force related to size and density. Human triggered loose snow avalanches tend to 
be released beneath the skier who triggers them, instead of above as slab avalanches often do, 
making them a lot less dangerous to skiers. One should not underestimate the danger of loose 
snow avalanches, as they pose a danger if skied into or if they trigger underlying slab 
avalanches. However, compared to slab avalanches, very few people are killed, and their 
assessment and management are much easier. Slab avalanches account for nearly all 
recreational avalanche deaths. Therefore, the focus of this thesis is on the assessment of slab 
avalanches. Cornice fall avalanches, icefall avalanches, glide avalanches (the entire snowpack 
glides on the ground), and slush avalanches are also referred to as avalanches. Although they 
occasionally claim the lives of backcountry recreationalists, especially cornice fall 
avalanches, the assessment basis of these is not discussed in this thesis.   
1.3.2 Avalanche terrain 
An avalanche path consists of three components: Starting zone, track, and deposition 
or runout zone (D. McClung & Schaerer, 2006). Together they are also referred to as 
avalanche terrain. The term is frequently used in avalanche hazard communication, e.g., 




A slab avalanche is the result of fracture initiation and following fracture propagation. 
Given that the slope is steep enough, the overlying slab releases and slides down the slope. 
All three processes are affected by inclination (Johan Gaume, van Herwijnen, Chambon, 
Wever, & Schweizer, 2017; D. McClung & Schaerer, 2006; Reiweger & Schweizer, 2010). 
Not all processes of fracture initiation and fracture propagation are fully understood. For all 
practical purposes it is sufficient to understand that the steeper the slope, the easier a fracture 
is initiated, the easier a fracture propagates, and that dry snow will slide when a proportion of 
the slope is >25o. However this low angle is the infrequent lower limit (D. McClung & 
Schaerer, 2006), and 30o is communicated as the critical angle in the context of training (S. 
Harvey, Rhyner, & Schweizer, 2012; Munter, 1997; Studeregger, 2016; Tremper, 2001). 
Most avalanche accidents happen in slopes between 35o and 40o inclination, regardless of the 
forecasted danger level (S. Harvey, 2002; S. Harvey et al., 2012).  
Avalanche terrain is characterized by more than the one-dimensional factor 
inclination. The avalanche terrain exposure scale (ATES) is a method to communicate the 
complexities and risks of traveling in avalanche-prone terrain (G. Statham, McMahon, & 
Tomm, 2006). It classifies terrain into different classes: simple, challenging, and complex. 
The three classes are determined in a technical model that describes exposure to different 
terrain elements such as inclination, forest density, terrain traps, and avalanche frequency. 
Whereas the technical model is primarily reserved for skilled users, the public communication 
model targets a less skilled audience. The ATES system is an integrated part of the Canadian 
decision-making framework (DMF), the Avaluator 2.0 (P. Haegeli, 2010). ATES is well 
suited to teach avalanche terrain fundamentals and basic route finding, and help balance 
terrain choice, conditions, and competence. The system is currently revised, and a new 
version is under development, probably with a more fine-meshed classification (Larsen, 
Hendrikx, Schauer, et al., 2020). Initially a Canadian initiative, ATES has gained popularity 
also in other countries, especially in Scandinavia. ATES and its Norwegian equivalent KAST 
are used in guidebooks and actively used as safety measures for avalanche observers in 
Norway (Landrø, Engeset, Haslestad, Aasen, & Orset. K., 2016). Currently, all avalanche 
terrain in Norway is mapped using an automated ATES model (Larsen, Hendrikx, Slåtten, & 




1.3.3 Decision environment 
Throughout the winter, snow settles in layers on the ground. Every snowfall adds a 
new layer. Wind, radiation, and temperature determine the properties of the layer (e.g., 
thickness, hardness), how well it bonds to the underlying layer, and how it develops further. 
Some layers are strong and bond well. Others are weak and can collapse with additional 
loads, such as a skier. When an overlying layer (slab) buries a weak layer, a weak layer 
collapse can propagate under the slab. Given terrain steeper than 30 degrees, the slab can 
release as an avalanche. Roughly speaking, a slab avalanche results from the interaction 
between a weak layer, slab, terrain, and a trigger. To trigger an avalanche, one must either 
weaken the strength of the snowpack (e.g., rapid increase in temperature) or increase stress 
(e.g., new snow or wind loading). When an avalanche is triggered without the interference of 
people, it is called a natural avalanche release. However, in most cases where humans are 
injured or killed when engaged in recreational activity, they also serve as the trigger. These 
avalanches are referred to as human triggered avalanches.  
This is, of course, a very simplistic presentation of the causes and triggers of slab 
avalanches. Each of the four overall factors; terrain, weather, snowpack and people, consist of 
a number of underlying factors and the interaction between them is very complex and there is 
uncertainty associated with their assessment. For example, there is uncertainty associated with 
inclination measurement (Würtl, 2016), weak layer spatial distribution (J. Gaume et al., 2014; 
Jürg Schweizer et al., 2008), to mention a few but critical examples. Another striking example 
of the uncertainty associated with the assessment of snow cover stability can be found in the 
Canadian Avalanche Association Observational Guidelines and Reporting Standards for 
Weather, Snowpack and Avalanches (OGRS) (CAA, 2016). Here the word rule is used seven 
times while at the same time indicating that no definitive rule is possible. So, even before we 
start to include the influence of human factors, it becomes clear that it is impossible to 
determine avalanche danger with absolute certainty. Thus, it is reasonable to claim that 
avalanche decision-makers operate in a world of uncertainty.  
Fortunately, human triggered avalanches are a quite rare incident in relation to the 
amount of avalanche terrain that is being covered by backcountry recreationalists every 
winter. To get caught in an avalanche, one needs to venture in or close to steep enough terrain 
with the “right” combination of weak layer and overlaying slab in the snowpack. This “right” 




general, there is limited or no feedback on how close one was to an avalanche release. Winter 
backcountry travelers therefore face what is called a wicked learning environment (R. M. 
Hogarth, Lejarraga, & Soyer, 2015). Repeated experience of non-event feedback can result in 
a false sense of confidence in assessment skills, and it becomes difficult to develop reliable 
intuition. It takes considerable amount of experience to develop reliable intuition, which is a 
privilege mostly reserved for experts. Therefore, most backcountry recreationalists must rely 
on deliberate reasoning, that may even be in competition with their falsely developed 
intuition. A study by the DAV-safety research showed that 110 of 120 informants reported a 
positive feeling of safety after a ski-trip, even though 78% of them did not apply appropriate 
actions at the critical places of the tour (Mersch et al., 2007).  
1.3.4 Decision-making phases 
Decision-making in avalanche terrain is structured into three phases; trip planning 
(regional), route selection (local/visible area), and slope-specific (zonal) decision-making. 
This approach serves as an increasingly fine-meshed net that allows the user to update and 
review the decision basis from the previous phases. In the trip planning phase, any local 
knowledge, information from maps, guidebooks, weather forecasts, the group's composition, 
and the avalanche forecast forms the basis for deciding which area to visit and what mountain 
to ski. In the route selection phase, the forecast is verified, information is updated, and the 
original plan is adjusted or changed. Other factors, such as snowpack information and signs of 
instability, become relevant. The constant update and information sampling continue in the 
slope-specific phase where the decision to ski or not is made. Again, other factors, like 
stopping at safe spots, skiing one-at-a-time, come into play.  
 




The 3x3 (3 filter x 3 criteria) by Werner Munter is an example of a structured 
approach to avalanche decision-making that evaluates a set of factors across three phases 
(Munter, 1997). The 3x3 is an integrated part of the Reduction method and is often used in 
combination with other frameworks. 
Another more comprehensive alternative is the AIARE Risk Management Framework 
which operates with the following phases; 1. Prepare (each season), 2. Plan your trip (equals 
the trip planning phase), 3. Ride safely (equals route selection and slope-specific phase), 4. 
Debrief the day (AIARE, 2021). In phases 2-3, teamwork is emphasized. Unlike the 3x3, this 
framework includes both education and evaluation.  
1.3.5 Avalanche decision making frameworks 
To make a qualified decision of whether a particular slope is safe to ski or not 
demands assessing a range of factors. To aid this decision, several decision-making 
frameworks have been developed by avalanche experts. Historically, different checklists in 
various formats have been available. According to LaChapelle, the earliest checklist is G. 
Bilgeri's Six Points, which was in use in the 1930s, followed by Atwater's Ten Contributory 
Factors in the 1950s (LaChapelle, 2005). However, no overall, methodical, and structured 
approach to avalanche decision-making existed. This changed when Swiss mountain guide 
Werner Munter introduced the 3x3 in the 1980s, initiating the development of a range of 
different frameworks (Munter, 1991). At the core is his structure of decision-making into the 
planning stage, the route selection stage and the slope-specific stage during an outing.  
Various terms are used when referring to these aids. English speaking countries use 
the terms decision aid, method, scheme, or decision tool (P Haegeli, McCammon, Jamieson, 
Israelson, & Statham, 2006; I.  McCammon, 2006; I. McCammon & Hägeli, 2005), whereas 
aids originating from the German-speaking part of the Alps mainly use decision system or 
decision strategy (Engler, 2001; S. Harvey et al., 2012; Larcher, 1999; Munter, 1997). This 
thesis uses the term decision-making framework when referring to all these aids. Framework 
refers to a basic structure underlying a system used to plan or decide that follows certain 
overall principles.   
Today's decision-making frameworks are explained in avalanche handbooks or folders 
and taught in avalanche safety courses. To further aid the decision process, most of these 




       Common to all frameworks is that the decisions are based on an assessment of different 
factors, such as: (1) the physical factors like slope steepness or slope shape, (2) regional 
danger rating provided by the avalanche forecast, and (3) signs of instability (alarm-signs) 
like for example shooting cracks, whoop sounds from the snow, assessed in the field, and (4) 
group size affecting decision making. However, existing frameworks work with 
simplifications to meet the assumed limited experience and knowledge of the user. Users who 
have gained some personal experience may start to deviate from the original rules and 
structure set out by the frameworks. This leads to variations of the original frameworks where 
exceptions from the basic rules are allowed, and adjustments by the user are applied. Thus, 
providing a tool to ensure safe travel in avalanche terrain is a difficult task. It is a question 
about balancing the users desire for maximum enjoyment (amount and kind of terrain that is 
considered safe to ski by the framework) and the risk of being caught in an avalanche (D. M. 
McClung, 2002). To avoid this risk altogether, one must avoid avalanche terrain. All other 
approaches involving travel in avalanche terrain means varying degrees of risk and 
uncertainty. 
Not all existing frameworks work equally well in every situation. A comparison of 
existing decision frameworks shows that most of them perform poorly at low and moderate 
avalanche danger and are sensitive to avalanche climate (I. McCammon, Haegeli, P., 2004). 
The same study also shows that simpler methods appear to be superior to more complex 
decision methods, similar to studies from  other fields, e.g., medicine (Gigerenzer, 2014). 
Even relatively simple aids can influence the decision-making process in the direction of a 
more avalanche hazard sensitive behaviour (P. Haegeli, Haider, Longland, & Beardmore, 
2009). 
 All decision-making frameworks have in common that they help recognizing hazard and 
recommend actions to manage the associated risks. For example, when deciding to ski or not 
to ski a certain slope, the After-ski method can “restrict” skiing based on steepness and the 
regional avalanche danger level, whereas the Avaluator combines an avalanche condition 
score with a terrain characteristic score that results in a recommendation of caution, extra 
caution or not recommended (Brattlien, 2014; P. Haegeli, 2010). What varies between the 
different methods is the performance in prevention, mobility, ease of use and utility (I. 
McCammon, Haegeli, P., 2004). The calculated prevention values of the Avaluator has been 
criticized for being grossly inflated and giving the users a false sense of confidence in slope 




1100 accident reports due to missing values. However, attempts to calculate a preventive 
value based on avalanche accident statistics face the same challenge due to the inherent biases 
in the data i.e., sampling bias (only reported accidents) and hindsight bias (available 
information). Another problem is that it is challenging to test for false negatives (DMF says 
NO, but the slope is stable and could be skied) and false positives (the DMF says YES, but 
the slope is unstable and should not be skied). Systematic Snow cover Diagnosis (SSD) is the 
only framework which has been tested for this, but only in a single study (G. Kronthaler, 
Mitterer, C., Zenke, B., Lehning, M., 2013).  
   
1.3.6 Probabilistic and analytical avalanche decision-making 
Decision-making frameworks fall into two general categories: Probabilistic and 
Analytical. Munter called his Reduction method probabilistic (Munter, 1997), and since most 
DMFs are derived from his original method, this is the term used in this thesis. Other terms 
used are rule-based and knowledge-based systems (I. McCammon & Hägeli, 2005). The term 
analytical corresponds to knowledge-based decision-making in McCammon and Hägeli's 
terminology. Most DMFs have components from both approaches.  
All frameworks are based on the use of several factors. The difference lies in whether 
a factor is regarded as a physical factor or a statistical factor. For example, avalanche accident 
statistics from the Alps show that the majority of avalanche fatalities are located in a northern 
aspect, so probabilistic frameworks have calculated a risk-score for skiing in the northern 
aspect (Munter, 1997). An analytical approach, however, regards the aspect as a physical 
factor, e.g., that it is of importance for snow metamorphism and snow stability due to the 
effects of solar radiation and temperature. Instead of looking at the northern aspect as having 
a certain risk-score regardless of the conditions, an analytical approach would rather evaluate 
how the weather (e.g., temperature and radiation) has affected the snowpack in terms of 
stability. This is also called process thinking (G. Kronthaler, 2019; G. Kronthaler, Mitterer, 
C., Zenke, B., Lehning, M., 2013).  
Another example are group factors. Statistically, small groups are less exposed to 
avalanche accidents than larger groups, and a risk score for different group sizes can be 
calculated (Munter, 1997). An analytical approach would be to take the groups composition 




accordingly. One would also consider available group management possibilities to reduce the 
load the group exerts on the snow cover.      
In an analytical decision-making framework, the overall structure is a sort of open-ended 
checklist that helps the user structure the decision process and not to overlook important 
factors or cues. The use presupposes that the user is able to assess the various factors and see 
these in context. Probabilistic frameworks on the other hand generally require less of the user. 
Based on avalanche fatality statistics, a probability of triggering an avalanche in a given 
situation is calculated, and numerical thresholds are used for making go/no-go decisions.  
Critics claim that an analytical assessment is a difficult task even for experts and that this 
type of approach is thus unsuitable for recreationalists (Brattlien, 2014; Munter, 1997). This 
view is not shared by all avalanche experts. In North America there is generally far more 
focus on snow knowledge and elements of analytical assessment both in recreational as well 
as professional avalanche education than is the case in parts of the Alps. This is first and 
foremost expressed in the methods that are developed and taught in the different countries 
(Behr & Mersch, 2018; Grady, 2013; P Haegeli et al., 2006; S Harvey & Nigg, 2009; Pichler, 
2014). However, even in the German speaking part of the Alps, where the use of probabilistic 
frameworks has the greatest prevalence, the use of W3-Wer geht wann wohin? (Who goes 
where when?) and the SSD, shows that analytical methods are used too (G. Kronthaler, 2019; 
Studeregger, 2016).  
1.3.7 Avalanche decision-making factors 
All decision-making frameworks build on a selection of factors. These factors are 
sometimes referred to as avalanche risk factors – factors that contribute to the avalanche 
danger, such as signs of instability and wind-loading (S. Harvey, Rhyner, Dürr, Schweizer, & 
Henny, 2018; D. McClung & Schaerer, 2006; Techel, Zweifel, & Winkler, 2015). However, 
the term is also used on different categories of factors, such as weather factors, snowpack 
factors, terrain factors and human factors. In this thesis, the term factor is used for all the 
different "puzzle pieces" underlying the different decision-making frameworks. The factors 
are thematically grouped into five categories: Snow and avalanche factors (e.g., signs of 
instability), Snowpack evaluation and stability tests (e.g., weak layer properties and test 
scores), avalanche forecast factors (e.g., danger level), Group and group management factors 




traps). The term factor is used to avoid using different terms when discussing factors within 
the different categories. 
1.3.8 Risk and uncertainty  
The term risk, or more precisely, the risk concept, has different meanings in different 
disciplines. In simple terms, risk is the possibility of something unwanted happening, but 
several definitions with different focus exist (see i.e., (Aven, 2012; Hertwig, Pleskac, & 
Pachur, 2019). Within the avalanche domain, the term risk is used far more frequently than 
uncertainty, and it is often used in combination with the word avalanche (e.g., avalanche risk, 
avalanche risk management, and avalanche risk assessment). Talking about avalanche 
accidents, hazardous events with dimensions other than probabilities and outcomes, it makes 
sense to use the term risk because it addresses the catastrophic potential of an accident. Also, 
in situations where all possible outcomes and their probabilities are known – as in a lottery, 
there would be decision-making under risk (Hertwig et al., 2019). A simple probability 
calculation would be sufficient. Whether the premises for risk calculations are present within 
the assessment of avalanches, is frequently discussed between avalanche experts. 
Nevertheless, it has resulted into overall approaches to avalanche decision-making, an 
analytical and a probabilistic approach.  
Whereas risk applies to situations of measurable probability, uncertainty applies to 
situations where such measurement is impossible. It is characterized by a state of incomplete 
knowledge and comprises two dimensions (Kozyreva & Hertwig, 2019; Ulkumen, Fox, & 
Malle, 2016). One dimension is environmental (aleatory) uncertainty. For instance, the weak 
layer distribution in a snowpack varies over time and space. The other dimension is 
knowledge-based (epistemic) uncertainty. It stems from limits in available knowledge about a 
fact and cognitive capabilities. In contrast to the inherent aleatory uncertainty associated with 
avalanche decision-making, epistemic uncertainty can be reduced with increased knowledge 
and training. 
In addition to these two dimensions of uncertainty, there is a third that applies to 
avalanche decision-making: Language-based uncertainty. This uncertainty arises because 
words can have vague or ambiguous meanings. Thus, people use and understand words 
differently (Burgman, 2016). Within avalanche decision-making, the language-based 
uncertainty becomes particularly problematic when discussing the likelihood of triggering an 




The distinction between risk and uncertainty is essential because it influences how one 
understands the avalanche decision-making problem and how one decides to approach it.        
1.3.9 Avalanche forecast 
To provide the public with detailed information about the snowpack and current avalanche 
situation many countries have avalanche warning services publishing avalanche forecasts, 
also called bulletins or warnings. An avalanche forecast is a prognosis trying to predict how 
the snow and avalanche conditions will be in a defined geographical region either later the 
same day or the next day, depending on publishing policy in each warning service. Production 
of avalanche forecasts includes two steps. The first step is an assessment of the current 
situation. The most important sources of information for avalanche forecasters are:  
• Field observations provided by observers 
• Data from weather stations and snow- and weather models 
The second step is making a prognosis. When the avalanche forecaster has an overview of 
the snow cover's current situation/status and the weather, they can start writing a forecast. 
That is, to predict how the reported weather will affect the snow cover and the risk of 
avalanches (Engeset, 2013). In the Norwegian Avalanche Warning Service (NAWS), the 
forecaster team includes an avalanche meteorologist who makes a weather forecast, especially 
for the warning regions' mountain areas. Hence, the forecasters have a good starting point for 
predicting the development of snow and avalanche conditions.  
Avalanche forecasts have similar content and use an information pyramid, presenting the 
most important information, the danger level, first (EAWS). The European forecasting 
services use the EAWS Matrix to determine the danger level, a function of the probability of 
avalanche release, distribution of hazardous sites, and avalanche size (EAWS). The danger is 
expressed in a five-stage scale, ranging from 1-low to 5-very high (EAWS). In North 
America, a slightly adapted version of this scale is used (G.  Statham et al., 2010). The 
avalanche forecast also provides information on areas where the danger is particularly 
significant, referred to as avalanche prone locations. These areas (aspect, elevation, and 
specific terrain features) are described using graphics and text. When writing an avalanche 
forecast, the forecaster can choose between five different avalanche problems in Europe 
(EAWS) or eight in North America (G. Statham et al., 2018). A forecast can contain up to 




e.g., persistent weak layer or wind drifted snow. The avalanche problems are expressed using 
icons. The avalanche risk assessment element is the avalanche warning's summary of factors 
that affect the avalanche danger and the reasons for choosing the avalanche problem. Finally, 
the avalanche forecast also contains snowpack information, a general description covering 
both the snow's layering and the stability and a mountain weather forecast. The NAWS and 
some other warning services have integrated travel advice aimed at snow sports enthusiasts or 
special information aimed at preparedness authorities in their forecasts. These advices are 
based on the current danger level and avalanche problem.  
The avalanche forecast applies for a region with a minimum size of 100 square kilometres 
(Nairz, 2010). It is an excellent starting point for trip planning but cannot fully answer the 
backcountry recreationalists question of whether it is safe to ski a specific slope or not. It is 
worth emphasizing that a forecast is based on the information available at any given time and 
that, for example, differences between the forecasted weather and actual weather or local 
differences may lead to the forecast not being correct. Verification and harmonisation of the 
forecasted danger level is no easy task (Techel, Dürr, & Schweizer, 2016; Techel, Müller, & 
Schweizer, 2020). Nevertheless, verification of predicted avalanche danger level proposes a 
score between 60%-80% (Föhn, 1995; B. Jamieson, Campbell, & Jones, 2008; Schweizer, 
Kronholm, & Wiesinger, 2003). Given these limitations of the forecast, backcountry 
recreationalist must make independent assessments based on field observations and base their 
decisions on these. 
1.3.10 Human factors  
As the story in the introduction shows, decision-making in avalanche terrain is about 
much more than snow physics. It involves group decision-making, communication, feelings, 
motivation, cognitive capacity, handling uncertainty, previous experiences, and knowledge 
acquisition, to mention a few issues. In recent years one has begun to take an interest in the 
decision-maker. The avalanche community refers to this as the human factor (I. McCammon, 
2009). Human factors are now an integrated part of many avalanche education initiatives e.g., 
(DNT, 2012; Johnson et al., 2020; Studeregger, 2016). Currently, the main focus in the 
human factors part of avalanche education is on learning about typical errors in judgment and 
group dynamics. Repeating errors have been identified by analysing avalanche accident 
reports and are referred to as heuristic traps, cognitive shortcuts used in decision-making that 




Kahneman's heuristics-and-bias work, who argued that the use of frameworks reducing 
cognitive effort could lead to negative outcomes (Tversky & Kahneman, 1972). However, in 
many real-world situations, heuristics support decision-makers in arriving at satisficing 
solutions, the focus of the fast-and-frugal-heuristics approach. From this perspective, the 
heuristics-and-bias approach's main problem is that it compares people's decisions and the 
predictions of "rational" decisions defined by logic or statistical models (Gigerenzer & 
Gaissmaier, 2011). Instead, when studying how people ideally should make decisions, one 
should consider how people are able to make decisions. A wide range of studies has 
researched fast and frugal heuristics from this perspective (Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011; 
Hertwig et al., 2019). This research has identified fast and frugal heuristics that lead to a 
judgment that equals or even outperforms judgment based on careful analysis. An example is 
a study on emergency medicine. A fast-and-frugal decision tree asking yes and no questions 
proved to be more accurate in predicting actual heart attacks than the considerably more 
complex alternative based on logistic regression (Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011). Some 
avalanche researchers acknowledge the limitations of the heuristics-and-bias approach, and in 
a recent article on heuristic traps and avalanche education, the authors point out that the 
human factor's role in avalanche decision-making is far too complex to be understood solely 
within the heuristic trap framework (Johnson et al., 2020).  
1.3.11 Decision makers 
In this thesis, different terms are used when referring to those who make decisions in 
avalanche terrain. Thus, there is a need to clarify what is meant by the various terms.  
- Backcountry skiers: people that ski or snowboard in uncontrolled terrain in the 
backcountry, regardless of competence level.  
- Backcountry recreationalists or recreationalists: People that recreate in the 
backcountry. The term includes activities such as skiing, snowboarding, 
snowmobiling, ice-climbing, and snowshoeing. The level of competence regarding 
avalanche decision-making can vary from novice to expert. Thus, when using this 
term, it is not the intention to underestimate this group's competence but separate them 
from those we refer to as experts.  
- Expert/professional: A person that has a large share of his/her daily work in 




and in some cases others, and has done this for many winter seasons. An expert can 
typically be a mountain guide, avalanche forecaster, or professional free skier. 
1.3.12 Avalanche education 
In this section, I give a brief overview of educational formats available to backcountry 
recreationalists. When education is seen in the context of the decision-making environment, 
risk and uncertainty, human factors, available methods, and the other background concepts 
presented, the challenges, opportunities, and limitations of current avalanche education 
become easier to grasp. 
Avalanche courses 
The organization of avalanche education varies from country to country. In both the 
US and Canada, avalanche education seems to be reasonably standardized, probably due to 
the strong position of national avalanche organizations that are also educational institutions 
(AIARE, 2021; CAA, 2021). In Europe, avalanche education varies between each country 
and, in some cases, also within a country. The main course providers are mountaineering 
schools, Alpine clubs, and other outdoor organizations. In most cases, education is linked to 
the preferred decision-making framework of the course provider. In Austria, for example, this 
means that two different methods, which have very different approaches to decision making, 
are taught. The Austrian Alpine club (ÖAV) teaches the Stop or Go method (probabilistic) 
(Larcher, 1999), whereas Naturfreunde teaches the W3 method (analytical) (Studeregger, 
2016). A similar situation is found in Norway. Two different decision-making frameworks, 
the Afterski method (probabilistic) (Brattlien, 2014) and Skikompis (analytical) (Lundberg, 
2018), are presented in books written in Norwegian. Because most Norwegians read English 
well, other methods, such as Avaluator (P. Haegeli, 2010) are available to the Norwegian 
public and have some prevalence. While some schools that offer outdoor training have taught 
the Afterski method, the country's largest avalanche course provider, The Norwegian 
Trekking Association (DNT), and members of the umbrella organization Norsk 
Fjellsportforum (NF) use the approach described in Skikompis.  
In Switzerland, the situation is different. The Swiss core training team of Snow Sport 
Avalanche Accident Prevention (KAT), a national umbrella organisation for avalanche 
education stakeholders, has agreed on and published the leaflet "Caution - Avalanches! " (S. 




education. There would probably be a lot to gain from standardizing and harmonizing 
avalanche assessments nationally like in Switzerland, and internationally too. An exciting 
idea would be if experts from different countries came together to develop best practices. The 
initiatives by mountainsafety.info on avalanche rescue and mountain emergency medicine 
shows that this can be done. An obvious advantage would be the financial savings of 
developing and maintaining only one set of teaching concepts, curriculums, and teaching 
materials. Another advantage is that skiers who got their training from different providers or 
countries would use the same method when skiing together. Differences aside, most 
avalanche courses focus on teaching many of the same basic skills such as trip planning and 
the use of an avalanche forecast, understanding basic avalanche formation, recognize 
avalanche terrain, route finding, safe travel behaviour, and companion rescue. The courses' 
duration is from a few hours to several weeks, depending on the target group and how much 
time the participant is willing to invest in learning the skills. The most common courses for 
recreationalist are weekend courses. Many recreationalists realize that a basic avalanche 
course is not enough and attend other courses on a higher level after gaining some experience.   
Avalanche safety literature 
Another source of knowledge and learning are books. There is a rich selection of 
avalanche books in different languages. The books vary in scope and how thoroughly each 
topic is treated, depending on the audience they address e.g., (D. McClung & Schaerer, 2006; 
O'bannon, 2012; Tremper, 2001). While some of the books primarily convey avalanche 
knowledge, some also include presentations of specific decision-making frameworks e.g., 
(Brattlien, 2014; Engler, 2001; S. Harvey et al., 2012; Munter, 1997). Interestingly, even 
though the books present decision-making frameworks that differ in overall approach 
(probabilistic or analytical), they present more or less the same avalanche fundamentals. It is 
also interesting to note that human factors have gained significantly more attention in books 
published in recent years.  
Internet 
Books are not the only source of information and knowledge. Many backcountry 
recreationalists educate themselves using various sources on the internet. There is a rich 
selection of both articles and videos that explain anything from search and rescue to near-




avalanche forecast and its supplementary material. Another knowledge source is avalanche-
specific podcasts, such as the Norwegian Skredpodden or the English-speaking The avalanche 
Hour. During the corona pandemic, the number of online avalanche seminars has increased 
dramatically and become very popular. In addition, there are various online avalanche forums 
where one can ask questions and discuss various topics. For many, it is more natural to seek 
knowledge on the internet than to immerse themselves in a book. 
E-learning 
The latest addition to the strain of avalanche teaching methods is e-learning. Even 
though e-learning has been around for a few years, it is still in the experimental and 
developmental stage. Technological development has been rapid, and probably the 
possibilities in that type of learning will develop further in the coming years. The most 
elaborate and comprehensive online tool currently is Whiterisk, developed at the WSL Swiss 
Institute for Snow and Avalanche Research SLF. Other less-comprehensive solutions also 
exist, such as Avysavvy by Avalanche Canada and the KBYG (Know Before You Go) 
avalanche awareness program developed by Utah Avalanche Center. The potential of this 
form of learning in avalanches has not been sufficiently investigated. However, studies from 
other disciplines suggest that a combination of traditional field-based training and e-learning 
is beneficial. Indeed, several studies show that hazard perception skills improve significantly 
using both field-based and video-based training methods (Kuiken & Twisk, 2001). Computer-
based scenario training would allow the students to learn to recognize and assess critical cues 
and repeatedly test their abilities without risk exposure. Students also benefit from this type of 
learning by improving knowledge retention (Helsdingen, van Gog, & van Merriënboer, 2011; 
Karpicke & Roediger, 2008). There are some apparent advantages of computer-based 
training. Nevertheless, it cannot replace practical field-based training. It can potentially serve 
as a supplement that complements and compensates for some of the outdoor teaching 
challenges. 
1.3.13 Framing of a message 
Framing is a cognitive bias that could be exploited for avalanche safety, like asking 
“why is it safe?” instead of “why is it dangerous?”. Framing implies how a situation, event, 
object, or problem is described, affects how people respond to or evaluate it. For example, an 
experiment showed that the verb smashed resulted in a higher speed estimate than the verb hit 




(Loftus & Palmer, 1974). The effects of framing are diverse and of interest in many 
disciplines from psychology, economics, political science, and health sciences both from a 
theoretical and applied perspective (Chong & Druckman, 2007; Kuhberger, 1998; Levin, 
Schneider, & Gaeth, 1998; Maule & Villejoubert, 2007). Especially relevant for avalanche 
research are the accounts of framing that highlight attentional processes. These state that a 
frame prompts the cognitive system to direct attentional resources toward a certain 
perspective on the target(s) of judgment while suppressing attention toward alternative 
perspectives (Keren, 2011; Teigen, 2015). For example, when the avalanche forecast predicts 
that the chances for a heavy snowfall are "greater than 60%" it guides attention toward the 
occurrence, whereas a forecast of "less than 60%" guides attention toward the non-occurrence 
of a heavy snowfall. In avalanche warning and when performing an avalanche assessment, the 
term danger is often combined with the terms avalanche, conditions, or terrain. One possible 
reason for this is that it is easier to say that something has some degree of danger than to say 
that something is safe with certainty. The choice of frame may also be influenced by liability 
or ethical issues. In the case of an accident, it may be perceived as more likely to be sued if 
safe is used rather than dangerous. A person may also be more likely to blame her/himself if 
safe was communicated instead of dangerous. Nevertheless, the use of the term danger will 
direct the decision maker's attention during the judgment process and potentially affect his or 
her decision-making. 
2 Objectives and structure 
2.1 Goal and approach 
The overall goal of my research is to contribute to avalanche accident prevention. More 
precisely, this thesis aims to gather more insight into the foundation in avalanche decision-
making, with the intention of improving decision quality. This must not be confused with 
"better" decisions or decision outcomes. In an uncertain environment, the best decision does 
not necessarily lead to a wanted result. Improving decision quality is about increasing our 
chances of good outcomes, not guaranteeing them.  
Initially, the ambition was to develop and test a new decision model with the working 
title “Why is it safe - enough?” (WISE). However, it quickly became clear that the first step 
had to be a study of the current decision basis for avalanche terrain decision-making. 
Understanding the overall approaches (analytical or probabilistic) of existing DMFs and 




decisions is crucial. This forms the background for another field of research and development 
- the improvement of decision quality based on psychological and pedagogical know-how.  
The study of decision-making in avalanche can be divided into the studies of decision 
basis, studies of the decision process (psychological aspects) and studies on decision 
competence. The main focus of this thesis is on the decision basis. However, aspects of 
decision competence and decision process are also studied. 
Table 1 Improving decision quality depends on decision basis, decision competence and the decision process. 
The main focus of this theisis is on decision basis. The elements in bold text are adressed in the different studies. 
1) The study on risk attitude and perception is mentioned, but not included in this thesis.  
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2.2 Research questions 
This thesis addresses the following overarching research question: What is the basis for 
decisions in avalanche terrain? This is split into five broad research questions with sub-
questions that guide the different studies: 
1. What is the decision-basis of existing decision-making frameworks? This research 
question is addressed in chapter 4. 
a. What are the underlying factors in existing decision-making frameworks? 
b. Which of these factors are shared amongst several frameworks? 
c. Which of these factors, and any others are used by experts? 
2. Do experts use existing decision-making frameworks? and which, if any, of the factors 
in these frameworks do they employ? This research question is addressed in chapter 5. 
a. Are avalanche experts familiar with the most commonly used frameworks in 
Europe and North America? 
b. To what extent do experts use these frameworks in their decision-making in 
avalanche terrain? 
c. Do avalanche experts evaluate the same factors as the ones used in the 
frameworks, and how important are these factors in different stages of an 
outing? 
d. Which factors are most commonly used by experts, independent of their 
background? And are these factors regarded as decisive, relevant, or irrelevant 
in the different phases of an outing? 
e. Do the factors used differ between those that have experienced avalanche 
accidents or incidents where they or someone in their group was caught by an 
avalanche and those without any experience of avalanche accidents? 
3. Does avalanche education affect the assessment and judgement of avalanche risk 
factors? This research question is addressed in chapter 6. 
a. Do backcountry recreationalist believe the risk of avalanches can be assessed 




b. Do recreationalist and experts agree which factors are relevant? 
c. How will recreationalists rate how precisely a factor can be assessed?  
d. Does avalanche education and experience influence the ratings? 
4. How do backcountry recreationalists use and understand different avalanche forecast 
elements? This research question is addressed in chapter 7. 
a. Which risk factors are considered as most difficult to assess and manage?  
b. Which elements in the warning are considered as most and least important? 
c. Which elements are easily misunderstood or considered poorly communicated? 
d.  What kind of information and features are missing or ignored by users?    
5. Does the qualitative frame in the question eliciting the risk judgment influence the 
judged safety of scenarios of backcountry skiing in avalanche terrain? This research 
question is addressed in chapter 8. 
2.3 Structure of the thesis 
This dissertation consists of five individual studies contributing with increased 
knowledge on the foundation in avalanche decision-making. Several studies build on findings 
from the other studies, which increases the overall significance of the studies. However, each 
study asks and answers its own research question and is important independently of the 
others. It has been important to make the individual studies available to the relevant groups in 
various ways. Therefore, table 2 contains conference proceedings and popular science articles 











Table 2. The table presents an overview of research questions, structure of the thesis, and associated papers. 
Additional conference proceedings and popular science articles are indicated with the letters a-d.  
Research question Structure of 
the thesis 
Publications, Conference Proceedings, Manuscripts, 
Popular Science Articles 




factors in 10 
most common 
used DMFs  
Paper I: Landrø, M., Pfuhl, G., Engeset, R., Jackson, M., & Hetland, 
A. (2020). Avalanche decision-making frameworks: Classification and 
description of underlying factors. Cold Regions Science and 
Technology, 169, 102903. doi:10.1016/j.coldregions.2019.102903 
Do experts use existing 
decision-making 
frameworks? and which, 
if any, of the factors in 
these frameworks do they 
employ? 
Usage of these 
factors by 
experts 
Paper II: Landrø, M., Hetland, A., Engeset, R., & Pfuhl, G. (2020). 
Avalanche decision-making frameworks: Factors and methods used by 
experts. Cold Regions Science and Technology, 170, 102897. 
doi:10.1016/j.coldregions.2019.102897 
a) Landrø, M., & Pfuhl, G. (2018). Analysis of decision-making 
frameworks for avalanche terrain. Paper presented at the International 
Snow Science Workshop, Innsbruck, Austria. 
b) Landrø, M., & Pfuhl, G. (2018). Wie entscheiden Experten im 
Lawinengelände? Bergundsteigen, 105, 75-80. 
Does avalanche education 
affect the assessment and 





Paper III: Landrø, M., Engeset, R., & Pfuhl, G. (2020). The role of 
avalanche education in assessing and judging avalanche risk factors. 
Submitted to the Journal of Arts and Sport Education 
How do backcountry 







Paper IV: Engeset, R. V., Pfuhl, G., Landrø, M., Mannberg, A., & 
Hetland, A. (2018). Communicating public avalanche warnings – what 
works? Natural Hazards and Earth System Sciences, 18(9), 2537-2559. 
doi:10.5194/nhess-18-2537-2018 
c) Engeset, R., Pfuhl, G., Landrø, M., Mannberg, A., & Hetland, A. 
(2018). Efficacy in communication of avalanche warnings. Paper 
presented at the International Snow Science Workshop, Innsbruck, 
Austria. 
Does the qualitative frame 
in the question eliciting 
the risk judgment 
influence the judged 
safety of scenarios of 






actions   
Paper V: Stephensen, M., Schulze, C., Landrø, M., Hendrikx, J. & 
Hetland, A. (2020). Should I Judge Safety or Danger? Perceived Risk 
Depends on the Question Frame. Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
Applied doi:10.1037/xap0000354 
d) Stephensen, M., Landrø, M., & Hendrikx, J. (2021) Should We 
Judge Danger or Safety in Avalanche Terrain? The Avalanche Journal 
 
In addition to these papers, I contributed to a study on individual characteristics on 
hypothetical terrain choices in my dissertation's early phase. The study resulted in one 
conference paper (ISSW) (Mannberg, Hendrikx, Landrø, & Stefan, 2018a), one article 
published in the Journal of Environmental Psychology (Mannberg, Hendrikx, Landrø, & 
Ahrland, 2018) and a popular science article in the mountain sports magazine Bergundsteigen 




conceptualization, scenario preparation, in addition to reviewing the three manuscripts. 
Thematically the peer-reviewed article from this study belongs to the theme of avalanche 
decision-making. However, it focuses on different aspects of avalanche decision-making than 





3 Methods and data 
Research within the fields of avalanche prevention, avalanche safety, and avalanche 
decision-making frequently uses a quantitative approach, like surveys (Furman, Shooter, & 
Tarlen, 2012; Hallandvik, Andresen, & Aadland, 2017; Sole, 2008), accident data analysis (I. 
McCammon, 2004; Ian McCammon & Hägeli, 2007; Techel et al., 2015; Winkler et al., 
2016) or discrete choice experiments (Furman, Shooter, & Schumann, 2010; P. Haegeli et al., 
2009; Mannberg et al., 2020; Mannberg, Hendrikx, Landrø, & Ahrland, 2018). Accident data 
analysis as discussed later, is a post-hoc analysis allowing some inference about when, where 
and who had an accident but not about the decision process itself. Discrete choice 
experiments, on the other hand, may lack ecological validity as they are done in the 
laboratory. Like other environments (e.g., traffic safety), avalanche terrain presents practical, 
ethical, and theoretical challenges to implementing field studies (Crandall, Klein, & Hoffman, 
2006; L. Maguire & Percival, 2018). 
Surveys also have shortcomings, but are an affordable, effective method of reaching out 
too many people. Social media, blogs, podcasts, and backcountry related websites have 
proven useful in distributing surveys to relevant groups. Those who participate in these 
surveys must be familiar with the activity being studied. Thus, one cannot use e.g., a random 
selection of undergraduate students nor a paid sample recruited via Amazon Mechanical Turk 
or a similar platform. Although some participants may be inexperienced from an avalanche 
expert's perspective, they are "insiders" who have some relevant backcountry experience. 
However, a criticism of using surveys is that it primarily attracts very engaged participants, 
resulting in a skewed selection (P. Haegeli, Strong-Cvetich, & Haider, 2012). To a certain 
extent, this can be counteracted by targeting different user groups directly, such as 
participants of entry-level avalanche courses.  
Field campaigns like interviewing skiers in the backcountry, avoid some of the problems 
of bias in surveys and have been used in several studies, e.g., (Mersch et al., 2007; Nichols, 
Hawley, Smith, Wheeler, & McIntosh, 2018; Procter et al., 2014; Silverton, McIntosh, & 
Kim, 2007, 2009). Nevertheless, there is still a danger of getting a somewhat skewed 
selection because different trips appeal to different groups of skiers. Some mountains have 
characteristics that make them popular and frequently visited by many people, while at the 
same time becoming less attractive to others. The least laborious will be to seek out popular 




kind of terrain. The challenge is balancing the need to get enough data to run statistical 
analyses against the need to gather a representative sample.  
Avalanche accidents are mainly studied using quantitative methods. Accident data can 
serve as a useful source of information to understand where and when accidents occur, who is 
involved, and the causes of an accident. Based on accident data, annual and multi-year 
statistics reveal patterns and trends that can be used in avalanche prevention (Mair & Nairz, 
2010; Techel, Jarry, et al., 2016; Techel & Winkler, 2015; Winkler et al., 2016). Also, 
repeating decision errors can be identified by analysing avalanche accident reports. These 
errors are referred to as heuristic traps, cognitive shortcuts used in decision-making that lead 
to accidents (I. McCammon, 2004, 2009). Although accident data can be very useful, there 
are inherent biases in the data, including base rate fallacy/neglect (unknown overall 
population frequencies), sampling bias (only reported accidents), analysis bias (variables 
change over time), and hindsight bias (available information) (Johnson et al., 2020). One 
problem is that these biases are neglected in risk calculations, when designing DMFs (except 
QRM/skitourenguru.ch), and in avalanche risk communication. Recently, attempts have been 
made to understand travel behaviour and actual terrain usage better (Saly, Hendrikx, 
Birkeland, Challender, & Johnson, 2020; Sterchi, Haegeli, & Mair, 2019; Sykes, Hendrikx, 
Johnson, & Birkeland, 2020). As important as these efforts are, the problems of accident data 
bias persist in the foreseeable future. 
An alternative to the quantitative approach of surveys and avalanche accident data in 
studying avalanche decision-making would be the qualitative approach of interviews and 
focus groups. An interview is well suited to bring out the meaning of people's experiences and 
reveal their experiences and knowledge (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2017). The method is widely 
used in other disciplines, but not so common within avalanche research. However, there are 
some examples. In her study of expert decision-making, Adams used interviews and focus 
groups (Adams, 2005b), and McCammon and colleagues used a mixed-method approach, 
including focus groups and interviews, when studying out-of-bounds avalanche awareness (I. 
Mccammon, Haegeli, & Gunn, 2008). Similarly, Zweifel used a mixed-method design, with 
online survey, intercept surveys, social network data and group interviews in his study of 
group decision-making (Zweifel, 2015). Another interesting study closely related to avalanche 
decision-making is Laura Maguire and Jesse Percival's study on the cognitive work of 




semi-structured interviews and artifact analysis; the tools - both technological and analogue, 
used for avalanche forecasting.  
In the following sections, I discuss the applied methods of the five studies in this thesis. 
A complementary explanation of each study's methodology is to be found in the publications 
(chapter 4-8). 
3.1 Methodological design  
The purpose of my thesis is to study the basis for decision-making in avalanche terrain. 
This led to five broad research questions and five individual studies (See table 2 for an 
overview of research questions and articles). Each study required independent considerations 
regarding sampling and methods. All but Study I, use a quantitative approach. Please see table 
3 for an overview of each study's content, methods, and publications. 
The use of decision-making frameworks is described in books and taught in avalanche 
courses. The purpose of the frameworks are to structure and help the user make decisions in 
the different phases of an outing. By reviewing literature that presents different DMFs, Study 
I classifies and describes the factors that form the basis of decisions made with these 
frameworks. Additional factors proposed by an expert panel were included in the study. A 
network analysis of factors used in each DMF displays the relationship between the 
frameworks.  
The survey used in Study II addresses the experts, those with the most exposure to 
avalanche terrain. The study aimed to map the experts' knowledge and use of existing 
decision-making frameworks and examine their use and opinion on factors used in these 
frameworks.  
Knowledge enables people to prioritize which information to seek, which cues to assess 
or monitor, and when to decide. Being able to recognize and assess different cues or factors is 
crucial, as is having insight into the limitations of this knowledge. Critics might argue that the 
assessment of factors beyond the most apparent, such as signs of instability and inclination, 
requires training to an extent unrealistic for most people. In Study III, a survey was used to 
test the understanding of avalanche risk factors among recreationalists with varying avalanche 




Avalanche forecasts are a common starting point for trip planning and thus part of the 
decision basis in avalanche decision-making. Study IV is twofold. An online survey targeted 
at avalanche professionals was used to establish an avalanche forecast's intended 
comprehension. The subsequent online study examined the use and understanding of different 
forecast elements among recreationalists with varying competence levels, as compared to the 
intended comprehension.  
The words we use affect our perception of a situation and thus how we make decisions. 
Study V studies the influence of frame selection on risk perception and how it affects actions. 
Using a series of hypothetical scenarios of skiing in avalanche terrain, backcountry skiers 
judged how safe or dangerous each scenario was and indicated whether they would ski the 
scenario. 
Table 3: Overview of the five studies with content, methods, and publications 
 Content Method Paper 
Study I 
Chapter 4 
1) Classification and description of 
avalanche decision-making factors 
2) Additional factors used proposed by 
expert panel 
3) Relationship between the different DMFs 
1) Qualitative: Review of 
existing decision-making 
frameworks, and review 
of factor-specific 
literature 
2) Quantitative: Expert 
panel survey 
3) Quantitative: Network 
analysis 
Landrø, M, Pfuhl, G., 




1) Expert knowledge and use of existing 
decision-making frameworks 
2) Expert use and opinion on factors used in 
decision-making frameworks 
1, 2) Quantitative: Online 
survey - experts 
 





1) The role of avalanche education in 
assessing avalanche risk factors 
1) Quantitative: Live 
demo and survey on 
mobile phone - 
recreationalists 
1) Quantitative: Online 
survey – recreationalists  
1) Quantitative: Online 
survey - experts 








1) Establish the intended comprehension of 
the avalanche warning 
2) The use and understanding of different 
avalanche forecast elements 
1) Quantitative: Online 
survey - expert panel  
2) Quantitative: Online 
survey– recreationalists 
R. Engeset, G. Pfuhl, M. 






1) The effect of choice of frame on 
perceived risk and behaviour decisions 
1) Quantitative: Live 
demo and survey on 
mobile phone – 
recreationalists 
1) Quantitative: Online 
survey – recreationalists 
Stephensen, Schulze, Landrø, 
Hendrikx & Hetland, A. 2020 
 
 
3.2 Data sets and analysis 
3.2.1 Data for study I 
Different DMFs have been developed to aid the decision-making process. When used, 
these DMFs constitute the decision basis for avalanche decision-making. Study I focus on ten 
widely used DMFs. These are; 3×3 and the Reduction method (Munter, 1997), Stop or go 
(Larcher, 1999), Snow-card (Engler, 2001), Graphic reduction method (S. Harvey et al., 
2012), Afterski method (Brattlien, 2014), NivoTest (Bolognesi, 2000), ALPTRUTh (I.  
McCammon, 2006), Avaluator 2.0 (P. Haegeli, 2010), and Systematic snowcover diagnosis 
(G. Kronthaler, 2003). Other DMFs or newer versions of the included ones may exist. 
However, we have sought to use the latest versions and include the most used frameworks. 
One method that could have been relevant, but which was omitted, is the Quantitative 
Reduktionsmethode (QRM) (Schmudlach, Winkler, & Köhler, 2018) used in the trip planning 
portal skitourenguru.ch. The QRM was omitted because it differs conceptually from 
traditional DMFs. The main reason is that it is a trip planning tool and not a DMF that 
implements decision-making in different phases (trip planning, route selection, slope 
specific).  
Previous studies have focused on calculating the prevention values of various DMFs 
(I. McCammon, Haegeli, P., 2004; Uttl et al., 2009; Uttl, McDouall, & Mitchell, 2012; Uttl, 
McDouall, Mitchell, & White, 2012), without going into more detail on the factors that 
constitute the basis for the decision, uncertainty associated with measuring or assessing these 




The frameworks included in Study I are often presented using a plastic-coated card or 
checklist that can be taken on a trip. The factors printed on these cards constitute the basis for 
making the decision. We refer to these as direct factors (e.g., the regional danger level and 
inclination in the DMFs derived from the RM). Most DMFs have some accompanying 
literature. This can be books or leaflets where the DMF is explained, and factors beyond the 
direct factors are presented. We use the term indirect factor when referring to these since they 
can be regarded as part of a framework but do not belong to the direct factors on the cards or 
checklists. We collected the factors included in the checklists, cards, or as described in the 
accompanying literature belonging to the different frameworks. This resulted in 44 different 
factors. Two of these factors stem from the avalanche forecast. An additional five elements 
from the avalanche forecasts were included. Next, we included one factor describing the most 
used stability tests, because in our experience, their use is quite common amongst experts, and 
they are featured in the literature accompanying some of the DMFs. We then conducted a pre-
test on a panel of 10 avalanche experts of different nationalities and professional 
backgrounds. Based on the feedback from the pre-test, we added three additional factors. This 
resulted in 53 factors that are grouped thematically into five categories. Each of the identified 
factors was described and problematized in the light of literature relevant for each factor, such 
as books on snow science and snow science articles. The literature review unveiled each 
DMF's structure and the ideas behind the overall approach to the decision-making process. To 
explore the relationship between the DMFs based on the factors they use, we conducted a 
network analysis. By assigning binary coding as 0=not included and 1=factor included. When 
a factor can be regarded as part of a framework because it is included in accompanying 
literature or is used indirectly, we coded it as 0.5 instead of 1. 
3.2.2 Data for study II 
The mapping and classification of the 53 factors formed the basis for the online survey 
used in Study II. The study aimed to (1) gauge experts' knowledge and use of existing DMFs 
and (2) expert use and opinion on factors used in decision-making frameworks. This resulted 
in a very complex survey studying 10 frameworks, 53 factors in 3 phases. The survey used 
logic to customize the survey, asking only questions regarding methods and factors that were 
relevant to each participant. This helped limit the time it took to respond to the survey. 
Questions about a factor followed the same procedure. Firstly, we asked if a factor is part of 
the respondent's decision-making in avalanche terrain. If yes, we asked in which phase 




importance. To reduce a possible priming effect, we asked the experts about the use and 
importance of all the factors in a randomized manner, before asking questions on knowledge 
and actual use of existing DMFs. The survey was pre-tested on 10 participants. Based on their 
feedback, we improved the clarity of questions, workflow, and translations. The survey was 
made available in Norwegian, English, and German, providing the avalanche terminology in 
native language. To ensure a thorough evaluation of the different methods and factors, we 
purposefully recruited different expert groups in several countries who differ in their 
traditions and approaches regarding decision-making in avalanche terrain. The participants 
were recruited among experts associated with the European Avalanche Warning Services 
(EAWS) or among professional mountain guides (IFMGA), ski guides, mountain guide 
instructors, and avalanche educators from Europe and North America. Through personal 
friendship, we recruited some professional free skiers. We also snowballed from established 
contacts. All but the Canadian respondents, who were invited and encouraged by the 
Association of Canadian Mountain Guides, received a personal invitation to participate. We 
only invited persons who were thought to be on the highest level, the expert stage, according 
to the five-stage phenomenological model of skill acquisition (Dreyfus and Dreyfus, 2005). 
121 participants visited the survey. Of those, 100 completed over 90% of the survey. Of those 
100 participants, ten were female and 89 men. The sample was equally divided between 
respondents from Scandinavia (n=32), the German-speaking part of the Alps (n=32), and 
North America (n=35). On average, the respondents had 28.2 years of experience in 
backcountry skiing, ranging from 8 to 52 years, spent 50 days backcountry skiing per season, 
of which 73% were in avalanche terrain. 
3.2.3 Data for study III 
In study III we tested the understanding of avalanche risk factors among backcountry 
recreationalists. Ideally, risk assessments should be based on relevant factors that can be 
precisely assessed. If a factor is misjudged, the entire risk assessment might be distorted. We 
had two groups of participants in our 
study. Group one included attendees at 
three avalanche seminars organized in 
a collaboration between the NAWS 
and the Center for Avalanche Research 
and Education (CARE). In the first 
seminar, eight factors were tested, and 
Figure 2 Participants the avalanche seminar at Chateau Neuf 




237 people completed the survey. In the second and third seminars, eleven factors were 
tested, and 352 completed the survey. The second group was recruited from the CARE-
research panel, and 630 participants answered an online version of the eleven-factor survey. 
The results from the two groups of recreationalists were compared with the data on expert use 
and opinion on factors used in decision-making frameworks from Study II. The survey 
consisted of questions regarding a selection of factors identified in Study I. For each factor, 
we asked how precise the respondent thinks she or he can assess the factor and how important 
the factor is for a person's avalanche risk assessment. The answer options for precision were: 
1 = not very precisely, 2 = fairly precisely, 3 = very precisely. The answer options for 
relevance were: 1 = insignificant, 2 = relevant, 3 = decisive. I don't know this factor was also 
possible to choose. Participants answered either the question about precision first and the 
relevance question secondly, or vice versa. We asked four questions measuring aleatory or 
epistemic uncertainty, e.g., whether avalanches are regarded as a random event or become 
predictable with more knowledge, respectively (Ulkumen et al., 2016). Finally, we asked 
about 1) their level of avalanche training (range: 0 = no avalanche training to 6 = expert level 
training); 2) skiing skills and exposure to backcountry skiing (range: 0 = beginner to 6 = 
expert skills); 3) avalanche accident involvement (answer options: "no avalanche accident 
experience" to "someone I was traveling with died"); and 4) demographic questions, i.e., age, 
gender, years of backcountry skiing, and the average number of backcountry trips during the 
last three season.  
Following two introductory lectures on avalanche safety, the online study link for 
participants (Qualtric software) to access via their internet-connected mobile devices was 
projected on an auditorium screen. Each of the factors was visually displayed on the 
auditorium screen while conducting the survey.  
The online survey was launched on 21st February 2020 and remained open until 6th 
March 2020. Participants were members of the CARE-research panel and were contacted via 
email, explaining the background, intention, and format of the survey. 
Study III included 11 of 53 decision-making factors identified in Study II. The 11 
factors were selected purposely and varied in use in DMFs, importance, and uncertainty 
associated with assessing the factor and overall factor category. Thus, the factors set different 
requirements for the competence of the user. Most likely, there are some differences in self-




to perform tests outdoors. It would have been difficult or impossible to test an equivalent 
number of participants outdoors, and thus we would have missed the variation in educational 
background and experience, which was the main point of the study. For details on data 
preparation and analysis see original paper.  
3.2.4 Data for study IV 
 
Previous studies suggest that avalanche forecasts are used extensively in trip planning 
and have a relatively strong influence on people's decisions (Furman et al., 2010; Hallandvik 
et al., 2017; Marengo, Monaci, & Miceli, 2017). Still, no evaluation concerning how 
efficiently the content is communicated and understood has been done to date. To manage 
avalanche risk successfully, it is fundamental that the content is understood and translated 
into practice by a wide range of different user groups. Along with any local knowledge, 
information from maps, guidebooks, weather forecasts, and the group's composition, the 
avalanche forecast forms part of the basis for avalanche decision-making.  
The data in this study comes from two online surveys conducted during the autumn of 
2017. The purpose of the expert survey was to establish an avalanche forecasts intended 
comprehension. We wanted to identify key information elements and define sets of 
behavioural implications at different avalanche danger scenarios. To ensure that the 
operationalization was valid, we used a relatively large (n=110) and heterogeneous group of 
avalanche experts (mainly professional avalanche observers and forecasters). Each expert was 
randomly exposed to one out of four alternative ways to present the forecast for each danger 
level. We then asked the experts to rate how well the danger was communicated in the 
example, on a scale from 0 to 10. Next, the experts were asked to identify key information 
elements and behavioural implications of the avalanche forecast. We were specifically 
interested in identifying the most important message that the forecast aimed to communicate. 
The expert answers were used to allocate weights to the different behavioural implications 
and establish a communication effectiveness score. 
The second survey intended to test how well non-expert users understood the NAWS 
message and therefore targeted recreational users of the NAWS. Participants were recruited 
via social media, NAWS web page - varsom.no, and different web pages addressing 
backcountry recreationalists. In addition, the Norwegian Hiking Association (DNT) and the 
Norwegian association of snow scooter clubs (Skuterklubbenes fellesråd) distributed the 
survey to their members. The survey was distributed to different backcountry recreationalist 




was done to counteract the survey being answered by one particular group of interested and 
committed people.   
A total of 485 respondents answered the user survey. Not all respondents answered 
questions in all sections, leaving 361 respondents to analyse avalanche warning, 222 
respondents for analysis of text versus symbols and pictures, and 177 respondents to analyse 
comprehension. The lower number of user respondents completing the entire survey reflects a 
common challenge in online surveys to engage participants enough to answer complex and 
time-consuming questions.  
The goal of the study was to investigate the use and understanding of different 
avalanche forecast elements. Because the forecast is part of the basis for decisions in 
avalanche terrain, it is fundamental that the content is understood. If the goal had been to 
study actual behaviour after reading an avalanche forecast, direct observation would be a 
valuable methodological approach.  
3.2.5 Data for study V 
Across six experiments (n=1599), we tested how risk perceptions and decisions are 
influenced by the qualitative frame of the question that elicits the risk judgment (e.g., the 
question frame). Using a series of hypothetical scenarios involving backcountry skiing in 
avalanche terrain, participants judged either how safe or how dangerous each scenario was 
and indicated whether they would ski the scenario. Each of the six experiments was 
conducted during a public seminar on safety and decision-making for backcountry skiers in 
avalanche terrain, with the seminar audience members as participants. 
 
Figure 2 Left picture: Example of dangerous scenario. Dangerous scenarios displayed photos with definite 
evidence of danger, a slab avalanche in motion. The icons substantiated the information from the image. Center 
picture: Example of uncertain scenario. Uncertain scenarios lacked definitive evidence of safety or danger 
because the available evidence in the photo and the icons were ambiguous, conflicting and/or highly interpretable. 
Right picture: Example of safe scenario. The photograph and icons in the safe scenarios conveyed sufficient 




 Each seminar was at a different location in Norway during the winter of 2019 to 2020. 
The six seminars' audience members were recreational backcountry skiers with varying 
degrees of experience judging avalanche risk during ski tours in avalanche terrain. 
Consequently, there was a self-selection for experienced participants in all six experiments. 
We did not conduct a priori power analysis to determine target sample size for any 
experiment. The audience size at a seminar determined the possible number of participants in 
the study conducted at that event. We recruited as many participants as possible during each 
seminar and did not continue data collection for the respective experiment beyond that 
seminar, but otherwise had no control over each study's final sample size. We set a minimum 
sample size for each experiment of approximately 60% of the anticipated audience size for 
that seminar. Participation exceeded 60% of the actual audience size for all six experiments, 
and we met the estimated minimum number of participants for experiment 1 to 5. Although 
more than 60% of the audience participated in experiment 6, we overestimated the expected 
audience size and did not meet the minimum number of expected participants. All six studies 
used the same experimental design, measures, and procedures. We used a between-subject 
design with two experimental conditions—the Safe Group or the Danger Group—for the 
qualitative attribute that framed the risk judgments. Following two introductory lectures on 
avalanche safety, the online study link for participants to access via their internet-connected 
mobile devices was projected on an auditorium screen. Upon accessing the study, participants 
were randomly assigned by the software to one of the two experimental conditions after 
indicating their informed consent to participate. 
Participants in experiment 1 to 4 judged six uncertain scenarios. We used the same six 
uncertain scenarios for all four experiments, changing their order of presentation between 
studies to account for any possible order effect. Participants in experiment 5 and 6 judged ten 
scenarios: four scenarios of uncertain risk, three safe scenarios, and three dangerous 
scenarios. We used the same set of ten scenarios for both experiments. The four uncertain 
scenarios used in experiment 5 and 6 were selected from among the six uncertain scenarios 
previously used in experiment 1 to 4. The three safe scenarios and the three dangerous 
scenarios used in experiment 5 and 6 were new. We anticipated the possibility of an effect 
from the order in which the categories of scenarios were judged. We therefore reversed the 
order of presentation between experiment 5 and 6. In experiment 5, we first presented the 
three dangerous scenarios followed by the four uncertain scenarios, and lastly the three safe 




scenarios, and finally the three dangerous scenarios. Although we reversed the order of the 
scenario categories in experiment 6, the order of the scenarios within each category was the 
same in both experiments.  
The scenarios were sequentially projected onto the auditorium screen for all 
participants in the audience to see. All questions were displayed exclusively in Qualtrics 
(survey software) on participants’ personal mobile devices. Participants in the Safe Group 
judged the scenarios by answering the question “How safe is it?” responding on a 7-point 
scale labeled “Not at all safe” and “Completely safe” at the extreme points. Participants in the 
Danger Group judged the same scenarios by answering the question “How dangerous is it?” 
responding on a 7-point scale labeled “Not at all dangerous” and “Completely dangerous” at 
the extreme points. Upon completing each risk judgment, participants in both experimental 
groups were asked the question “Would you ski this slope?” with the three response options 
“No”, “I cannot say” or “Yes”. Participants had approximately one minute per scenario to 
answer the risk judgment and the behaviour intention questions before the next scenario was 
projected. Participants were instructed not to discuss with their neighbours during the study 
and the seminar leaders confirmed that all auditoriums were silent during data collection. 
For this study we developed three categories of scenarios: scenarios of uncertain risk, 
safe scenarios, and dangerous scenarios. I selected photographs from my personal library and 
assigned icons to those photographs to create scenarios of differing risk level. The 
combination of visual evidence in the photograph and the information conveyed by the icons 
established the objective risk level of each scenario. 
The objective uncertainty was independently confirmed by a second avalanche expert. 
Ideally, we could have established a gold standard by asking a group of experts to evaluate 
and rate each scenario. Unfortunately, there was no time to conduct such an expert panel 
assessment before the avalanche seminars where the survey was conducted. The possibility of 
data collection opened up unexpectedly, and the scenarios had to be created relatively 
quickly. This could, of course, have been done afterward, but the results showed that the 
participants did not have problems distinguishing between safe, unsafe, and dangerous 
scenarios. Indeed, uncertainty was not a requirement for the framing effect. Therefore the 
need to involve one expert panel was not present. The dangerous and safe scenarios were 
deliberately made very clear and conveyed sufficient evidence to ascertain the scenario's 




evidence of danger, a slab avalanche in motion, and the icons substantiated the information 
from the image. Similarly, in the safe scenarios, the stated slope inclination is low, 
respectively 27o, 25o, and 30o. Supplemented with cues shown in the picture (e.g., forest 
density, snow on trees, no runout zone), the scenarios are objectively safe because all the 
evidence aligns to indicate that an avalanche is extremely unlikely. In contrast, the uncertain 
scenarios lacked definitive evidence of safety or danger because the available evidence in the 
photo and the icons were ambiguous, conflicting, and/or highly interpretable. For details on 
data preparation and analysis see original paper.  
4 Study I. Mapping and review of factors used in 
avalanche decision-making frameworks. 
Researchers and avalanche experts have developed a range of avalanche decision-
making frameworks to support decision-making in avalanche terrain and reduce fatalities. 
These frameworks rely on and assess different factors. We collected 44 factors included in the 
checklists, cards, or as described in the accompanying literature belonging to the different 
frameworks. Nine other factors were added based on feedback from pretesting our survey, 
resulting in 53 factors. Each factor is described, and the eventual uncertainty associated with 
measuring or assessing these factors is addressed. Our analysis shows that the factors 
included in the different frameworks range from simple to complex and simplifications of 
complex factors. Some factors are used from a statistical perspective in some frameworks, 
whereas others assess the same factors as a physical factor. There are differences in the 
number, type, and importance of factors amongst existing decision-making frameworks for 
avalanche terrain. The consequences of these differences are: 
• Different DMFs can give conflicting results when it comes to go or no-go decisions 
• Different DMFs pose different demands on user knowledge and competence 
• DMFs differ in ease of use 
• DMFs differ in the level of residual risk they accept 
• DMFs differ in the amount of terrain regarded as accessible under the same conditions 
The frameworks were developed to make informed and ultimately safe decisions but the 




and revisions. By mapping and reviewing the relevant factors in avalanche decision-making 
this study provides a foundation to improve decision quality by improving the decision basis. 
4.1 Contribution of Study I to the present thesis 
Decision-making frameworks rely on and assess different factors. Ultimately the use of 
these factors provides a go or no-go decision in avalanche terrain. The study unveiled each 
method's structure and the ideas behind the overall approach to the decision-making process. 
It also forms the basis for understanding the selection of factors the developers include in 
their frameworks. The network analysis explored the relationship between the DMFs based on 
the factors they use. This study provides the first complete overview and description of all the 
factors used in existing DMFs. This knowledge is a crucial prerequisite to study and improve 
the actual decision process, the next natural step in studying avalanche decision-making and 
improving decision quality. Also, the 53 factors identified in Study I formed the basis for the 
online survey used in Study II. 
4.2 Publication and presentation of study (Study I)  
At the International Snow Science Workshop in Innsbruck (ISSW) in 2018 I got the 
opportunity to give an oral presentation of the results from Study I and II. It was a great 
honour to present in front of such a large and knowledgeable audience. The conference brings 
together researchers and practitioners from around the world to present new knowledge and 
share experiences. What is special about decision-making in avalanche terrain is that it 
matters to all that somehow are concerned with avalanches. Whether one works with snow 
science, studies human factors in decision-making, or works as a ski patroller, all must 
somehow assess avalanche danger and make decisions either at work or in their free time. 
After the presentation, many people contacted me to discuss the findings, provide input, and 
discuss new ideas. I was also invited to publish a popular science article (Landrø & Pfuhl, 
2018) in the mountain sports magazine Bergundsteigen, the conference co-organizer, and 
media partner. The article is attached in the appendix. Since 1998, Cold Regions Science and 
Technology has publishing selected, peer-reviewed contributions at the International Snow 
Science Workshop in a Special Issue. This was also the case for the conference in Innsbruck. 





5 Study II. Expert evaluation of factors in avalanche 
decision-making 
The primary target group of existing DMFs is backcountry recreationalists. Most 
existing frameworks work with simplifications to meet the user's assumed limited experience 
and knowledge. This, though, risks losing the distinction between a factor's relevance in 
different situations and the degree of uncertainty associated with the factor's interpretation. 
Furthermore, simplifications may lead users who have gained some personal experience to 
deviate from the frameworks' original rules and structure. This raises two interesting 
questions: Do the experts, the ones with the most exposure and experiences with decision-
making in avalanche terrain, base their decisions on the same factors as the ones used in the 
frameworks? And are avalanche experts familiar with and use the frameworks?  
We asked 100 experts about their familiarity and usage of the DMFs and their 
underlying factors. We found a large discrepancy between familiarity with and actual use of 
the most commonly used DMFs. Our results show that experts use more factors and 
emphasize other factors than most DMFs do. Indeed, the factors the experts use do not match 
any of the DMFs well, with the agreement ranging from 56% to 73%. In contrast to many 
decision-making frameworks, experts perform snowpack evaluations or stability tests and 
consider the avalanche problem. The experts also pay attention to group skills and safety 
equipment and evaluate the presence or absence of favourable terrain and terrain traps. 
Experts frequently use additional factors not found in the DMFs. In contrast to most 
frameworks that have a probabilistic approach, experts primarily use an analytical one. 
5.1 Contribution of Study II to the present thesis 
Study II gave an expert opinion on which factors are relevant for avalanche risk 
assessment in the different phases of an outing. Thus, providing an overview of factors that 
should be taught in connection with knowledge-based analytical avalanche education and 
included in future analytical DMFs. In contrast to probabilistic DMFs, this would allow the 
avalanche assessments of backcountry skiers to evolve and grow with their experience while 





5.2 Publication and presentation of Study II  
As previously mentioned, the results from Study I were presented in a joint oral 
presentation with Study II at the ISSW 2018 in Innsbruck. The article associated with Study II 
was published in the Special Issue of Cold Regions Science and Technology, issued after the 
conference. A part of Study II concerns the use of elements from the avalanche forecast in the 
different phases of an outing and is of interest to forecasting services worldwide. This resulted 
in me being invited to give an oral presentation during the 20th General Assembly of the 
European Avalanche Warning Services in Oslo, Norway, in June 2019. Other presentations 
addressed end-user needs and decision aids and lay the foundation for fruitful discussions on 
avalanche decision-making. These discussions initiated an ongoing project attempting to log 
actual decision-making in the field.  
Norway hosts a bi-annual Nordic avalanche conference, and in 2019 it was held in 
Voss. The conference offers a wide range of topics but especially attracts people who work 
with avalanche education in various ways. I was given the honour of being the keynote 
speaker on of the conference days. I presented findings from Study II, because they have 
implications for avalanche education in general and avalanche decision-making in particular. 
The presentation ended with an interesting panel debate on avalanche education in Norway, 
where representatives from the largest educational institutions were represented. I find such 
discussions very useful since they contribute to an increased common understanding and 
consensus on avalanche education.  
6 Study III. Avalanche education and the assessment 
of avalanche factors 
The study shows that the ability to assess avalanche risk factors is dependent on and 
improve with education. Further, it shows that the relevance rating of avalanche risk factors 
amongst beginners is similar to that of experts.  
6.1 Contribution of Study III to the present thesis 
Whereas Study II examined expert use and opinion on factors used in existing DMFs, 
Study III included backcountry recreationalists on different levels of competence. The aim 
was to examine the role of education in the assessment of avalanche factors. A factor's 
relevance did not depend on avalanche education. However, education influenced how 




apply analytical, knowledge-based decision-making given the proper education. This allows 
for the development of decision-making tools with an overall approach that has previously 
been reserved for experts.  
6.2 Publication and presentation of study (Study III)  
The paper associated with Study III is submitted to the Journal for Research in Arts and 
Sports Education special issue with the theme: Outdoor life, education, learning and didactics. 
As Study III studies the role of avalanche education on the assessment and judgement of 
avalanche risk factors, and the findings have implications for avalanche education, I believe it 
fits well to this journal.  
Hopefully, I will have the opportunity to present the findings both from this and the other 
studies at the Nordic avalanche conference in autumn 2021 and at ISSW in 2022. All the 
articles are about improving the quality of decision-making, albeit with a slightly different 
focus. These conferences are an excellent opportunity to discuss decision-making quality at 
an overall level and the road ahead for research and education. 
7 Study IV. Avalanche danger communication and 
understanding 
In Study IV, we investigated how efficiently the NAWS forecast's content is 
communicated and understood amongst recreational users. We first asked a panel of experts 
from NAWS to answer the survey and used their answers to establish the avalanche warning's 
intended comprehension. We recruited over 200 recreational users and compared their 
answers to those of the experts for the different communication modes. Because the forecast 
is part of the basis for decisions in avalanche terrain, it is fundamental that the content is 
understood and translated into appropriate practice. We identified elements in the avalanche 
warnings that recreational users perceive to be of greater or lesser importance, are easily 
misunderstood or missing. Our empirical analyses suggest that most users find the warning 
service useful and well suited for their needs. However, the effectiveness of a forecast seems 
to be influenced by the user's competency and the complexity of the scenarios. The testing of 
the effectiveness of different alternatives for communication of level 2 - moderate and level 4 
- high avalanche danger suggested that the avalanche problems communicated more 
effectively than the danger level at lower danger. At the higher danger levels, no significant 




is not enough to convey the intended warning message on lower danger levels. Rather the 
warning should present the avalanche problem with a reasonable level of details. The results 
suggest that leaving out the advice and explanation resulted in lower comprehension at higher 
danger levels. For danger level 2 - moderate, a user's competence mattered when it came to 
the alternatives' rating, but not for danger level 4 - high. Most experts (79 %) and many 
recreational users (65 %) rated the avalanche problem as the most important warning element. 
The danger level was rated as important but somewhat difficult to understand. It is a simple 
numeric value but is determined from relatively complex and subjective factors and is 
probably difficult for users to understand and use. The avalanche danger level is not enough 
for making decisions in avalanche terrain; more detailed information is needed, especially at 
danger levels 2 and 3, which also are the conditions under which most fatalities occur. A 
relatively large share (more than a third) finds it difficult to identify terrain traps and manage 
others in the group, illuminating the need for basic avalanche training. Another finding that 
underscores the need for good and targeted avalanche education is that a considerable share of 
both expert and recreational respondents state that they find it most difficult to assess and 
manage the snow cover. This challenges avalanche warning services to present the avalanche 
problem, snowpack information, and danger description more systematically and 
pedagogically to increase the understanding and improve the users' competence. It should be 
noted that even the experts considered the snow cover as the most difficult factor, suggesting 
that it is complex to manage for users at all levels.  
Based on the findings in this study, NAWS redesigned the avalanche forecast on Varsom.no: 
the communication of the avalanche-prone locations was improved, the display of avalanche 
problems was moved up to just below the main message, the redundancy in information 
between the avalanche problem, snowpack information, and the avalanche danger description 
was reduced. 
7.1 Contribution of Study IV to the present thesis 
Along with any local knowledge, information from maps, guidebooks, weather 
forecasts, and the group's composition, the avalanche forecast forms part of the basis for 
avalanche decision-making. To manage avalanche risk successfully, it is fundamental that the 
forecast content is understood and translated into practice. This study agrees with previous 
research and confirms the forecast's importance and role as the primary source of information 




divide the decision-making process into several phases. It serves as an increasingly fine-
meshed net that allows the user to update and review the decision basis from the previous 
phases. Therefore, the forecast should also be integrated into new methods, as this study 
indicates. Furthermore, the study highlights weaknesses and opportunities for improvements 
in the presentation of some of the forecast elements. The study also showed the need for 
education to use the forecast's various elements as part of the decision basis.  
7.2 Publication of study and contribution to actual changes 
(Study IV) 
The journal Natural Hazards and Earth System Sciences is dedicated to research on 
natural hazards and their consequences. It welcomes research on strategies to reduce the 
impact of natural hazards on society and individuals and has previously published articles on 
avalanche risk management. The results are relevant to avalanche safety and warnings, but it 
is also relevant for communication of risk and warnings of other types of natural hazards. 
Thematically, Study IV fit well in this journal, so the authors chose to publish here.  
As a result of the findings in study IV, the NAWS made visual changes to two essential 
icons used in the forecast (height level and aspect). It also led to a restructuring of the 
forecast's presentation and an increased emphasis on the avalanche problem. The study 
revealed a need for training, especially in terms of basic avalanche knowledge and 
vocabulary. This has led to an investment in training materials, both in writing and short 
films, available on the NAWS web page. 
8 Study V. Perceived risk and question framing 
Framing implies how a situation, event, object, or problem is described, affects how 
people respond to or evaluate it. The fifth study in this thesis presents results from an 
experiment conducted during a series of avalanche awareness seminars. Using a series of 
hypothetical scenarios of skiing in avalanche terrain, backcountry skiers judged how safe or 
dangerous each scenario was and indicated whether they would ski the scenario. This study 
demonstrates that risk judgments framed in terms of safety (How safe is it?) result in more 
cautious, conservative judgments than when framed in terms of danger (How dangerous is 
it?), irrespective of the objective risk of the judged object. These findings advance our 
understanding of the framing effect while illustrating its particular relevance for applied risk 




8.1 Contribution of Study V to the present thesis 
Improving decision quality is not all about the factors included in the assessment, or 
the decision basis as it is referred to in this thesis. It is also about improvement of the decision 
process itself. Framing is a cognitive bias that could be exploited for improving decision 
quality by asking “why is it safe?” instead of “why is it dangerous?” during an assessment. 
The use of the term “safe” will direct the decision makers attention during the assessment and 
potentially affect his or her decision-making. When using an analytical approach in avalanche 
decision-making, the user should be encouraged to ask, "why is it safe?" instead of "why is it 
dangerous?" because it results in more cautious, conservative judgments. Further, asking 
questions about one's own and others' assessments, e.g., "why is it safe?" could also increase 
assessment transparency. The basis for the decisions becomes visible and errors, 
misunderstandings and shortcomings may be discovered. Clues that are overlooked by some 
but not by others can be included in the assessments. It also provides a vehicle for discussing 
the assessments themselves and the level of confidence.  
8.2 Publication and presentation of study (Study V)  
In Study V the judgment task was shaped by the uncertainty of avalanche terrain and 
this research has applied relevance specifically for the field of avalanche safety. However, the 
research also has relevance for a wider audience. Therefore, the study was published in the 
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied. This journal covers research in experimental 
psychology that bridge practically oriented problems and psychological theory.  
Study V was presented as a poster at the Virtual Snow Science Workshop 2020. This 
was an alternative to the originally planned 2020 ISSW in Fernie, Canada. After the 
conference, the authors were invited to write an article on the framing research for the 
Avalanche Journal. This is the official publication of the Canadian Avalanche Association, 
that keeps its members informed about current research, training and products. This was an 
opportunity to reach a relevant audience that can translate this research into practical 
measures. The popular science article in the Avalanche Journal is translated, compressed, and 






9 Discussion  
9.1 The decision basis and beyond 
In avalanche decision-making research, there has been a research gap regarding the 
decision basis. This thesis aims to fill parts of this gap and gather more insight into the 
foundation in avalanche decision-making to improve decision quality. Decision quality is a 
result of decision basis, decision competence, and the actual decision process. The main focus 
of this thesis is on the decision basis. However, aspects of decision competence and decision 
process that have implications for the decision basis are also studied. In addition to the 
research gap, this thesis is motivated by my personal experience of major differences among 
backcountry skiers when assessing avalanche danger. Also, in my experience, existing 
methods are somewhat used in an educational context, but their use is not widespread beyond 
this. Considerable resources are spent developing the frameworks and creating educational 
concepts, but the dealignment between training and practice is worrying. The overarching 
research question in this thesis is: What is the basis for decisions in avalanche terrain? This is 
split into five broad research questions that guide the different studies.  
I started by investigating existing decision-making frameworks. By reviewing literature 
describing the most commonly used DMFs, I identified each frameworks' underlying 
assessment factors. This overview is crucial to understand the structure of existing 
frameworks and makes it possible to compare their decision basis. I followed research 
question 1: What is the decision-basis of existing decision-making frameworks? 44 factors 
were identified. An expert panel provided an additional nine factors commonly used by 
experts, resulting in a total of 53 factors. Each factor was described, and eventual uncertainty 
associated with measuring and assessing the factors was addressed. This study differs from 
previous studies that have focused on calculating prevention values without detailing the 
factors that constitute the basis for the decision or problematizing the choice of an analytical 
or probabilistic approach. The avalanche field is constantly evolving, so are the decision-
making frameworks. When the work on this dissertation started four years ago, I tried to find 
the latest updated versions of all the frameworks. Since then, both new versions of existing 
and completely new ones have been developed (Mersch & Hummel, 2020; Reuter, Semmel, 
Mallon, & Schweizer, 2021; Schmudlach & Köhler, 2021; Semmel & Reuter, 2021; 
Studeregger, 2016), and the frameworks decision basis and overall approach are being 




included in this thesis. However, my impression is that currently in Europe, greater emphasis 
is placed on the analytical approach, especially in the last two phases of an outing, after the 
probabilistic approach has long dominated avalanche decision-making. Another interesting 
development is that consequences are included in the assessment in some of the frameworks 
(S. Harvey, Rhyner, Dürr, & Henny, 2018; Reuter et al., 2021). A whole new addition to the 
strain of frameworks is the AIARE Risk Management Framework, which includes both 
education and evaluation in its different phases (AIARE, 2021). Another development that 
has gained momentum due to technological innovation and computing power is trip planning 
tools such as skitourenguru.ch, which will be discussed in section 9.3.  
After mapping the frameworks and identifying their underlying factors, it was paramount 
to study the decision basis of experts. The second research question guided this study: Do 
experts use existing decision-making frameworks? And which, if any, of the factors in these 
frameworks do they employ? The study revealed a large discrepancy between familiarity with 
and actual use of the most commonly used DMFs. It also showed that experts use more 
factors and emphasize other factors than most DMFs do and primarily use knowledge-based 
analytical decision-making. An alternative approach to the chosen use of an online survey 
could be direct observation or interviews. Observing people's decision process, subsequent 
actions - witnessing outcomes - would pose practical, theoretical, and ethical challenges 
(Crandall et al., 2006; L. Maguire & Percival, 2018). Focusing on the practical and theoretical 
aspects, it would require some participant decision-log or in-situ interview since it is 
impossible to observe all the factors included in the decision process and their significance in 
the given situation. This, in turn, would require each participant to be observed in many 
different situations to cover the spectrum of different avalanche conditions. The workload to 
study the necessary sample would be prohibitive. An alternative would be interviews. Mark 
A. Burgman, recognized for studying expert decision-making within different fields of 
expertise states: “Face-to-face elicitation is effective if the number of questions is modest, 
usually no more than about 20-30, and the expert is available for the better part of the day." 
(Burgman, 2016, p. 104). Neither part is the case in this study. It is more effective to 
distribute questions and give people time to think about answers and reflect on questions on 
the basis of real-life situations. Many of the experts in our study found the task challenging 
still interesting because it forced them to reflect upon their decision-making basis. It would 




direct observation with this number of participants, living in different countries, varying in 
educational background, and belonging to different avalanche decision-making "cultures". 
The study aimed to investigate the knowledge and use of existing DMFs and the use 
and importance of their underlying factors amongst a purposefully selected group of experts. 
The study of the psychological aspects of decision-making requires separate studies.  
After establishing differences between existing frameworks and experts' decision 
basis, the natural next step was to explore the possibilities of using a similar approach to that 
of the experts amongst backcountry skiers with varying competence. We investigated this by 
asking: Does avalanche education affect the assessment and judgement of avalanche risk 
factors? We found that the ability to assess avalanche risk factors is dependent on and 
improved with education. Further, the study shows that the relevance rating of avalanche risk 
factors amongst beginners is similar to that of experts. This implies that even non-experts 
could apply analytical, knowledge-based decision-making given the right education. The 
factors that were used in this study were selected purposely and set different requirements for 
the competence of the user. Probably there are differences in self-reported and actual in-field 
use and understanding of a factor. To clarify this, we would have to perform tests outdoors. It 
would have been nearly impossible to test an equivalent number of participants with varied 
educational backgrounds outdoors. The study does not try to show the difference between 
own reported and actual knowledge. On the other hand, the findings show that there is a 
potential for teaching something previously been thought to have been reserved for experts. 
The avalanche forecast is a valuable source of information and represents an element 
in the decision basis.  The third research question: How do backcountry recreationalists use 
and understand different avalanche forecast elements? guided the fourth study. A survey was 
used to obtain answers from an expert panel and recreational users and compare their 
understanding of the forecast. If the goal had been to study actual behaviour after reading an 
avalanche forecast, direct observation would be a valuable methodological approach.  
The analysis showed that the forecast meets the needs of the end-user. However, 
competency and scenario complexity influence the effectiveness of the forecast. Based on the 
study's findings, the NAWS made changes to the forecast to provide the best possible basis 
for further assessments out in the field. The study confirms previous assumptions that the 
warning plays a central role in the decision-making process. As previously discussed, a 




resulting in a skewed selection. However, this can be counteracted by targeting different user 
groups with different levels of competence, as done in this project.  
Understanding the avalanche forecast and the translation into appropriate practice is 
always up for discussion amongst services that want to improve their product. Currently, a 
research collaboration between a cross-border forecasting service in Tirol (AUT), Süd Tirol 
and Trentino (IT) called Euregio and Simon Fraser University (CA) is studying the 
understanding of the forecast by the end-user. This project also asks whether the forecast 
conveys the most important information and investigates if the forecast affects risk 
management in the backcountry. 
Avalanche experts worldwide agree on an increase in the number of backcountry 
recreationalists in recent years, involving new users and user groups. Thus, the need for 
training in the interpretation and use of avalanche warnings is possibly greater than ever. The 
number and diversity amongst users pose some challenges:  
• The content of many avalanche forecasts is primarily tailored toward skiers, not 
communicating optimally to other groups such as ice-climbers, snowshoers, and 
snowmobilers.  
• Not all backcountry skiers feel attracted to traditional avalanche education 
communities, such as alpine clubs, which have been an important mediator of the use 
of avalanche forecasts.  
• Increasingly, both individuals and warning services share avalanche information on 
platforms, such as Instagram and Facebook. These have a format, with extensive use 
of photos and film, communicating in an appealing and easily understandable way, 
somewhat in contrast to the current avalanche forecast format.  
 
To continue being the primary source of avalanche information and provide the best 
decision basis, at least for the trip planning phase, avalanche forecasting services must 
continuously re-evaluate how they convey the information, what this information contains, to 
whom they are communicating and if the receiver understands the message.  
As mentioned, starting on my Ph.D. journey, my ambition was to develop and test a 
new decision model with the working title "Why is it safe - enough?" (WISE). Nevertheless, 
the first step was to study existing DMFs. I was not unfamiliar with existing models in the 
first place since I have both used and taught the use of several of them myself. However, in-
depth insight into the decision-basis and understanding of the structure of existing DMFs 




basis. On the other hand, I have never completely let go of the idea of WISE. As a mountain 
guide, I have used this question to be transparent and open about the decision basis towards 
my clients. Being a part of the research group at CARE, provided an opportunity to test any 
benefits of WISE beyond being transparent. So, the fifth and final study of this thesis was 
guided by the following research question: Does the qualitative frame in the question eliciting 
the risk judgment influence the judged safety of scenarios of backcountry skiing in avalanche 
terrain? Interestingly, we found that risk judgments framed in terms of safety result in more 
cautious, conservative judgments than when framed in terms of danger. Thus, when choosing 
to use an analytical decision-making approach, the user should be encouraged to ask, "why is 
it safe?" because it results in more cautious, conservative judgments. However, the actual in-
field effect of asking this question requires further studies.  
9.2 A broader perspective 
Thematically this thesis belongs to the study of avalanche decision-making. This 
research area can be divided into studies of the decision basis (e.g., the individual factors 
used), studies of the decision process - various psychological aspects of decision-making 
(e.g., heuristics and group dynamics), and studies on how to improve decision-making quality 
in avalanche terrain (e.g., pedagogy and training strategies). Common to four of the studies in 
this thesis is that they examine various aspects of the basis in avalanche-decision making. 
Even if the framing study investigates a cognitive mechanism involved in the decision-
making process, it has practical implications regarding the decision basis.  
With an insight into the decision basis and an understanding of the decision 
environment, the foundation has been laid for future studies of the psychological aspects of 
avalanche decision-making and improvements thereof. The focus on the decision basis has 
been decisive for the literature used to answer the research questions in this thesis.   
The first study was the study of the underlying factors of existing decision-making 
frameworks. The primary source is books and leaflets from the genre of avalanche safety 
literature. Frameworks described in books in German, French, English, and Norwegian were 
included in the study. Other frameworks may exist, but their prevalence is probably limited. It 
was always sought to analyse the latest version of a method. However, there may have been 
new versions that we were unaware of. The literature review unveiled each method's structure 
and the ideas behind the overall approach to the decision-making process. Most importantly, 




identified factors was described and problematized in the light of literature relevant for each 
factor, such as books on snow since and snow science articles. For example, The Avalanche 
Handbook (D. McClung & Schaerer, 2006) was used to illuminate the uncertainty and 
relevance of factor signs of instability and a range of other factors that belong to snow 
science. Another example is factors belonging to the avalanche forecast category. These were 
problematized based on articles dealing with the possibilities and limitations of avalanche 
warnings i.e., (Müller, 2016; Nairz, 2010; Techel, Dürr, et al., 2016). The second study builds 
on the work in the first study and is based on the same on the same literature.  
In the third study of the thesis, relevant literature stems from fields of snow science and 
avalanche safety. However, when discussing the implications of the results, literature within 
decision psychology and learning was highly relevant e.g., (Helsdingen et al., 2011; Karpicke 
& Roediger, 2008; Gary Klein & Borders, 2016; Kuiken & Twisk, 2001).  
The fourth study included literature on risk communication and literature that addresses 
different aspects of the avalanche forecast. The avalanche warning specific literature was 
chosen to understand the possibilities and limitations of the actual warning. When combined 
with the literature on risk communication, it formed the basis for interpreting the survey 
results and developing the specific changes made to the NAWS forecast.  
The literature used in Study V is thematically divided into snow science, avalanche 
safety, and a comprehensive selection of literature regarding various aspects of framing. 
Especially relevant in this context are the articles on evidence sampling in relation to 
reference points.  
These five studies have contributed to insight into the decision basis part of avalanche 
decision-making research. The next natural step is to use this insight to study the decision-
making process and improve decision quality. There is little disagreement that avalanches are 
complex phenomena. I have always thought so too, which is one reason what makes it 
interesting to study. Through the study of the decision basis, I have delved into this 
complexity and gained an understanding of what the various aspects entail. On the one hand, 
one has all the factors that can be assessed and their complex interaction. Not a single factor 
alone shapes the avalanche risk, and not every factor is relevant in every situation, and there is 
uncertainty associated with their assessment. This is at the core of it being a complex 




dangerous to learn from experience due to the wicked learning environment. This almost 
demotivating complexity and the uncertainty it entails motivated me to study decision-making 
research within other domains. The intention was to see if there is research from which 
avalanche decision-making can benefit. The study of decision-making literature from other 
domains enables me to see the decision basis research in a larger context. It also provides a 
good starting point for future studies and improvements of avalanche decision-making. 
Without listing all relevant literature, there are some articles and books that appear to be 
particularly relevant and that have shaped my thoughts regarding the improvement of 
avalanche decision-making:  
Risk and uncertainty: Ralph Hertwig and colleagues on uncertainty and the adaptive 
toolbox (Hertwig et al., 2019), Mark A. Burgman on uncertainty and expert judgements 
(Burgman, 2016), and Ulkumen with colleagues on the dimensions of uncertainty. Kozyreva 
and Hertwig on uncertainty and ecological rationality (Kozyreva & Hertwig, 2019) 
Heuristics and reasoning: Tversky and Kahneman's work on heuristics-and-bias (D. 
Kahneman, 2013; Tversky & Kahneman, 1972), Hertwig and colleagues on the heuristic mind 
(Hertwig et al., 2019), Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier on fast-and-frugal-heuristics approach 
(Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011) and Gigerenzer with colleagues on heuristics (Gigerenzer, 
2014; Gigerenzer & Todd, 1999; Hafenbradl, Waeger, Marewski, & Gigerenzer, 2016), and 
Klein and colleagues on anticipatory thinking (G. Klein, Snowden, & Pin, 2011) 
Skill development: Gary Klein and colleagues on training of cognitive skills and the gaining 
of insight  (D. Kahneman, Klein, G., 2009; G. Klein, 2015; Gary Klein & Borders, 2016; 
Phillips, Klein, & Sieck, 2004), Robin Hogarth and colleagues on learning environment (R. 
M. Hogarth et al., 2015) and skill development and intuition (Hertwig, Hogarth, & Lejarraga, 
2018; R. Hogarth, 2010a, 2010b), and Karpice & Roediger, Kuikenen & Twisk, and 
Helsdingen and colleagues on how to improve learning (Helsdingen et al., 2011; Karpicke & 
Roediger, 2008; Kuiken & Twisk, 2001). 
9.3 Quo vadis 
All existing avalanche DMFs are developed with the best intentions – helping people 
to make better decisions. No decision-aid is perfect in every situation. They all have their 




intuitive. There is a lot to be gained from making it easier for people to make better choices, 
especially when they can have serious consequences.  
The Skitourenguru is an online tool that helps backcountry skiers to plan their outings. 
A list of trips is presented based on personal preferences (travel distance, trip difficulty, 
elevation gain). Each trip is assigned a risk level based on the current regional forecasted 
danger level. The trips are presented in a list ordered green (low avalanche risk), orange 
(elevated risk), and red (High avalanche risk). The Skitourenguru has become a popular trip 
planning tool recommended by the Swiss Council for Accident Prevention BFU. User data 
shows that the users predominantly chose green, low-risk trips. By offering a convenient 
solution that requires little effort from the user, it helps the user to select a low-risk option.  
The Skitourenguru is a lot more sophisticated than other risk based DMFs. It uses an 
algorithm that classifies terrain better and more consistently than what is possible for humans. 
Also, it solves the problem of base rate neglect because it includes actual terrain usage (GPS-
tracks) and thus can calculate relative risk. However, the risk-calculations suffer from 
sampling bias, analysis bias, and hindsight bias, like more traditional risk-based approaches.   
The Skitourenguru is undoubtedly an appealing aid to many backcountry 
recreationalists. This and similar tools will evolve and improve parallel to technical 
development. Nevertheless, it is worth reflecting on some negative consequences. The use of 
such tools requires almost nothing of the user. No further information collection or deliberate 
reasoning regarding current conditions is required. The user ends up being unprepared for 
what will meet him or her out in the field: no knowledge of which cues to track or monitor; no 
idea about the distribution of critical weak layer; no insight into local differences that deviate 
from the forecast. This is most worrying because it is an awful starting point for dealing with 
unforeseen situations that typically deviate from what is expected. However, what is most 
provocative is that it builds up under the assumption that people are slaves to their whims, are 
lazy, stupid, and fallible, whereas computers are not. 
In contrast to this view of human limitations in decision-making, there is another 
approach that values different aspects of decision-making competence and has a more positive 
view on human ability: empowerment. The objective is to empower people to make their own 




motivational competencies. An example of fostering such competence is learning the 
necessary skills and to exploit the appropriate heuristics. 
9.4 Heuristics  
When making decisions under various degrees of uncertainty, people often rely on 
heuristics (Gigerenzer & Todd, 1999; Hafenbradl et al., 2016). A heuristic is a simple 
decision rule that allows one to make judgments without integrating all the information 
available. When situations are complex and time is scarce, these simplifications support 
humans coping with their limited capacity to process information.  
One major concern, especially in situations where decisions can have severe 
consequences, is research showing that heuristics can result in biased thinking and errors. 
McCammon showed this in his study of avalanche accidents (I. McCammon, 2004), and there 
is a rich body of research showing this in other domains (D. Kahneman, 2013). This research 
is done from a heuristics-and-bias perspective that focuses on understanding the cognitive 
processes underlying human judgment by observing biases and errors. 
Not all heuristics perform equally well in every environment. Rather, people rely on a set 
of heuristics and choose an adequate one from what is termed the adaptive toolbox. When 
there is a good match between the environment and the heuristic used, it is ecologically 
rational. Hence, when relying on an ecologically rational heuristic, people are able to arrive at 
satisfactory decisions in a short time and based on little information. One heuristic that is used 
by experts in many applied domains is fast-and-frugal decision trees. The use of this heuristic 
ranges from emergency medicine to military decision-making (Banks, Gamblin, & 
Hutchinson, 2020; Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011). Fast-and-frugal decision trees heuristics 
aids decision-making based on the assessment of a small number of cues. Each cue either 
leads to a decision or a continued search. The decision structure of this heuristic agrees well 
with the one used by experts in avalanche decision-making identified in Study II. Together 
with core avalanche factors/cues identified in Study I, it would be possible to design a fast-





10 Conclusions  
This thesis contributes to our understanding of existing decision-making frameworks and 
provides new knowledge about the decision basis and ways to improve decision quality. It 
provides research that can be translated into actionable and practical measures. Moreover, it 
provides a foundation for future avalanche decision-making research intending to improve 
decision quality. More specific, it shows large differences in the number of factors, which 
factors are used and the overall approach to decision-making between the different existing 
frameworks and between the frameworks and expert decision-making. This provides a 
previously non-existing foundation to improve our decision basis. Further, this research 
substantiates that the analytical approach, previously been thought to be reserved for experts, 
could be applied by other user groups given the right education. It also confirms the 
importance of the avalanche forecast and suggests that most users find the warning well suited 
for their needs. Finally, it demonstrates that risk judgments framed in terms of safety result in 
more cautious, conservative judgments than when framed in terms of danger. Thus, framing 
could be exploited in both avalanche risk communication and future decision-making 
frameworks.  
All existing DMFs follow a structure, which is how the user should ideally make 
decisions in the developer's opinion. Future studies on decision-making in avalanche terrain 
should consider how people are able to make decisions.  
Backcountry skiing has become an increasingly popular and important tourist industry. 
This development is linked to an international trend where sports involving risk-exposure 
have become more popular than ever. For the accident figures not to follow the same abrupt 
development, we must facilitate high-quality decision-making amongst those who travel in 
avalanche terrain. This thesis contributes to just that. This thesis is also relevant to other 
application and science domains, where decisions are made under uncertainty and feedback is 
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A B S T R A C T
Snow avalanches are a complex phenomenon and correctly assessing avalanche danger is crucial in order to
avoid accidents. To aid the decision-making process, different decision-making frameworks (DMFs) have been
developed. However, each DMF assesses different factors. We identified 44 factors included in the ten most
commonly used DMFs, supplemented by nine factors regarded as important by avalanche professionals, resulting
in 53 factors. We classify and describe each factor's possible strengths, weaknesses and limitations. Many factors
are shared by the DMFs, but there are differences when it comes to type of factor and emphasis. The number of
factors used by the different DMFs varies from 11 to 31. 81 out of 100 experts who participated in our survey
use>33 factors in their decision-making, and regard other factors as more important than the ones emphasised
in most DMFs. We discuss the usage of the factors and provide recommendations. Our classification and de-
scription of the factors contribute to a better understanding of why the developers of the different DMFs have
included them in their frameworks. This is fundamental for a better understanding of expert use or lack of use of
DMFs, and why some DMFs or single factors are preferred to others.
1. Introduction
1.1. Avalanches and decision making
Snow avalanches are a hazard to people in mountainous regions
around the world (Furset, 2006; Lied and Kristensen, 2003; Techel
et al., 2016a). The victims are, workers, skiers, snowboarders, snow-
mobilers, snowshoers, soldiers, climbers, hikers, mountain guides and
rescuers. The annual fatality rate within Europe and North America is
about 140 (Techel et al., 2016a; Brugger et al., 2007; Boyd et al., 2009).
Between 80% and 90% of fatal accidents amongst backcountry users
were triggered by the victims or someone in their party (Harvey et al.,
2018; MCClung and Schaerer, 2006a; Schweizer and Lütschg, 2000).
Correctly assessing avalanche danger is crucial for avoiding accidents,
and this becomes even more important as the number of people using
mountain areas for recreation increases.
Researchers and avalanche experts have developed a range of ava-
lanche decision-making frameworks (DMFs) to support the decision-
making in avalanche terrain and reduce risk. Some frameworks struc-
ture the decision-making process, whereas others conclude with a go or
no-go decision. However, each DMF assesses different factors in the
decision-making process.
In this article we examine the ten most commonly-used approaches
in Europe and North America. The selection is based on recommended
frameworks from national umbrella organisations such as the Swiss
core training team for avalanche education (www.slf.ch, KAT) or the
Canadian Avalanche Association (CAA), and methods being taught by
mountain guide associations, alpine clubs and educational institutions.
Other accessible methods exist, but those considered here are the ten
most commonly taught and used.
1.2. Objectives
This study is part of a larger research project on decision-making in
avalanche terrain. Here, we present a classification of the assessment
factors, not an analysis of the decision-making process itself. The ob-
jectives are (a) to identify the underlying factors in existing decision-
making frameworks, (b) analyse which of these factors are shared
amongst several frameworks, and (c) assess which of these factors, and
any others are used by experts.
By classifying and describing each factor their possible strengths,
weaknesses and limitations become apparent. Since the aim is to assess
which factors the experts consult at different stages in their decision-
making process, we and an avalanche expert advisory board, identified
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further relevant factors not included in the DMFs, such as different
stability tests and information from the avalanche forecast. Finally, we
asked a panel of one hundred avalanche experts about their use and
opinion on the importance of each factor, presented in detail in the
companion article (Landrø et al., 2019, this issue). These two articles
represent the first step in examining and comparing different DMFs in
this way. Future research will analyse the decision-making process it-
self, amongst experts and backcountry users.
Given the complexity of this material we have chosen to present it in
two accompanying articles. This article provides a classification and
analysis of the factors used in avalanche DMFs and factors used by
experts. A complementary article presents the experts' knowledge and
use of the DMFs and their underlying factors.
1.3. Development of avalanche decision-making frameworks
In 1916, Matthias Zdarsky published his “Elemente der
Lawinenkunde” (“Elements of avalanche knowledge”), stating that
slope angle, molecular strength and the weight of the snow are essential
elements in the release of avalanches (Zdarsky, 1929). This is seen as
the starting point of documented practical knowledge about snow and
avalanches, leading up to today's decision-making frameworks.
By 1930, the fundamental knowledge concerning snow and ava-
lanches was available for backcountry travellers (Höller, 2016). In the
1940s and 50s, the research focus was on layering and snow meta-
morphosis, leading to a snow hardness scale and the first international
Snow Classification in 1954 (Schaefer et al., 1954). In the following
years, snow cover and stability tests, such as Die Norweger Methode
(“the Norwegian method”) by Nils Faarlund (Kellermann, 1990) and
the Compression test (Jamieson, 1999) were developed, thus providing
the important aids for backcountry travellers.
Previously, there was little structure in the evaluation and no de-
cision aids existed. This changed when Swiss mountain guide Werner
Munter introduced the 3× 3 in the 1980s (Munter, 1991), initiating the
development of today's use of a range of different frameworks.
2. Methods and data
2.1. Ten decision-making frameworks used in the study
We focus on ten widely used decision-making frameworks. These
are; The 3× 3 (Munter, 1997), The Reduction Method(Munter, 1997),
Stop or Go (Larcher, 1999), Snow-card (Engler, 2001), The Graphic
Reduction Method (Harvey et al., 2012), The After Ski Method
(Brattlien, 2014), NivoTest (Bolognesi, 2000), ALPTRUTh (McCammon,
2006), The Avaluator 2.0 (Haegeli, 2010a), and The Systematic Snow-
cover Diagnosis (Kronthaler, 2003). A brief description follows of each
of these frameworks.
2.1.1. The 3× 3
The 3×3 (3 filter× 3 criteria) is a structured approach to ava-
lanche evaluation. By use of guided questions this method evaluates
three main factors 1) avalanche conditions, 2) terrain and 3) human
factors. These factors are evaluated across three stages; 1) Regional/trip
planning, 2) local/visible area and 3) zonal/slope specific. The 3× 3 is
an integrated part of the Reduction Method and is often used in com-
bination with other frameworks. It should not be regarded as a DMF
itself, but more as an overarching structure to organise the decision-
making process at different stages.
2.1.2. Reduction method (RM)
The Reduction method (RM) developed by Werner Munter (Munter,
1997) is based on an equation that balances the danger potential
against reduction factors. The danger potential is an expression for the
probability of hitting a weak spot and triggering an avalanche at each
danger level. It is based on a comparison of stability test results
(Rutschblock tests) and danger level. According to Munter's calculations
the danger potential increases exponentially for each danger level. To
reduce risk different safety measures, so-called reduction factors, can be
applied. The values of these reduction factors were calculated using
data from fatal avalanche accidents in Switzerland. The weight of these
factors mirrors Munter's ambition to reduce the amount of avalanche
fatalities by 50% from their 1997 levels – a level that would equal
accidents in hiking or driving a car, according to Munter.
This accepted residual risk is defined by the ratio of danger potential
and the reduction factor. Danger potential is thought to be 2D (D being
the current danger rating), i.e. danger level 3 corresponds to danger
potential 8. The reduction factors (RF) are categorised into three
classes: RF1 slope angle, RF2 slope aspect, elevation and travel fre-
quency, and RF3 group size and management. Within each class, they
have different values, for example, for a slope less than 35o the calcu-
lated RF is 4, whereas for the avoidance of north-facing slopes the RF is
2, and for a small group the RF is 2. The reduction factors are then
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According to Munter, the accepted residual risk should be ≤1. The
RM and 3× 3 are complementary tools that have to be combined to
achieve acceptable residual risk.
Munter (Munter, 2003) later introduced several other simplifica-
tions of the Reduction Method, such as the Elementary Reduction
Method (ERM), to attract novice users. ERM focuses exclusively on
terrain restrictions based on combining danger level and inclination.
2.1.3. Stop or Go (SoG)
Stop or Go (SoG) was introduced by Michael Larcher (Larcher,
1999) that has a framework similar to the RM, and uses Munter's risk
calculations, but omits the mathematical equation that is used in the
RM. The method consists of three components. In check 1, the ERM is
applied. In check 2, Larcher added recognition and assessment of what
is thought to be the five most crucial contributors to avalanche hazard:
new snow, wind-deposited snow, recent avalanches, water saturation
and collapsing weak layers making “whumpf” sounds; followed by the
question:” are the observed conditions a threat to the group?” Check 3
is similar to the 3× 3 method in addition to hazard mitigation mea-
sures, such as transceiver testing and keeping a safe distance of 10m
apart on slopes steeper than 30o when ascending.
2.1.4. Snowcard (SC)
The SnowCard (SC) method is also derived from Munter's original
Reduction Method. The developer, Martin Engler, made a limited sta-
tistical study on avalanche incidents, confirming Munter's findings on
exponential growth of the risk potential from one danger level to the
next. The objective of SC is to determine average risk based on the
danger level provided by the avalanche warning, inclination and a
distinction between “favourable” and “unfavourable” aspects and ele-
vation bands (Engler, 2001).
Decision-making using SC is done in two stages. In the first stage a
graphic version of the ERM showing risk sequences from green to
yellow to red is used. The card has a hologram such that the sequences
change when the card is tilted depending on whether a slope is con-
sidered favourable or unfavourable according to the avalanche forecast.
In the second stage, out in the terrain, SC takes level of competence into
account. Level one (basic) resembles the avalanche danger assessment
done in check 2 in the SoG. In level two (advanced and expert), dif-
ferent parts of the “Factor Check” are used. The “Factor Check” is a
checklist for examining the proposed main factors contributing to
avalanche incidents. It is used to adjust the local danger level, thus
allowing the experienced user more flexibility when it comes to terrain
choice.
In later years SC has become an integrated part of the “Lawinen-
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Mantra” (Avalanche Mantra) that adds a checklist to the original SC: 1)
risk assessment using the SC (as before), 2) Analytic assessment if
practical given current avalanche problem, 3) Take gut feeling and
human factors into account, 4) Evaluate the consequences, 5) Take
sensible safety precautions (Mersch & Behr, 2018).
2.1.5. Graphic reduction method (GRM)
The Graphic Reduction Method (GRM) is another type of reduction
method. In the GRM, a risk-check is performed that combines danger
level and inclination (Harvey et al., 2012). According to the GRM, the
danger level outside the core area (aspect and elevation band given in
the forecast) can be reduced by one level. As in the SC, GRM works with
the concepts of favourable and unfavourable slopes, but other factors
are not taken into account. Also similarly to the SC, the status of the
GRM is reduced in route selection and slope specific decision-making
for the advanced user. The focus is on evaluation of avalanche condi-
tions, terrain and the human aspect. Avalanche patterns, as used in the
avalanche forecast, play an important role (Harvey and Nigg, 2009).
However, no structured approach for evaluating these factors is pro-
vided.
2.1.6. After ski method (ASM)
The Norwegian After Ski Method (ASM) is similar to the GRM. The
difference is a 5° reduction in inclination in relation to danger level
(Brattlien, 2014). The ASM recommends avoiding slopes steeper than
30° at danger level 3 – considerable, compared with 35° in the GRM and
ERM. The inclination reduction is done to achieve a greater risk re-
duction. Using the same data set as the one used in (McCammon and
Hägeli, 2005) the preventative effect of these terrain recommendations
is 93% according to Brattlien (2014).
2.1.7. Nivotest (NT)
The NivoTest is designed for an assessment of the avalanche risk
without using an avalanche forecast. Based on 25 yes/no questions
regarding weather, snowpack, avalanche activity, route and partici-
pants the user can calculate risk for a specific route or terrain
(Bolognesi, 2000). Each of the first 20 questions is weighted based on a
statistical analysis of> 7000 actual cases. The last five questions are
based on the developer's experience. After answering all questions, the
result of the avalanche risk assessment is shown in the form of one of
three icons: smiley face, uncertain face or sad face.
2.1.8. Checklist sum obvious clues ALP TRUTh (AT)
ALP TRUTh (AT) is the acronym for the seven clues included in the
checklist for this method: Avalanche, Loading, Path, Terrain traps,
Rating, Unstable snow, Thaw instability (McCammon, 2006). The user
adds up the number of obvious clues for the slope in question. If two or
fewer obvious clues are observed, normal caution is recommended.
With three or four obvious clues present, extra caution is advised. When
observing five or more obvious clues, skiing is not recommended.
2.1.9. Avaluator 2.0 (A2.0)
As with SC and GRM, the Avaluator 2.0 (A2.0) has a graphic re-
presentation of the estimated risk (green= caution, yellow= extra
caution and red= not recommended). Unlike the different reduction
methods that combine inclination and danger level, this recommenda-
tion is based on an avalanche condition score and a terrain character-
istics score. Each factor that constitutes the avalanche condition and
terrain characteristics is given a weighting value, e.g. signs of in-
stability: +1, Slope steeper than 35°: +2. The user evaluates the dif-
ferent factors and ends up with a score for avalanche conditions and
terrain characteristics. The estimated risk is read from a classic risk
matrix, giving one of the initial three categories (Haegeli, 2010b).
2.1.10. Systematic snow-cover diagnosis (SSD)
The Systematic Snow-cover Diagnosis (SSD) is a purely analytical
framework (Kronthaler, 2003; Kronthaler and Zenke, 2006; Kronthaler,
2019). It uses three steps to come to a decision. Step one: finding the
most prominent weak layer and testing the weak layer - slab combi-
nation using the Small Block Test (SBT). This is followed by an eva-
luation of four weak layer properties (Kronthaler, 2019). The SSD uses
many of the same factors as the threshold sum approach when evalu-
ating snow layer properties. Properties that are regarded as unfavour-
able are: smooth fracture upon light lateral tapping; weak layer is thin
(≤ 3 cm) and consists of large crystals (> 1.25mm); weak layer is
within one metre of the snow surface; the overlying snow is soft. Step
two: Process thinking, consider the processes that led to the weak layer
slab combination observed and distribution of this combination. Step
three: Assessment of the situation using a systematic structure of
questions and YES or NO answers (loose or slab avalanche; natural
release; release by a single skier; release with high additional load; no
weak layer). This leads to an interpretation aid that ends with three
different recommendations regarding cautions (red: avoid, keep dis-
tance to slope, not over 30°; yellow: one-by-one, safety distance; green:
standard measures).
2.1.11. Scope
In our presentation of the different DMFs we have focused on the
key factors, and given a brief review of the frameworks' overall ap-
proaches (analytical or probabilistic), and workflow. The decision-
making process within the frameworks is beyond this scope of this ar-
ticle.
2.2. Reasoning methods to assess avalanche risk
Assessing avalanche risk requires integrating a range of factors
(Table 2) that are often derived from partial observations, that them-
selves are uncertain, and is further impeded by the complexity of the
interaction between the factors. Strictly speaking, neither deductive nor
inductive reasoning is appropriate. Accordingly, reasoning is abductive,
i.e. from incomplete observation one makes a best prediction of the
avalanche risk, related to but not identical with using a heuristic ap-
proach. Abductive reasoning requires deliberate reasoning and is often
more challenging than deductive or inductive reasoning. Indeed, the
frameworks often use elements from the deductive and inductive ap-
proaches to accommodate the abductive approach. To reduce abductive
reasoning and exploit deductive reasoning, Munter's method assesses
the avalanche risk during the different phases of an outing by providing
a set of instructions based on risk calculations. Munter called this ap-
proach probabilistic (Munter, 1997). In McCammon and Hägeli (2005)
terminology, Munter's probabilistic approach corresponds to rule-based
decision-making. (See Fig. 1)
Most DMFs have components from both approaches, i.e. operating
with numerical thresholds and checklists to aid in the decision-making
process (Table 1).
2.3. Direct and indirect factors
The frameworks are often presented by use of a plastic-coated card
or checklist that can be taken on a trip. The factors printed on these
cards constitute the basis for making the decision. We refer to these as
direct factors. Examples are the six avalanche condition factors
(Regional Danger Rating, Persistent Avalanche Problem, Slab
Avalanches, Signs of Instability, Recent Loading, and Critical Warming)
and four terrain characteristics factors (Slope steepness, Terrain Traps,
Slope Shape, Forest Density) printed on the plastic-coated card that
comes with the A2.0.
In addition to the plastic-coated card or checklist, most DMFs have
some accompanying literature. This can be books or leaflets where the
DMF is explained and factors beyond the direct factors are presented.
The leaflet Caution Avalanches! (Harvey et al., 2018) that accompanies
the GRM, is such an example and gives group management and
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snowpack evaluation factors as well as others. We use the term indirect
factor when referring to these since they can be regarded as part of a
framework, but do not belong to the direct factors on the cards or
checklists.
2.4. Data on underlying factors in avalanche decision-making frameworks
We collected the factors included in the checklists, cards or as de-
scribed in the accompanying literature belonging to the different fra-
meworks. This resulted in 44 different factors. Two of these 44 factors
are found in the avalanche forecast, namely the danger level and most
exposed height level and aspect. However, in order to examine whether
experts use the forecast we included five additional elements from the
avalanche forecast; 1) main message, 2) avalanche problem, 3) moun-
tain weather, 4) snowpack information and 5) travel and terrain advice.
Next, we included one factor describing the most used stability tests,
because in our experience, their use is quite common amongst experts
and they are featured in the literature accompanying some of the DMFs.
The factors were then incorporated into a survey and pretested on a
panel of 10 avalanche experts of different nationalities and professional
backgrounds. The participants provided instant feedback via online
video or in person. Based on the feedback from the pretest we added
three additional factors (how snow feels when moving on skis; avalanche
sensitivity to triggering; avalanche type). This resulted in 53 factors that
are grouped thematically into five categories (Table 2).
2.5. Data from expert survey
100 people (including10 women), considered experts according to
Dreyfus & Dreyfus (2005), completed over 90% of the survey. The re-
spondents were from Scandinavia (n=32), the German-speaking part
of the Alps (n=32) and North America (n=35). On average, re-
spondents had 28.2 years of experience in backcountry skiing and spent
50 days backcountry skiing per season of which 73% were in avalanche
terrain. The experts rated the 53 factors in terms of use and importance
(decisive, relevant or irrelevant). Tables 3–7 present how many of the
experts consider each factor as being decisive in their decision-making
in at least one of the three stages. For more details please see the ac-
companying article (Landrø et al., 2019).
3. Results
The mapping resulted in 53 different factors, and the frameworks
include between 11 and 31 factors. Several factors are shared amongst
the frameworks (see Tables 3–7), but differences in type and number of
factors are prevalent. The factors are grouped thematically into five
categories (Table 2), which is also used to structure the presentation
and discussion of the results. Further results from the expert evaluation
are presented in the accompanying article (Landrø et al., 2019).
3.1. Snow and avalanche factors
Category A (Snow and avalanche) factors are indicators of snow
instability and they can be observed in the terrain. In avalanche fore-
casting observations of these factors are divided into three classes; 1)
Fig. 1. Illustration of the overall decision-making process in analytic and probabilistic DMFs.
Table 1
The ten most common avalanche decision frameworks with description of region of origin, approach (terminology from Munter) and number of included factors.
Framework Region Go / no go decision rule # Factors Reference
3x3 Alps (Munter, 1997)
Reduction method (RM) Alps Probabilistic. Calculation 15 (Munter, 1997; Munter, 2009)
After ski method (ASM) Norway Probabilistic 18 (Brattlien, 2014)
Snow-card (SM) Alps Probabilistica 29 (Engler, 2001)
Stop or go (SoG) Alps Probabilistica 31 (Larcher, 1999)
NivoTest (NT) Alps Probabilistic. Adding and weighting of factors 27 (Bolognesi, 2000)
Avaluator 2.0 (A2.0) CA Adding and weighting of factors, probabilistica 27 (Haegeli, 2010a)
Graphic Rreduction method (GRM) Alps Probabilistica 31 (Harvey et al., 2012)
ALPTRUTh (AT) North-America Adding of factors 11 (McCammon, 2006)
Systematic snow-cover diagnosis (SSD) Alps Analytic 27 (Kronthaler, 2003; Kronthaler et al., 2013)
a =Includes elements of analytic/deductive avalanche assessments.
Table 2
Categorisation of factors used in ten avalanche decision frameworks in this
study.
Category Number of factors
A. Snow and avalanche 13
B. Snowpack evaluation and stability test 10
C. Avalanche forecast 7
D. Group and group management 13
E. Terrain 10
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Table 3
Snow and avalanche factors by framework and expert usage.
Direct factor in DMF Indirect factor in DMF # use # decisive as %
Signs of instability SoG, AT, A2.0 RM, ASM, SC, GRM, SSD 73 62 85
Loading of new snow SoG, NT, AT, A2.0 RM, ASM, SC, GRM, SSD 73 54 74
Wind or rain within last 48 h NT, A2.0 RM, ASM, SC, SoG, GRM, AT, SSD 74 53 72
Critical warming AT, A2.0, NT RM, ASM, SC, SoG, GRM, SSD 80 65 81
Signs of slab avalanches within last 48 h SoG, AT, A2.0, NT, GRM RM, ASM, SC, SSD 73 50 68
Presence of persistent or deep persistent slab problem(s) A2.0 RM, ASM, SC, SoG, GRM, NT, SSD 79 66 84
Unusual, infrequently travelled route NT RM, SC, SoG, GRM, SSD 53 18 34
Pillows wind-drifted snow/cornices SoG, NT RM, ASM, SC, GRM, AT, A2.0, SSD 68 54 79
Deep snow RM, ASM, SC, SoG, GRM, NT, AT, A2.0, SSD 67 30 45
How snow feels when moving on skis 78 39 50
Potential avalanche size 70 50 71
Avalanche sensitivity to triggering 77 59 77
Possible avalanche type (loose snow, slab avalanche) 75 52 69
Legend. RM=Reduction Method, ASM=After Ski Method, SC= Snow-card, SoG=Stop or Go, NT=NivoTest, A2.0=Avaluator 2.0, GRM=Graphic Reduction
Method, SSD= Systematic Snow-cover Diagnosis, AT=ALPTRUTh. Last three columns: number of experts stating that they use the factor, state it being a decisive
factor in any of the 3 stages (planning, route, or slope), and the percentage.
Table 4
Snowpack evaluation in DMFs and by experts.
Direct factor in DMF Indirect factor in DMF # use # decisive as %
Hardness of overlaying snow (over weak layer) SSD SC, SoG, GRM 78 23 29
Weak layer distance from snow surface SSD SC, GRM 80 23 29
Weak layer grain type SSD SC, GRM 70 19 27
Hardness difference between layers SSD SC, GRM 38 17 45
Weak layer thickness SSD 62 15 24
Grain size of weak layer SSD 58 17 29
Fracture character SSD A2.0 75 16 21
Test score from stability test(s) SSD GRM, A2.0 38 9 24
Stability tests (CT, ECT, hand shear, little block, PST, Rutschblock, ski cut) SSD (little block) GRM, A2.0 92 11 12
Combination of different elements SSD SC N/A
For abbreviation see Table 3.
Table 5
Avalanche forecast factors by DMF and expert usage.
Direct factor in DMF Indirect factor in DMF # use # decisive in %
Danger level RM, ASM, SC, SoG, GRM, A2.0 AT 66 26 39
Main message SoG 65 21 32
Most exposed height level and aspect RM, SC, SoG, GRM, A2.0 SSD 66 35 53
Avalanche problem(s) A2.0 SoG, GRM, SSD, (NT*) 86 47 55
Mountain weather forecast SC, GRM, A2.0 75 28 37
Snow pack information SC, SoG, GRM, A2.0, SSD 81 30 37
Travel and terrain advice 21 1 5
For abbreviation see Table 3.
Table 6
Group factors and group management by DMF and expert usage.
Direct factor in DMF Indirect factor in DMF # use # decisive in %
Group size (small, large, very large) RM, SoG SC, GRM, NT, SSD 98 65 66
Participants with low technical skills NT ASM, SC, SoG, GRM, SSD 99 69 70
Participants in bad physical shape NT ASM, SC, SoG, GRM 97 63 65
Group not trained in avalanche rescue NT ASM, SoG 99 77 78
Participants with avalanche safety equipment SoG, NT ASM, GRM, A2.0 99 53 54
One-at-a-time exposed – – 75 39 52
Ski at a distance – – 57 21 37
Clear directions / plan on where and how to ski SoG SC, GRM 84 58 69
stopping at safe spots A2.0 ASM, SC, GRM 94 53 56
10m distance from 30° ascending SoG SC, GRM, A2.0, SSD 34 10 29
Safety distance ascending RM, ASM, SC, SoG, GRM, A2.0, SSD 59 17 29
30m distance when descending SoG SC, A2.0, SSD 27 9 33
One-at-a-time from 35° when descending SoG SC, A2.0, SSD 28 7 25
For abbreviations see Table 3.
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Instability factors; 2) Snowpack structure, and 3) Snow and weather
factors at the snow surface, where class 1 factors are the most sig-
nificant indicators of avalanche danger (MCClung and Schaerer,
2006b). Except for the three factors regarding avalanche type, size and
sensitivity to triggering, which are presented at the end, we have
grouped our factors according to this three-class division.
We identified 13 factors in this category, of which four are not part
of any decision-making framework, but have proven to be important in
expert avalanche decision-making (Landrø et al., 2019).
3.1.1. Factor 1: signs of instability
In addition to recent avalanches, other signs of instability such as
collapsing, whumpfs, cracks and drum-like sounds, are easy accessible
information. Signs of instability (class 1) are regarded as direct evi-
dence of snow instability and avalanche danger, and there is little un-
certainty associated with their interpretation (MCClung and Schaerer,
2006a).
3.1.2. Factor 2: loading of new snow
The loading of new snow is directly associated with meteorological
factors (class 3) such as the amount of new snow, precipitation intensity
and wind speed. These related factors are less direct evidence in eval-
uating snow instability (MCClung and Schaerer, 2006a). Loading of
new snow will add extra weight to the existing snowpack, potentially
increasing stress and instability. However, this is again dependent on
the amount of snow, precipitation intensity and wind speed. Its actual
effect concerning instability is also heavily dependent on the stability of
the old snowpack and the snow surface before the loading. The inter-
action of these factors is decisive for factor loading of new snow's re-
levance in avalanche danger assessment. However, the use of this factor
in avalanche decision-making depends on interpretation, and carries
uncertainty.
3.1.3. Factor 3: occurrence of wind or rain within the last 48 h
The evaluation of wind and rain relies on interpretation and is not
direct evidence of snow instability. Wind belongs to class 3 whereas
rain (precipitation type) belongs to class 2. As well as new snow, wind
(snow drift) and rain will also add extra weight to the existing snow-
pack. Rain can weaken bonding within the snowpack thus reducing its
strength and potentially increasing stress and instability.
3.1.4. Factor 4: critical warming
Rapid increases in temperature will affect snow metamorphism,
reduce strength by weakening bonding within the snowpack and in-
crease stress and instability by affecting the continuous downhill mo-
ment of snow called snow creep. When critical warming occurs in
combination with snowfall and wind it is commonly referred to as
“avalanche weather” due to a high likelihood of avalanches under these
conditions. This is also a class 3 factor needing careful interpretation
and is accompanied by uncertainty.
3.1.5. Factor 5: signs of slab avalanches within the last 48 h
Signs of slab avalanches are easy to observe and are direct evidence
of snow instability (class 1). There is little uncertainty associated with
their interpretation. However, the time of release may be very difficult
to determine under certain conditions in some environments. Some
avalanche situations stabilise rather quickly, whilst others last for
weeks, affecting the importance of this factor in each case.
3.1.6. Factor 6: presence of persistent or deep persistent slab problem(s)
Weak layers are a class 2 factor. Persistent weak layers can form at
the snow surface (surface hoar) or in the snowpack and also near the
surface due to a high temperature gradient (1 °C / 10 cm) (facets and
depth hoar). Deep persistent slab problems often involve thick and hard
slabs, and there are often no visible or audible signs of this kind of
instability. There is a lot of uncertainty related to weak layers and
especially to persistent weak layers. It is probably the hardest avalanche
problem to manage in a consistent way, and is sometimes referred to as
an expert trap. Common advice is to be very conservative in terrain
choice. Avalanches that release on these kinds of layers have the po-
tential to be large, cross-terrain barriers and can have multiple slide
paths. Remote triggering and releasing above the trigger are common.
This problem stabilises slowly, if at all, and potentially can last an entire
season. Depending on the conditions that created this layer, it can be
localised at specific elevations and aspects.
3.1.7. Factor 7: unusual, infrequent travelled route
Frequent skiing may have a stabilising effect on the snowpack. If a
slope is skied during or directly after every snowfall, this will affect
bonding between layers, and the distribution and development of weak
layers. This means that the part of the slope that is heavily tracked will
be more stable than adjacent parts that are not tracked or less tracked.
Exceptions to this stabilising effect are snowpacks with deep persistent
weak layers and very wet snowpacks. This factor is approached dif-
ferently amongst the different DMFs. The NT rates unusual, infrequent
travelled route as negative, giving it 1, max 2 points, whereas in several
other DMFs, such as RM, this factor is not rated at all but instead fre-
quently travelled slopes are rated as positive, giving it a reduction
factor of 2 (Munter, 2009; Bolognesi, 2013).
3.1.8. Factor 8: presence of pillows of wind drifted snow or cornices
When snow is transported by wind, rolling and saltation will de-
crease snow crystal size considerably. These small crystals will sinter
and form cohesive snow layers (dense- or soft-cohesive slab) in lee
areas. Pillows of wind-drifted snow and cornices are the result of wind-
transported snow and hence say something about wind strength and
direction. The pillows indicate extra weight on the existing snowpack,
increasing stress and instability to the old snowpack in addition to
potentially being a slab in itself. Cornices indicate wind direction and, if
they collapse, act as an avalanche trigger to the possible unstable slope
below. The evaluation of this factor involves uncertainty and does not
Table 7
Terrain factors by DMF and expert usage.
Category: Terrain factors Direct factor in DMF Indirect factor in DMF # use # decisive in %
5° intervals from 30° RM, ASM, GRM, SC, SoG A2.0 28 17 61
Danger level/slope inclination RM, ASM, GRM, SC, SoG 18 12 67
slope between 34 and 36 degree steep 26 14 54
Discriminating between AT /no AT SSD NT, A2.0 86 61 71
ATES A2.0 72 8 11
Use of favourable terrain formations SoG GRM, A2.0 94 59 63
Avoiding terrain traps AT, A2.0 ASM, SC, GRM 95 59 62
Forest density SoG, AT, A2.0 71 10 14
Convex or unsupported slopes NT, A2.0 SC 83 45 54
Avoiding known avalanche paths AT A2.0 81 19 23
Avoiding exposed routes without protected areas NT GRM 88 41 47
For abbreviation, see Table 3. AT= avalanche terrain.
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provide direct evidence of snow instability. This factor is associated
with the factor loading of new snow (class 3).
3.1.9. Factor 9: deep snow
This factor is an indicator of several danger assessment criteria:
amount of snow available for wind transportation; ability of the
snowpack to support a certain load; avalanche type and potential size;
additional load on the existing snowpack. Like the other class 2 factors,
it requires careful interpretation, is not free of uncertainty and provides
no direct evidence of snow instability.
3.1.10. Factor 10: how snow feels when moving on skis (additional factor,
not part of a DMF)
Observing how snow feels when moving on skis can be an important
source of information. Experts note crystal forms on the surface, surface
roughness, hardness or if the snow is dry, moist or wet, fracture pro-
pagation, amount of new snow and its density, how deep one penetrates
and, possibly most important, changes in surface snow. This informa-
tion can be important in determining avalanche type, potential ava-
lanche size and the likelihood of triggering an avalanche. This factor
belongs to class 3: Meteorological Factors - surface condition (MCClung
and Schaerer, 2006a).
3.1.11. Factor 11: potential avalanche size (additional factor, not part of a
DMF)
Avalanches are classified into five categories according to size; 1-
small, 2-medium, 3-large, 4-very large and 5-extremely large1 (EAWS
(2019)). In the process of decision-making, this factor is mainly of in-
terest with regard to possible consequences of a release, i.e. potential
avalanche size big enough to be of great consequence on a specific
slope. Potential slab avalanche size is an estimate built on different
combinations of inclination, terrain formation, weak layer, slab thick-
ness, slab stiffness and amount of snow carried along. Potential loose
snow avalanche size is estimated by a combination of inclination, ter-
rain formation and amount of accessible loose snow in the avalanche
path. In size 1, small avalanches, there is minimal danger of burying.
These avalanches will typically stop before the end of a slope. However,
depending on terrain, there can be a risk of falling or being carried over
cliffs. Size 2, medium, is defined as avalanches that can bury, injure or
kill a person. Thus any avalanche larger than size 1 may easily become
fatal.
3.1.12. Factor 12: avalanche sensitivity to triggering (additional factor, not
part of a DMF)
The sensitivity to triggering describes how easy it is to trigger an
avalanche, distinguishing between natural and human triggered ava-
lanches. This factor is part of the workflow when determining danger
level in an avalanche forecast when using the Conceptual Model of
Avalanche Hazard (Statham et al., 2018) or ADAM (Müller et al., 2016).
The sensitivity ranges from unreactive or very hard to trigger to touchy
or very easy to trigger. Under unreactive conditions there is no or only a
minor avalanche problem, no distinct weak layers and the fractures are
hard to initiate or do not propagate. In the touchy condition there is at
least one avalanche problem, one or several well-developed weak layers
and the fractures can be initiated with low additional load, such as one
single skier, and propagates well. Remote triggering is typical.
3.1.13. Factor 13: avalanche type (additional factor, not part of a DMF)
Avalanche type is not included in the process of determining danger
level, but due to the differences between slab and loose snow
avalanches, they pose different threats and can be of relevance in
avalanche danger assessment. Avalanches can be divided roughly into
three types; slab, loose, and glide avalanches. Their characteristics
differ in terms of how fast the snow stabilises, possibility of remote
triggering, typical release zone steepness, release characteristics and
destructive force related to size and density (EAWS, 2019).
3.1.14. Summary snow and avalanche factors
To summarise, all the DMFs use factors 1–5 (signs of instability,
loading of new snow, wind or rain within the last 48 h, critical
warming, signs of slab avalanches within the last 48 h) to some degree.
However, not all DMFs use presence of persistent or deep persistent slab
problems, how snow feels when moving on skis, unusual, infrequently
travelled route, pillows of wind drifted snow or cornices. What distin-
guishes factor 1–5 from the other factors is that they generally are ea-
sier to observe and interpret, i.e. are direct evidence with a high level of
certainty, and competence required to evaluate them is moderate.
However, experts use a range of factors but, somewhat surprisingly,
not all experts use signs of instability (Table 3).
3.2. Snowpack evaluation and stability test factors
Category B consists of two sub categories; B1) snowpack evaluation
and B2) stability tests. In situations with poor snowpack stability, nature
provides us with rather obvious signs. These warning signs, such as
recent avalanches, shooting cracks and “whumpfs”, indicate an un-
stable snowpack and are typically associated with danger level 3 -
considerable or higher. The more stable the snowpack, the greater the
load it can support before it fails. In these situations, instability can be
less obvious and more indirect factors have to be evaluated. A snow-
pack can have a favourable buildup, e.g. no slab on a weak layer, only
loose snow. In these situations, the snowpack is considered stable and
no avalanche danger exists.
Factors in subcategory B1 snowpack evaluation belong to both class 2
data and class 1 data (MCClung and Schaerer, 2006a). In order to
evaluate snow cover and be able to assess the current avalanche si-
tuation, knowledge of snow classification is required. Due to the nature
of these factors, there is uncertainty and a careful interpretation re-
quired.
The descriptions of the factors in this group is based on the
threshold sum approach (Jamieson and Schweizer, 2005b; Schweizer
and Jamieson, 2002) and a description of the practical application of
the SSD (Kronthaler and Zenke, 2006).
3.2.1. Factor 1: hardness of the overlaying snow
By overlaying snow, we mean the snow above a potential weak
layer. The hardness of the overlaying snow is one of the factors de-
termining what will affect the weak layer and possibly initiate a frac-
ture that could lead to an avalanche release (Kronthaler, 2003;
Kronthaler and Zenke, 2006). Additional load by backcountry tra-
vellers, precipitation type, intensity and amount, solar radiation and
temperature are all criteria to be taken into consideration when asses-
sing the importance of the hardness. It is also of importance for po-
tential avalanche size.
3.2.2. Factor 2: weak layer distance from snow surface
This factor is evaluated in combination with the factor hardness of
overlaying snow, and affects sensitivity to trigger and potential size of
an avalanche. The effect of the additional load of a backcountry re-
creationalist, additional wind loading or precipitation and possible
additional weakening by rain or high temperatures on the weak layer
are all of importance. There are countless possible combinations of the
distance from surface and the hardness of overlying snow, and this has
to be assessed for each individual situation. The influence of skiers on a
weak layer decreases with increasing depth, i.e. weak layers deeper
than 80 cm from snow surface are hardly effected by skiers (Schweizer
1 Note that as of winter season 2018–2019 the EAWS (European Avalanche
Warning Services) has agreed on implementing new names for the different
categories. The changes are meant to improve the effectiveness of the avalanche
warnings because the new names communicate the danger better.
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and Camponovo, 2001). However, additional stress is dependent on
riding style, e.g. falls. Dependent on terrain, the depth of snow, and
thus the depth of the weak layer, can vary considerably over short
distances. This makes the estimation of depth very difficult in practice,
as changes in topography, wind-deposited snow depths, inclination etc.
may have a strong effect on the importance of the depth to the weak
layer.
3.2.3. Factor 3–6: weak layer properties
We present four factors in the same heading because they are
evaluated in combination. The four factors are: grain size; grain type;
thickness and difference in hardness. One factor, difference in hard-
ness> 1 between layers, is not part of any DMF, was not asked for by
any of the experts, and was not included in the survey. However, it is
part of the threshold sum approach and hence included in this section.
When analysing the properties of a weak layer grain type, grain size
and layer hardness is of importance (Jamieson and Schweizer, 2005a).
Grain size> 1.25mm is regarded as unfavourable. Layers consisting
primarily of surface hoar, facets and depth hoar and layer hardness
softer than 1F (one finger) are regarded as unfavourable. Also of in-
terest are the properties of the boundaries or interfaces between layers.
A differences in grain size> 0.5mm and a difference in hardness> 1
are regarded as unfavourable. A weak layer thickness of< 3 cm is also
considered unfavourable (Kronthaler et al., 2013). Grain size, type and
hardness are dependent on the processes affecting snow metamor-
phosis. By understanding these processes, one can estimate the dis-
tribution of a weak layer.
The analysis of weak layer properties can be done systematically
and is then called: Threshold sum or yellow flags (Schweizer and
Jamieson, 2007). Only minor differences separate the Threshold sum
from the analysis of weak layer properties used in the SSD. The analysis
of weak layer properties is often combined with stability tests by ex-
perts.
3.2.4. Factor 7: fracture character
This factor is evaluated from stability tests. It is important to obtain
a better understanding of snow stability / instability. Fracture character
/ shear quality is significantly less spatially variable than stability test
results. This factor is regarded as class 1 data in relation to predicting
avalanches. Fracture character is divided into 5 classes, with a corre-
sponding description and code for each class (e.g. Sudden Planar, code
SP, description: Planar fracture suddenly crosses column in one loading
step and the block slides easily on the weak layer) (van Herwijnen and
Jamieson, 2004). It is also common to use the three-class Shear Quality
score (Q1, Q2, Q3) which is an expression of how even or uneven the
shear surface is (e.g. Q1 clean, planar, smooth and fast shear surface;
weak layer may collapse during failure) (MCClung and Schaerer,
2006a). The SSD uses the terms Smooth or Stepped fracture (Glatter
oder Gestufter Bruch) (Kronthaler, 2003; Kronthaler et al., 2013).
3.2.5. Factor 8: test score from stability tests
The tests differ in descriptive terms, coding and description of load
at failure because they are designed to test different snowpack prop-
erties (see below), and have different strengths and weaknesses. For
example the Rutschblock test uses 7 load levels, and failure with load
levels 1, 2 and 3 stability is rated poor. A detailed description and
stability interpretations on the basis of test scores can be found in
(MCClung and Schaerer, 2006a; Kronthaler, 2014).
3.2.6. Factor 9: combination of different elements
Evaluating the different snowpack factors in combination con-
stitutes the actual diagnosis in the SSD. This component is thus an as-
sessment of the various factors of a snowpack evaluation (factor 1–8)
and the interaction between them. Individually, the different factors do
not necessarily imply any instability or danger. What matters is the
interaction and properties of the different factors or elements. For
example: consider the surface of a stable snowpack with a layer of
surface hoar with unfavourable properties (2.5 cm thick layer, 10mm
crystals, fist hardness). This layer is then covered by a 30 cm layer of
unbounded, dry, loose, new snow. Even if a weak layer exists, the
surface hoar layer, there is no slab avalanche problem because the slab
is missing.
3.2.7. Summary B1: snowpack evaluation
Snowpack evaluation requires knowledge, detailed observation, a
careful weighing of factors and the interaction between factors. The
more distinct the unfavourable snow layer properties and interfaces are,
the more unstable is the snowpack. As important and valuable the
threshold sum approach may seem, it is accurate only about 60–75% of
the time and should be interpreted alongside other information in-
cluding snowpack distribution over terrain, according to the method
developers (Schweizer and Jamieson, 2007). The SSD uses many of the
same factors as the threshold sum approach when evaluating snow
layer properties, and snowpack evaluation is essential. In a compre-
hensive real-life test involving 190 test slopes, the accuracy rate was
very high (99.34% for stable slopes) (Kronthaler et al., 2013).
As Table 4 shows, the reduction methods ASM, SoG and RM, have
no or very little focus on snowpack evaluation. SC and GRM have some
focus on this in their accompanying literature (Harvey et al., 2018;
Engler et al., 2001), but without offering any structure on how to sys-
temise and interpret these factors. The NT focuses only on the presence
of a weak layer, whereas the stability test scores and fracture character
are included in the A2.0.
Overall, the DMFs assess snowpack differently. There is not a single
factor that is common to all DMFs.
3.2.8. Factor 10: B2, Stability tests
Together with snowpack evaluations, stability tests are an important
part of avalanche forecasting (MCClung and Schaerer, 2006a). Obser-
ving clear signs of instability implies that travel on similar slopes with
similar conditions will be high risk. When instability is less obvious,
tests that make the user aware of unstable conditions are highly valu-
able. Quite often, the spatial distribution of a specific instability is more
limited in lower danger situations, i.e. level 1-low or 2-moderate si-
tuations, than at higher danger levels. In order to expose these in-
stabilities, it may be necessary to perform several tests to track the
instability.
Evaluations and tests are also used to directly assess avalanche
danger in the field. We included tests that either are part of a decision-
making framework, or frequently involved in evaluation of instability:
the Rutschblock Test (RB), Compression test (CT), Extended column test
(ECT) and the Small Block Test (SBT). Detailed description of the tests
can be found in e.g. (Jamieson, 1999; Kronthaler, 2014; Schweizer,
2002; Simenhois and Birkeland, 2009). We describe also two informal
tests; 1) ski cut and 2) hand shear.
3.2.8.1. Small block test (SBT). The SBT is an important factor in
snowpack evaluation and decision-making using the SSD. The test is
not a stability test in a traditional sense. However, it tests the initial
fracture with the amount of force applied and the type fracture with the
propagation potential. Other tests consider load levels and scores or
descriptive terms (MCClung and Schaerer, 2006a), whereas the SBT
core target is to identify potential weak layers within a snowpack and
then evaluate its properties. SBT distinguishes only between light,
moderate and hard lateral tapping and smooth, rough, and “stepped”
fractures (Kronthaler et al., 2013). The SBT is the only test that uses
lateral loading/tapping. In a recent study (Kronthaler et al., 2018)
significantly more energy had to be applied to initiate a fracture when
using vertical load compared with lateral load. In addition, applying
vertical load revealed just over half of the weak layers compared to the
SBT. Also, the dispersion of stability values was significantly larger
using vertical load. The authors concluded that the SBT can be used to
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make more reliable statements about the properties of the weak layers.
However, they also stressed that one test is insufficient in slope specific
decision-making independent of lateral or vertical tapping. Therefore
they recommend performing several tests and analyses of the weak
layer using the threshold sum method or the analysis structure used in
SSD.
3.2.8.2. Rutschblock test (RB). An isolated block of snow, preferably on
a 30° inclined slope, is loaded by a person in several stages (MCClung
and Schaerer, 2006a) and load levels for Rutschblock failure are
interpreted in several stages from having poor to good stability.
However, it is challenging to find a safe spot to perform the test.
3.2.8.3. Compression test (CT). The test can be used to identify weak
layers in the snowpack, and uses loading steps to initiate failure in a
weak layer (MCClung and Schaerer, 2006a). The loading is applied
vertically on an isolated column measuring 30x30cm. The descriptive
terms for failure range from very easy to no failure. Interpretation of
results should include shear quality.
3.2.8.4. Extended column test (ECT). This test gives information on
fracture initiation and fracture propagation (Simenhois and Birkeland,
2007). Like the CT, vertical loading is applied in different steps. The
isolated column measures 30x90cm. Descriptive terms for propagation
range from no fracture to fracture propagates during isolation.
3.2.8.5. Propagation saw test (PST). This test indicates how easily a
fracture propagates in a chosen weak layer in the snowpack. A column
of 30 cm width and 100 cm horizontal length in slope direction is
isolated. Vertically it has to be isolated deep enough to include the
weak layer. If the weak layer is deeper than 100 cm the length of the
column should match the depth of the weak layer. Sawing with the
blunt end of a snow saw in the weak layer is done until a fracture
propagates through the whole column.
3.2.8.6. Ski cut. Ski cut or ski cutting is not a formal test, has no
stepwise loading levels or recording standards. It can be used to test
slope stability using skis primarily on smaller slopes. Pro-skiers and
expert riders sometimes perform ski cut at the very top of a run in order
to release a potential avalanche before exposure to the entire slope. The
effectiveness is condition-dependent and not risk-free.
3.2.8.7. Hand shear test. If a weak layer has been identified, and if it is
high in the snowpack then it can be tracked using an informal test, the
hand shear test. It is performed by isolating the overlaying snow by
hand. Next, one evaluates the interface between the weak layer and the
isolated column and the weak layer properties. The hand shear test has
no defined block size, nor does it imply any stepwise loading levels or
recording standards. The test can also be used to determine if the
overlaying snow is loose or bonded.
3.2.8.8. Summary stability tests. In the SSD, the key component is
finding the most prominent weak layer and testing the weak layer -
slab combination using the SBT. Results are interpreted considering the
processes that lead to the weak layer slab combination observed. Based
on this, the user can assess release probability for the investigated
slope. During a comprehensive field campaign, the transferability of the
danger assessment to neighboring slopes was tested. Results showed
that in situations with low release probability the variability of the
prominent weak layer was higher than for situations with high release
probability (Kronthaler et al., 2013). Based on their investigation the
authors conclude that snowpack evaluation, using the little block test
and analysing snowpack and weak layer properties provide robust
results in slope specific avalanche danger assessment.
For other DMFs, only the A2.0 and GRM mention stability tests in
their accompanying literature (Harvey et al., 2018; Haegeli et al.,
2010), but offer no information or structure on how to interpret and use
this information. In the ASM, stability would naturally fall under safety
wall 1-danger assessment, but is instead presented in a separate chapter
called depth knowledge and can therefore not be considered part of the
framework (Brattlien, 2014).
The best tests for backcountry travellers will be those having the
best balance between time consumption, risk in performing the test,
ease of interpretation and reliability in identifying instability relevant
for the user. All stability tests are point measurements that can provide
high-quality information, but have limited value beyond the area where
they are performed. Therefore one should always evaluate them in as-
sociation with other factors (MCClung and Schaerer, 2006a).
3.3. Avalanche forecast factors
To provide the public with detailed information about the snowpack
and current avalanche situation many countries have avalanche
warning services publishing avalanche forecasts, also called bulletins
(Engeset et al., 2018). Category C includes the factors used in the
bulletins (also called warnings and forecasts).
In general avalanche forecasts have similar content and use an in-
formation pyramid, presenting the most important information, the
danger level, first.
3.3.1. Factor 1: danger level
The danger level uses a five-stage scale, ranging from 1-low to 5-
very high (5 is labeled extreme in North America). Each danger level is
derived from a set of definitions, expressing the interaction between all
evaluated factors. The European danger scale is a function of a) prob-
ability of avalanche release, b) distribution of hazardous sites and c)
avalanche size. European forecasting services use the EAWS Matrix to
determine the danger level.
As Table 5 shows, except for the NT and SSD, the danger level re-
trieved from an avalanche forecast is either a factor on par with other
factors (AT and A2.0) or the most prominent factor and starting point in
the decision-making process.
3.3.2. Factor 2: main message
Large amounts of data are analysed and the resulting forecast is the
condensed presentation of this data. The Main message, is not integrated
in the information pyramid, but is the forecaster's opportunity to
communicate directly with the reader in order to inform and point at
key aspects of the avalanche situation in a concise way, relating the
message, i.e. “this is what you have to be aware of”. If there are changes
in the avalanche problem, important new observations, or significant
changes in weather, the main message will include this information.
3.3.3. Factor 3: avalanche prone locations (aspect, elevation and specific
terrain features)
Avalanche prone locations are areas where the danger is particu-
larly significant. In the forecast, these areas are described using gra-
phics and text. There are two ways to incorporate this factor into the
avalanche assessment; A) as a physical factor, i.e. that the location is of
importance for snow metamorphism and snow stability such as effects
of temperature dependence on altitude and effects of solar radiation
dependence on aspect, or B) as a statistical factor, i.e. taking into ac-
count where accidents tend to occur. For example avalanche fatality
statistics from the Alps show that a majority of accidents are located in
the northern sector. How the DMFs use this factor varies.
3.3.4. Factor 4: avalanche problem
When writing an avalanche forecast, the forecaster can choose be-
tween five (Europe, EAWS, 2019) or eight (North America, Statham
et al., 2006) different avalanche problems. A forecast can contain up to
three different avalanche problems. The avalanche problem is third in
the information pyramid, but to the experts (Landrø et al., 2019) it is
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the most important factor in the forecast. Avalanche problems are a
good starting point for an analytical danger assessment. Avalanche
problems directly influence terrain choice, what type of observations
are relevant, procedural choices, and they determine the degree of
uncertainty in the current situation.
3.3.5. Factor 5: mountain weather
Weather affects the snowpack and thus the avalanche danger.
Mountain weather gives information on previous, current and future
weather and its effect on avalanche danger. This factor can be of im-
portance for the type of avalanche problem, weak layer formation and
development in addition to more general information on what condi-
tions (wind, temperature, precipitation) and visibility one can expect.
3.3.6. Factor 6: snowpack information
In the snowpack information part of a forecast, a general description
covering both the layering of the snow and the stability is given. This
allows understanding of the processes causing the current snowpack,
the further development of the snowpack, possible destabilisation, and
facilitates managing the avalanche problem.
3.3.7. Factor 7: travel and terrain advice
This factor is especially aimed at snow sports enthusiasts and is in
addition to the recommendations defined in the avalanche danger scale.
Recommendations are often linked to how to handle different ava-
lanche problems. Experts consider this factor mainly during planning
and route-selection. It is of limited use, probably due to the advice
being too general or obvious for the expert user.
3.3.8. Summary avalanche forecast
Except for the NT and SSD, the danger level retrieved from an
avalanche forecast, is either a factor on par with other factors (AT and
A2.0) or the most prominent factor and starting point in the DMFs.
However, reliance on the danger level has been criticised for several
reasons:
a. The danger level is not suited for small-area or slope specific de-
scriptions, nor was it developed for that purpose (Nairz, 2010);
b. There is no objective definition of how to determine the danger
level, neither in the forecast nor in the field;
c. In reality, danger level changes continuously, not stepwise as in the
scale. The steps imply distinct danger level bands;
d. (Lack of) uniformity of the forecast (Müller et al., 2016);
e. Uncertainty related to prediction (forecast) and systematic ver-
ification procedures regarding the danger level (Schweizer, 2010;
Schweizer et al., 2003a; Techel et al., 2016b);
f. The risk calculation (including the danger level) ignores the total
number of people travelling in the backcountry (McCammon and
Hägeli, 2005; Kronthaler, 2001);
g. Accident-based risk calculations do not take into account all the
cases where an expert has chosen not to enter a specific slope on the
basis of his or her avalanche danger assessment. In a calculation,
this should have counted as an event;
h. The avalanche problem has no direct influence on determining the
danger level (e.g. calculations by (Techel and Winkler, 2015) show
that the relative risk is 50% higher at the same danger level in si-
tuations with persistent weak layers than with other avalanche
problems).
3.4. Group and group management factors
Category D consists of two related subcategories; Group factors and
group management factors. Group factors can be regarded as a physical
factor (weight), statistical factor (accidents), human factors (heuristic
traps). How these factors are regarded and used in the DMFs differ. In
this category, the skills, level of fitness, safety equipment and training
in avalanche rescue of the group are assessed.
Group management factors are concrete measures concerning how a
group travels in avalanche terrain to minimize risk. On the one hand,
these factors are about exposing as few as possible to avalanche risk at
the same time, and on the other hand they are about minimising the
extra load backcountry recreationalists exhort on the snowpack. These
factors are standard travel measures and are applied independently of
the DMFs. However, they are an integrated part of some DMFs.
3.4.1. Factor 1: group size
This factor classifies groups into small (2–4 people), large and very
large (Munter, 1997). The NT defines groups> 5 people as negative.
Note, that there is no universal definition of large and very large
groups. Regarding different heuristic traps, such as the Expert Halo,
Social Facilitation and Acceptance (McCammon, 2004), organisation
and communication in the group are probably more important than
group size.
3.4.2. Factor 2 and 3: group skills and fitness level
Low technical skiing skills increase the likelihood of falling, re-
sulting in high, abrupt additional load on the snowpack, increasing the
likelihood of an avalanche release. Skiing skill is also important for
keeping the optimal planned line and for stopping at safe spots. Low
levels of fitness also increase the physical demand on the skiers leaving
less surplus energy for avalanche danger assessments and route selec-
tion. There is also extensive evidence suggesting that high levels of
physical activity decrease a person's cognitive abilities to make sound
decisions (Hetland et al., 2018).
3.4.3. Factor 4 and 5: avalanche rescue skills and safety equipment
These factors belong together and assess whether group members
have the necessary safety equipment (transceiver, shovel, and probe)
and the skills to rescue a companion (Falk et al., 1994). Avalanche
rescue skills essential for efficient companion rescue, thus increasing
survival chances in case of an avalanche burial. Using rescue strategies,
teaching methods and rescue equipment optimized for novices, com-
panion rescue can be performed very efficient and successful
{Genswein, 2008 #154){Genswein, 2008 #616}, even in complex si-
tuations with multiple burials. The three main tools: transceiver, shovel
and probe, must be used in combination to function optimally
(Stumpert, 2002).
3.4.4. Factor 6–11: standard travel measures, group management
techniques
Standard travel measures are the steps to handle avalanche risk.
Different DMFs provide variants of factors such as: a) One-at-a-time
exposed, b) safety distance when ascending, c) one-at-a-time 35°, d)
30m distance, e) safety distance 10m from 30° onwards, f) skiing with
distance. These were presented as different items in the survey but have
been collapsed into one factor in this analysis. This factor is primarily a
risk reduction measure to limit additional loading on the snowpack. It is
connected to the definitions in the European Avalanche Danger Scale
(EAWS, 2019). In the description of likelihood of triggering, descrip-
tions such as “Triggering is possible, even from low additional loads
(danger level 3-considerable)” are used. Low is defined as: individual
skier / snowboarder, riding softly, not falling; snowshoer; group with
good spacing (minimum 10m) keeping distances. High load is defined
as: two or more skiers / snowboarders etc. without good spacing (or
without intervals).
Secondly it is a measure that can limit the number of people caught
in an avalanche release. The different variations of the factor, regarding
recommendations at different inclination are based on avalanche acci-
dent statistics and related to risk calculations. Applying this manage-
ment strategy in large groups and on long runs costs time, but the
benefits outweigh the disadvantages.
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3.4.5. Factor 12: clear direction
This is a risk reduction measure optimising line selection in relation
to skiing the best snow possible, avoiding terrain traps, avoiding trigger
points and especially exposed areas. Clear directions that are heard and
understood by the group are an essential factor to manoeuvre groups in
avalanche terrain.
3.4.6. Factor 13: Stopping at safe spots
This is a risk reduction measure that ensures safety in case of an
avalanche release triggered by someone else in the group.
3.4.7. Summary group factors and group management
All DMFs have recommendations to minimize the risk of getting
caught in an avalanche. The primary focus is to avoid avalanche re-
lease, not to provide detailed group management strategies in ava-
lanche terrain.
Some DMFs include group management techniques that are mainly
slope specific. A few of the DMFs from the Alps, such as SoG and SC, use
what is called Einzugsgebiet meaning assessment area and it describes
the amount of terrain that should be taken into consideration. The as-
sessment area is derived from the danger level. For example, at danger
level 2-moderate, track surroundings or areas within 20m should be
considered, and at danger level 3-considerable the entire slope should
be considered. This approach may be insufficient when the avalanche
problem is associated with a risk of remote triggering (i.e. persistent
weak layers), natural releases at lower danger levels and infrequent but
long avalanche runouts at lower danger levels. The assessment area
concept and the high and low additional load definitions in the EAWS
contribute to the different risk reduction measures.
As Table 6 shows, as many as six group factors are used by nearly all
experts (> 90%) and four of these are considered decisive by two of
more out of three experts. In other words group size, technical skills,
physical shape and avalanche rescue training are important.
3.5. Terrain factors
Avalanche hazard is based on evaluating the interaction of four
variables – snowpack, weather, person and terrain. Terrain is the
foundation for avalanches and without an inclination of minimum 30°,
avalanches will usually not occur. When assessing avalanche danger,
terrain factors can be used as physical factors (e.g. inclination) or a
statistical factor (avalanche accidents). Category E includes different
factors used to describe the terrain.
Inclination plays an important role in all three processes relevant for
dry slab triggering (Schweizer and Camponovo, 2001; Heierli et al.,
2008; Heierli et al., 2011; Schweizer et al., 2003b):
• Fracture initiation – likelihood increases with steepness
• Fracture propagation – likelihood increases with steepness (but de-
pendent on several factors)
• Slide - dry snow slides at inclinations steeper than about 30°
However, avalanche statistics show that most accidents happen on
slopes between 35° and 40° (measured at the steepest point), in-
dependent of avalanche danger level (Harvey et al., 2012).
Apart from inclination, commonly used terrain factors include ter-
rain traps, curvature/convexity, avalanche paths, forest, safe spots, etc.
3.5.1. Factor 1: 5° intervals from 30°
This factor originates from a statistical/probabilistic approach to
avalanche danger assessment and decision-making and measures in-
clination in 5° intervals. Frameworks derived from the RM use it in
combination with danger level to reduce risk (Munter, 1997). Inclina-
tion belongs to what Munter calls First Class Reduction Factors. For
example, at danger level 3-considerable, if the steepest part of the slope
is 35°-39° (< 40°) this gives a First class reduction factor with a score of
2.
Similarly, A2.0 differentiates between slopes 30°-35° and slopes
steeper than 35° and gives them a score of respectively +1 and+ 2 in
the terrain characteristics score card.
3.5.2. Factor 2: danger level/slope inclination
This factor corresponds to factor 1 in Category C and factor 1 in
Category E.
3.5.3. Factor 3: discriminating between avalanche terrain and non-
avalanche terrain
Here, users need to distinguish only between avalanche terrain
(terrain steeper than 30° and runout zones) and non-avalanche terrain.
Because the total number of people in avalanche terrain (including
exact inclination) is unknown, as well as the exposition and danger
level it is not possible to calculate an individual's risk. Instead, the in-
clination at which there are no accidents should be found, up to 40° at
danger level 1 and up to 30° at danger levels 2, 3 and 4 (Kronthaler,
2001). This does not take into account groups that have turned around
in terrain steeper than 40° at danger level 1-low, due to a local danger
assessment.
3.5.4. Factor 4: avalanche terrain exposure scale (ATES)
ATES is a Canadian initiative to classify terrain into three different
classes: simple, challenging and complex. The three classes are de-
termined in a technical model that describes exposure to different ter-
rain elements (e.g. inclination, forest density, terrain traps, avalanche
frequency). In addition to the technical model, there is a public com-
munication model targeted at a less skilled audience (Statham et al.,
2006). ATES is well suited to teach avalanche terrain fundamentals and
basic route finding, and can help balance terrain choice, conditions and
competence. Guide books or maps showing terrain or routes that have
been classified using ATES assist backcountry travellers new to an area
to identify terrain that matches their competence and the current
avalanche conditions.
3.5.5. Factor 5: use of favourable terrain formations
Use of favourable terrain formations refers to terrain where the
impact of the additional load is limited such as thicker snowpack,
avoiding high stress areas such as convexities (tension) and concavities
(compression), and where the consequences of an avalanche are
thought to be less serious as where there is a smooth runout without
obstacles and terrain traps.
3.5.6. Factor 6: avoiding terrain traps
This factor has nothing to do with avalanche release, but refers to
the consequences of an avalanche. Gullies, cliffs, trees and crevasses are
examples of such. Flats at the bottom of steep slopes that may accu-
mulate a deep avalanche deposit on top of an avalanche victim, are
another example.
3.5.7. Factor 7: forest density
This factor can be both a positive and a negative factor depending
on tree species and forest density. Trees will have an effect on snowpack
layering (i.e. temperature, wind, incoming and outgoing radiation, in-
terception of snowfall), can have an anchoring effect (dependent on
slab stiffness) reducing avalanche likelihood, or increase the likelihood
when their effect is weakening the snowpack (i.e. facets and depth hoar
development). When an avalanche releases in or flows into forested
terrain, the consequences increase dramatically.
3.5.8. Factor 8: convex or unsupported slopes
Convex and unsupported slopes are terrain features that have an
increased likelihood of avalanche release, unless the wind has removed
potential weak layers. Convexities add tension to the snowpack and are
likely trigger points given additional load or weakened bonds. On
M. Landrø, et al. Cold Regions Science and Technology 169 (2020) 102903
86
unsupported slopes the slab lacks the additional support of the lower
lying snow and the concave area. This is especially true for small and
medium sized slopes, where forces acting on the slab (shear and com-
pression) play an important role.
3.5.9. Factor 9: avoiding known avalanche paths
This factor originates from avalanche accident statistics. Terrain is
obviously steep enough for an avalanche or acts as a runout-zone.
Avalanche paths indicate a certain return frequency. In the ATES
technical model, Avalanche frequency (events:years) is an important
factor. In sparsely populated areas and areas without forests clearly
indicating avalanche paths (i.e. sparse birch forest) it can be hard to
determine avalanche frequency.
3.5.10. Factor 10: avoiding exposed routes without protected areas
This factor is not related to avalanche release, but to consequence.
By exposed routes, we understand exposure to avalanche prone slopes.
The use of protected areas (safe spots) is a means to reduce risk (see
category D). Safe spots are used to limit the number of people exposed
to risk at the same time. Especially in larger runs and complex / con-
voluted terrain this is a commonly used group management technique.
3.5.11. Summary terrain factors
Terrain as a factor in its entirety is important to all DMFs but usage
varies. In some DMFs it is a one-dimensional physical factor, inclina-
tion. In other DMFs it is more complex, e.g. ATES. Terrain factors can be
physical, necessary for or increasing the likelihood of avalanche release
or a statistical factor stating the probability based on avalanche acci-
dent statistics. In DMFs derived from the RM inclination is a core factor,
and together with danger level the avalanche risk is calculated.
Inclination can be measured objectively, but there is still measurement
error and uncertainty how “large” the steepest part has to be (Würtl,
2016):
• Maps and inclination maps masking the actual steepness by means
of elevation lines. The elevation lines can have the same distance,
but in reality the terrain can be much steeper in the range of up to
40m than can be shown by the map.
• The maximum possible accuracy of measuring inclination on high
quality maps is 4–5° (± 2°)
• The ability to read inclination correctly requires training using a
precise inclinometer to ensure accurate feedback on estimates
during training
• A meaningful inclination estimate presupposes an optimal reference
area. In practice, the steepest areas of a slope with a coherent size of
approx. 20m×20m (400m2) is recommended. It can be relatively
unproblematic to estimate inclination in smaller slopes, but poses
serious potential risk in larger slopes.
• There are no standards regarding inclination measurements in
avalanche accident investigations. These can be determined using
maps, implying the sources of error described above. Whether in-
clination is measured on the snow surface, bed surface or ground is
up to the expert assessment of the situation. In principle, only in-
clination of the snow surface should be considered as this is the only
one that can be assessed by a backcountry recreationalist.
As Table 7 shows, only two terrain factors (terrain formations and
traps) are used by nearly all experts (> 90%). However, discriminating
avalanche terrain, convexities, avalanche paths and exposure also
matters.
3.6. Expert use
We gathered data from experts on their use of the above reviewed
factors. The full results are presented in Landrø et al. (2019). Tables 3–7
summarises the use and importance of the different factors. Factors can
be used but not deemed decisive, e.g. avoiding terrain traps. In category
A, signs of instability and loading of new snow are used by 3 out 4 experts.
We refrain from speculating why not all experts use signs of instability
but using an anonymous survey may elicit more honest answers than
interviews.
Seven out of 10 factors in category B (snow evaluation) are used
by> 2 out of 3 experts, but each individual factor is considered deci-
sive by far fewer experts than category A factors. Given some overlap
between the factors, and the categories, this is unsurprising, particu-
larly since many experts also indicated the factors as relevant and si-
tuation-dependent.
In category C (avalanche forecast), all factors but travel advice are
used by more than two out of three experts. However, these factors are
not decisive for the majority. A possible explanation could be that
avalanche forecasts are provided for areas (much) larger than 100 km2,
and thus do not translate directly to making decisions on the slope-
scale.
Six out of 13 factors in category D (group factors) are used by
practically all experts, highlighting the importance of the human factor.
Many of these factors were also considered decisive by at least half of
the experts.
For category E (terrain), inclination is not a prominent factor. More
than half of the experts rely on discriminating avalanche terrain - not
avalanche terrain, ATES, favourable terrain formations and avoiding terrain
traps.
3.7. Network analysis
The DMFs can also be analysed as networks in order to explore the
relationships between them based on their factors. We coded whether
the DMF uses the factor in its decision-making or not. By assigning
binary coding as 0=not included and 1= factor included. When a
factor can be regarded as part of a framework because it is included in
accompanying literature, or is used indirectly (i.e. all snow and ava-
lanche factors are indirectly a part of the SSD because they are a part of
process thinking) we coded it as 0.5 instead of 1. The results are
identical.
We used the network analysis function in jasp (jasp-stats.org).
Unsurprisingly (see Fig. 2), the reduction method is a central node from
which several DMFs derive. There is also a strong relationship between
AT and A2.0. SSD and NT are not related to the reduction method fa-
mily network. Thus, the analysis of the factors in the frameworks
Fig. 2. Network analysis of the different DMFs based on shared factors. The line
thickness and color strength indicate the positive correlation between the
DMFs. Distance between the DMFs is of no importance.
RM=Reduction Method, ASM=After Ski Method, SC= Snow-card,
SoG=Stop or Go, NT=NivoTest, A2.0=Avaluator 2.0, GRM=Graphic
Reduction Method, SSD= Systematic Snow-cover Diagnosis, AT=ALPTRUTh.
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resonates well with the historical emergence and philosophical back-
ground of the decision-making frameworks. More details on the net-
work analysis can be found at https://osf.io/2z95n/
4. Discussion
In the current paper we present the first comparative and compre-
hensive overview of the factors described in the ten most commonly
used DMFs and complemented by factors suggested by an avalanche
expert advisory board. This resulted in 53 factors used in avalanche
decision making. We grouped these factors into five different cate-
gories: A) snow and avalanche factors, B) snowpack evaluation and
stability test, C) avalanche forecast, D) group factors and group man-
agement and E) terrain factors.
4.1. Comparing the frameworks
Our analysis shows that the frameworks differ in terms of number,
type of factors and how they emphasise the factors they assess. The
number of factors used by the different DMFs varies between 11 (AT)
and 31 (GRM, SoG). There is no single factor that is shared by all DMFs,
reflecting different decision approaches, varying in their degree of ab-
ductive reasoning. Frameworks belonging to the RM family resemble
each other, varying only in minor details (Tables 3–7). The NT uses
other factors than those in the RM family and also applies different
calculations. AT and A2.0 share many of the same factors, but A2.0
gives the factors a score, uses more factors, includes analytic elements
and is a considerably more comprehensive framework. The SSD is the
only purely analytic framework. It differs from all the other frameworks
on factors included and how these factors are assessed.
4.2. Snow and avalanche factors
The snow and avalanche category factors are the ones shared by
most DMFs, especially those that are easiest to interpret, commonly
called signs of instability. In some DMFs these factors are core factors
on par with others, whereas in other DMFs, they are less important or
used only indirectly (included in accompanying literature) and without
offering any structure on how these factors should be systemised and
interpreted. However, the developers of the frameworks appear to
agree that factors belonging to this category are of importance and
should be part of avalanche danger assessment and decision-making.
4.3. Snowpack evaluation and stability test factors
The largest difference amongst the DMFs is found in this category.
The primarily probabilistic approaches (RM family and NT) do not in-
clude these factors, or at most use these factors indirectly. If included,
they do not provide the user with any guidance or assessment structure.
In contrast, the purely analytic SSD requires a thorough understanding
of these factors.
4.4. Avalanche forecast factors
An avalanche forecast contains many factors. The main factor in the
probabilistic DMFs (the RM family and NT) is the danger level, and
secondary is the avalanche prone locations. Only the A2.0 uses ava-
lanche problems as a factor. For the remaining factors there is only
limited and indirect use, e.g. the RM, ASM, SC, SoG, GRM, NT and SSD
indirectly include the existence of a slab problem. The danger level is a
good indication of the situation one most likely will meet. However, the
avalanche forecast is much more than danger level, and the avalanche
problem and snowpack information have the potential of becoming
important factors.
4.5. Group and group management factors
The human factor is absent in a range of DMFs, particularly in those
of the RM family. A range of factors concerning group management are
considered in the SoG and NT includes group factors such as assessing
knowledge, skills and level of fitness. Given the inherent uncertainty
and complexity in avalanche assessment it is striking that travel tech-
niques like spacing out or stopping at safe spots are not included as a
prominent measure in all DMFs. They are effective measures for
handling residual risk and may determine the difference between an
avalanche incident and fatal accident, as seen in their use by experts.
4.6. Terrain factors
As simplification, many DMFs have reduced terrain assessment to a
measure of inclination. Even though inclination may be the most ob-
jective factor that can be measured, the complexity should not be re-
duced to one single factor. For example, terrain traps may increase the
consequences of even small avalanches. Furthermore, measuring slope
angle accurately in snow-covered terrain can be very challenging.
Choosing terrain wisely according to the given condition may be one of
the most important measure in avalanche decision-making.
4.7. Consequences
There are differences in the number, type and importance of factors
amongst existing decision-making frameworks for avalanche terrain.
The consequences of these differences are:
• Different DMFs can give conflicting results when it comes to go / no-
go decisions
• Different DMFs pose different demands on user knowledge and
competence
• DMFs differ in ease of use
• DMFs differ in level of residual risk they accept
• DMFs differ in the amount of terrain regarded as accessible given
current conditions.
Our analysis shows that the factors included in the different fra-
meworks range from simple to complex as well as simplifications of
complex factors. Some factors are used from a statistical perspective in
some frameworks, whereas others assess the same factors as a physical
factor. The descriptions of each factor lay the foundation for a future
assessment of their ease of use, importance, reliability and significance.
Even use of the factor regarded as most objective, inclination, comes
with challenges. This confirms that avalanche danger assessment in-
volves reducible and irreducible uncertainty, and that there can never
be absolutely certainty in assessing the avalanche risk.
4.8. Limitations
The presented frameworks undergo revisions, and our analysis is
based on the latest versions we were aware of at the time of this ana-
lysis.
We did not review the decision-making processes of each DMF in
detail, as our focus was on collecting the various factors and their use
by experts. The natural next step is an analysis of the decision-making
process itself.
5. Conclusion
A correct assessment of avalanche danger is crucial in order to avoid
accidents. Researchers and avalanche experts have developed a range of
avalanche decision-making frameworks to support decision-making in
avalanche terrain and reduce fatalities. These frameworks rely on and
assess different factors to provide a go or no go decision. We identified
M. Landrø, et al. Cold Regions Science and Technology 169 (2020) 102903
88
44 factors included in the checklists, cards or described in the accom-
panying literature belonging to the different frameworks. Nine other
factors were added based on feedback from pretesting our survey, re-
sulting in 53 factors.
The frameworks were developed to make informed and ultimately
safe decisions but the disagreement amongst the frameworks and fac-
tors used by experts warrant reconsideration and revisions. By col-
lecting and reviewing the relevant factors in avalanche decision-making
we provide the foundation to improve the decision process.
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A B S T R A C T
The snowy mountains of the world attract more and more backcountry recreationalists. Besides beauty and joy,
traveling in avalanche terrain can involve risk of injury and even death. A correct assessment of avalanche
danger and following a correct decision is crucial. This requires a thorough evaluation of a range of factors. To
aid these decisions several decision-making frameworks (DMF) have been put forward. However, actual use of
these frameworks and their underlying factors can be questioned. We asked 100 experts about their familiarity
and usage of the DMFs and their underlying factors. We found a large discrepancy between familiarity with and
actual use of the most commonly used DMFs. In contrast to most frameworks that have a probabilistic approach,
experts primarily use an analytical one. We also found that experts use more factors and emphasize other factors
than most DMFs do. Indeed, the factors the experts use do not match any of the DMFs well, with the agreement
ranging from 56% to 73%. Factors seen as core in many frameworks, such as the combination of danger level and
slope inclination, are by a large margin the least used of all the terrain factors among the experts. We found a
void between the existing frameworks and how – and on what basis – experts make their decisions. Our findings
raise a fundamental question: How, when and where do the transition from novice to expert occur? Future
initiatives to revise or develop new decision-making frameworks should take into account what experts use.
1. Introduction
Avalanches pose a major threat to recreational travelers in moun-
tainous regions of the world. The fatality rate per year averages about
100+ in Europe with another 40 in North America (CAIC; Boyd et al.,
2009; Techel et al., 2016). In 9 out of 10 fatal accidents among re-
creational backcountry travelers the victim or somebody in the party
triggered the avalanche (Schweizer and Lütschg, 2000; MCClung and
Schaerer, 2006). A correct assessment of local avalanche danger is
therefore lifesaving. The avalanche danger can never be reduced to zero
in avalanche terrain, however a thorough evaluation of a range of
factors can reduce the danger considerably, and contribute to safe de-
cisions (McCammon, 2000; Haegeli, 2010). The problem is, that hu-
mans are susceptible to a range of biases and thinking fallacies that may
hamper arriving at a safe decision (Kahneman, 2011; Gigerenzer,
2014). Another problem is the uncertainty of the information at hand
and the insufficient understanding of the relevant processes (MCClung
and Schaerer, 2006; Statham et al., 2018). As a response to the chal-
lenge of evaluating avalanche danger, avalanche experts and scientists
have developed a range of decision-making frameworks (DMFs) to aid
the decision-making process.
In 2005 the Canadian Avalanche Association (CAA) published a
comprehensive report describing and evaluating four of the existing
European DMFs for recreational backcountry travelers (McCammon
and Hägeli, 2005). The goal was to evaluate the utility of these fra-
meworks for their use in North American avalanche terrain. The per-
formance of each framework was determined by applying it to a data-
base of 751 avalanche accidents. Utility for the different frameworks
was determined by three factors: preventive value, mobility, and ease-
of-use. The study showed that not all of the existing frameworks work
equally well in every situation. Most frameworks perform poorly at low
and moderate avalanche danger. They are sensitive to different climate
zones that can have an effect on typical avalanche problems in a region.
Like for example that persistent weak layers tend to be more frequent in
continental climate zones than in maritime climate zones. The CAA
study also points out that many users may choose not to use the
methods, as the frameworks cast severe limitations on how much ter-
rain is available for skiing. The authors also found that simpler fra-
meworks appeared to be superior to more complex ones, a fact that is
also well documented for other complex decisions (Gigerenzer, 2014).
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A study from the Alps, where the development of these frameworks
has the longest history, found a limited use of decision aids by the in-
tended target group, the backcountry recreationalist (Mersch et al.,
2007). A more recent study on group dynamics and decision-making,
showed no formal use of published decision aids among the interviewed
groups (Zweifel and Haegeli, 2014). Similarly, other studies have found
that users did not correctly integrate the available information in the
decision-making process or applied inappropriate decision-making
strategies (McClung, 2002; McCammon and Haegeli, 2004). Further, in
our experience, avalanche experts seem to have a different approach to
decision making. This raises concerns about the utility of the DMFs.
The primary target group of existing frameworks are amateur
backcountry recreationists. One argument in favor of developing DMFs
is that most backcountry recreationists spend too little time in ava-
lanche terrain to develop a meaningful experienced-based approach. To
cater to this target audience, most existing frameworks work with
simplifications to meet the limited experience and knowledge of the
user. This, though, risks losing the distinction between how accurate a
factor can be assessed and how reliable the factor is in predicting an
avalanche (Pfuhl et al., 2011). Furthermore, simplifications may lead
users who have gained some personal experience to deviate from the
original rules and structure set out by the frameworks.
This raises two interesting questions: Do the experts, the ones with
most exposure and experiences with decision-making in avalanche
terrain, base their decisions on the same factors as used in the frame-
works? Do existing frameworks provide a structure that users can use at
different levels of competence? Here, we will address these questions by
investigating the use of DMFs and their factors among experts em-
ploying a quantitative survey.
Given the complexity of the material we have collected during this
study, we have chosen to present the results in two accompanying ar-
ticles. In this article we report the experts' knowledge and use of the
DMFs and their underlying factors based on data collected by a survey
of experts using an online questionnaire. The accompanying article
(Landrø et al., 2019) presents the most commonly used DMFs and
provides a detailed presentation of the factors used in these avalanche
DMFs as well as the factors used by. We recommend reading the ac-
companying article as an introduction to the article at hand.
1.1. Decision-making frameworks used in the survey
We focus on ten widely used decision-making frameworks. These
are; 3× 3 (Munter, 1997), the Reduction Method (professional)
(Munter, 1997; Munter, 2009a), Stop or Go (Larcher, 1999), Snow-card
(Engler, 2001), the Graphic Reduction Method (Harvey, 2012), the
After Ski Method (Brattlien, 2014), NivoTest (Bolognesi, 2000), ALP-
TRUTh (McCammon, 2006), the Avaluator 2.0 (Haegeli, 2010), and the
Systematic Snow-cover Diagnosis (Kronthaler, 2013).
An overview of the frameworks is presented in Table 1. Many of the
frameworks are used in combination with the 3×3 by Munter or si-
milar three step approaches. The 3×3 is not seen as a DMF in itself,
but rather an overarching way of structuring the decision process into
three different stages. Even if one does not use the 3×3 by Munter, it is
common to divide an outing into different stages. The stages can be
seen as a decision-making process that starts with trip planning, con-
tinues with route selection and culminates with slope specific decision-
making. The idea is that it helps to make decisions and gives several
possibilities to make changes to current plans given new information,
thereby reducing the risk of an avalanche. According to Munter, only by
using both the 3× 3 and the RM, one achieves the intended level of risk
(reduction) Munter was aiming for (Munter, 2009b).
In addition to the existing DMFs we asked the experts questions
about the use of intuition in expert decision-making. We defined in-
tuition in the survey as gut feeling, decisions that are difficult to ex-
plain, and/or decisions based on long-term experience. It is not un-
known that different experts rely and sometimes base their decisions on
intuition (Mersch and Behr, 2009; Mersch and Kühberger, 2009).
Therefore, we included a broad definition of intuition as an additional
or alternative decision-making “framework” in the survey (Fig. 1,
Table 3).
The frameworks fall into two general categories: probabilistic and
analytical. Probabilistic approaches calculate risk based on combina-
tions of probabilities derived from avalanche statistics. The Reduction
Method and DMFs deriving from this method use such a probabilistic
approach. In contrast, DMFs such as the Systematic Snow over
Diagnosis use an analytic approach. In such a DMF one evaluates the
different factors to decide whether to ski a specific slope or not, re-
quiring knowledge and the ability to see how the different factors in-
teract.
1.2. Underlying factors in the avalanche decision-making frameworks
In all these frameworks the decisions are based on an assessment of
a range of different factors. We refer to factors that constitute the basis
of a DMF as direct factors. These are typically printed on a plastic-
coated card that can be taken on a trip. Additional factors, that are
presented in accompanying literature (i.e. a leaflet), and therefore can
be regarded as part of a DMF, are referred to as indirect factors. Here,
the assigned number of factors is the sum of both direct and indirect
factors, see Landrø et al., 2019 for more details and a full review of the
factors. Briefly, we identified 53 different factors that can be grouped
into five different categories (Table 2). Some of these 53 factors are
used by all DMFs, a few are not part of any DMF but mentioned by
avalanche experts and were included in the survey (Appendix I).
1.3. Aims of the study
The overarching aims of the study are to (1) study experts' knowl-
edge about – and use of – existing decision-making frameworks and (2)
evaluate the importance of the underlying factors by use of an expert
survey. The main questions this study seeks to answer are: Do experts
use existing decision-making frameworks? Which, if any, of the factors
Table 1
Decision-making frameworks used in the survey with description of decision-style (terminology from Munter, 2009b), and number of underlying factors. The 3×3
filter method is not included as it is an approach to structure the decision process.
Framework Abbrev. Region Decision process # Factors Reference
Reduction Method RM Alps Probabilistic 15 Munter (2009a)
After Ski Method ASM Norway Probabilistic 18 Brattlien, 2014
Snow-card SC Alps Probabilistic 29 Engler, 2001
Stop-and-Go SoG Alps Probabilistic 31 Larcher, 1999
Graphical Reduction Method GRM Alps Probabilistic 31 Harvey et al., 2012
NivoTest NT Alps Probabilistic, 27 Bolognesi, 2000
Avaluator 2.0 A2.0 US / CA Probabilistic and analytical 27 Haegeli, 2010
ALPTRUTh AT Alps Probabilistic 11 McCammon, 2006
Systematic Snow cover Diagnosis SSD Alps Analytical 27 Kronthaler et al., 2013
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in these frameworks do they employ?
More specifically we ask:
1. Are avalanche experts familiar with the most commonly used fra-
meworks in Europe and North America?
2. To what extent do experts use these frameworks in their decision-
making in avalanche terrain?
3. Do avalanche experts evaluate the same factors as the ones used in
the frameworks, and how important are these factors in different
stages of an outing?
4. Which factors are most commonly used by experts, independent of
their background? And are these factors regarded as decisive, re-
levant, or irrelevant in the different phases of an outing?
5. Do the factors used differ between those that have experienced
avalanche accidents or incidents where they or someone in their
group was caught by an avalanche and those without any experience
of avalanche accidents?
An expert is a person that has a large share of his/her daily work in
avalanche prone terrain, performing real-life decision-making on behalf
of themselves and in some cases others, and has done this for many
winter seasons. An expert can typically be a mountain guide, avalanche
forecaster or professional free-skier. To us, it is of great interest to know
if the ones that have the most exposure to avalanche terrain actually
know and use existing avalanche decision-making frameworks. It is also
of interest if they evaluate and emphasize different factors in the same
phases during an outing as the ones used in the frameworks.
Answers to these questions will potentially have implications for
future initiatives to revise existing and develop new decision-making
frameworks. It could also be of importance for the structure and content
in training, both for professionals and recreationalist.
2. Methods
2.1. Participants
To ensure a thorough evaluation of the different methods and fac-
tors we recruited different expert groups, in several countries, who
differ in their traditions and approach regarding decision-making in
avalanche terrain. 121 participants visited the survey. Of those, 100
completed over 90% of the survey. Of those 100 participants, 10 were
female and 89 men.1 The participants were recruited among experts
associated with the European Avalanche Warning Services (EAWS), or
among professional mountain guides (IFMGA), ski guides, mountain
guide instructors and avalanche educators from Europe and North
America. Through personal friendship, we recruited some professional
free skiers. We also snowballed from established contacts. All but the
Canadian respondents, who were invited and encouraged by the Asso-
ciation of Canadian Mountain Guides, received a personal invitation to
participate. We only invited persons who were thought to be on the
highest level, the expert stage, according to the five-stage phenomen-
ological model of skill acquisition (Dreyfus and Dreyfus, 2005).
The sample was equally divided between respondents from
Scandinavia (n=32), the German-speaking part of the Alps (n=32)
and North America (n=35). On average, the respondents had
28.2 years of experience in backcountry skiing, ranging from 8 to
52 years, spent 50 days backcountry skiing per season, whereof 73%
were in avalanche terrain.
2.2. Survey
We created an online survey following the grouping of the under-
lying factors as presented in Landrø et al. (2019, this issue). Questions
about a factor followed the same procedure. Firstly, we asked if a factor
is part of the respondent's decision-making in avalanche terrain. If yes,
we asked in which phase (planning, route, slope decision) the factor is
used, and how they evaluated the factor's importance.
To reduce a possible priming effect, we asked the experts about use
and importance of all the factors – randomized - before asking questions
on knowledge and use of existing decision-making frameworks. In ad-
dition, we asked questions about background (e.g. avalanche related
education) and skiing (e.g. exposure to avalanche terrain) and demo-
graphic questions at the end of the survey. The survey was pre-tested on
10 participants. Based on their feedback we improved clarity of ques-
tions, workflow and translations. The survey was made available in
Norwegian, English and German, providing the avalanche terminology
for many in their native language.
The final survey design is presented in Appendix I. The survey was
implemented in Qualtrics (Qualtrics, Provo, UT).
2.3. Procedure
The survey was launched on 20th February 2018 and remained










3x3 RM ASM SC SoG GRM Nivo AT A2.0 SSD Other Intuition
Usage of Decision-making frameworks
Teaching in avalanche courses
Guiding
Off-piste skiing
Fig. 1. Experts' stating for what they use the DMFs. Two experts wrote in the text field for other DMF: “Canadian joint decision making” and MB Achtung Lawinen,
respectively.
1 1 respondent abandoned the survey before the demographics section, no
nationality, years of experience and gender information is available, the re-
spondent took the survey in German.
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accompanied with an information letter explaining the background,
intention and format of the survey. In addition, we briefly explained the
structure and workflow of the survey as pretesting showed a need for
that. Information from the information letter (Appendix II) was re-
peated and elaborated in the introduction part of the survey. After
reading this information participants gave their informed consent. The
survey could be answered with self-paced breaks. Answering took be-
tween 9min and 2 h.
2.4. Analysis
The importance of the factors as rated by the experts is presented in
absolute numbers by category and stage. To assess whether experts
comply with the framework they are familiar with, we calculated a
factor profile for each expert (row 2 in Table 4) and compared it to the
DMF they said they are using. Take for example a participant stating he
knows ALPTRUTh. This DMF has 11 factors: signs of instability, loading
of new snow, wind or rain within last 48 h, critical warming, signs of
slab avalanches, pillows of wind-drifted snow / cornices, deep snow,
danger level, avoiding terrain traps, forest density, avoiding known
avalanche paths (Table 2). If the same participant states he uses at least
9 of these 11 factors (she/he can use all the other 42 factors not part of
the DMF but assessed in the survey), we score this as a factor profile
compatible with the corresponding DMF. That is, we use a minimum of
80% of agreement between factors included in the DMF and factors
stated as using by the expert. We used the minimum of 80% as the
DMFs vary nearly by a factor of 3 (11 factors vs 31 factors), and some
factors are more similar than others (e.g. category snowpack
Table 2
Overview of the 53 factors assessed in the survey, which DMFs use the factor and out of the 100 surveyed experts how many that state they are using the factor.
Factors DMF including it # using factor
Snow and avalanche Signs of instability SoG, AT, A2.0, RM, ASM, SC, GRM, SSD 73
Loading of new snow SoG, NT, AT, A2.0, RM, ASM, SC, GRM, SSD 73
Wind or rain within last 48 h NT, A2.0, RM, ASM, SC, SoG, GRM, AT, SSD 74
Critical warming AT, A2.0, NT, RM, ASM, SC, SoG, GRM, SSD 80
Signs of slab avalanches within last 48 h SoG, AT, A2.0, NT, GRM, RM, ASM, SC, SSD 73
Presence of persistent or deep persistent slab problem(s) A2.0, RM, ASM, SC, SoG, GRM, NT, SSD 79
Unusual, infrequently traveled route NT, RM, SC, SoG, GRM, SSD 53
Pillows wind-drifted snow/cornices SoG, NT, RM, ASM, SC, GRM, AT, A2.0, SSD 68
Deep snow RM, ASM, SC, SoG, GRM, NT, AT, A2.0, SSD 67
How snow feels when moving on skis none 78
Potential avalanche size none 70
Avalanche sensitivity to triggering none 77
Possible avalanche type (loose snow, slab avalanche) none 75
Snowpack evaluation and stability test Hardness of overlaying snow (over weak layer) SSD, SC, SoG, GRM 78
Weak layer distance from snow surface SSD, SC, GRM 80
Weak layer grain type SSD, SC, GRM 70
Hardness difference between layers SSD, SC, GRM 38
Weak layer thickness SSD 62
Grain size of weak layer SSD 58
Fracture character SSD, A2.0 75
Test score from stability test(s) SSD, GRM, A2.0 38
Stability tests (CT, ECT, hand shear, little block, PST, Rutschblock, ski
cut)
SSD, GRM, A2.0 92
Combination of different elements SSD, SC N/A
Avalanche forecast Danger level RM, ASM, SC, SoG, GRM, A2.0, AT 66
Main message SoG 65
Most exposed height level and aspect RM, SC, SoG, GRM, A2.0, SSD 66
Avalanche problem(s) A2.0, SoG, GRM, SSD, (NT*) 86
Mountain weather forecast SC, GRM, A2.0 75
Snow pack information SC, SoG, GRM, A2.0, SSD 81
Travel and terrain advice none 21
Group and group management Group size (small, large, very large) RM, SoG, SC, GRM, NT, SSD 98
Participants with low technical skills NT, ASM, SC, SoG, GRM, SSD 99
Participants in bad physical shape NT, ASM, SC, SoG, GRM 97
Group not trained in avalanche rescue NT, ASM, SoG 99
Participants with avalanche safety equipment SoG, NT, ASM, GRM, A2.0 99
One-at-a-time exposed none 75
Ski at a distance none 57
Clear directions / plan on where and how to ski SoG, SC, GRM 84
stopping at safe spots A2.0, ASM, SC, GRM 94
10m distance from 30° ascending SoG, SC, GRM, A2.0, SSD 34
Safety distance ascending RM, ASM, SC, SoG, GRM, A2.0, SSD 59
30m distance when descending SoG, SC, A2.0, SSD 27
One-at-a-time from 35° when descending SoG, SC, A2.0, SSD 28
Terrain 5° intervals from 30° RM, ASM, GRM, SC, SoG, A2.0 28
Danger level/slope inclination RM, ASM, GRM, SC, SoG 18
slope between 34 and 36 degree steep none 26
Discriminating between AT /no AT SSD, NT, A2.0 86
ATES A2.0 72
Use of favorable terrain formations SoG, GRM, A2.0 94
Avoiding terrain traps AT, A2.0, ASM, SC, GRM 95
Forest density SoG, AT, A2.0 71
Convex or unsupported slopes NT, A2.0, SC 83
Avoiding known avalanche paths AT, A2.0 81
Avoiding exposed routes w/o protected areas NT, GRM 88
Abbreviation of DMFs: please see Table 1.
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evaluation). The agreement between the DMF and the expert is assessed
with the chi-square test.
We also performed a regression analysis with the number of factors
an expert uses as dependent variable and (1) number of days in back-
country, (2) proportion of days in avalanche terrain, (3) years of ex-
perience, (4) number of DMF familiar with, (5) competency, and (6)
number of avalanche accidents as predictors. Based on the analysis in
(Landrø et al., 2019) we counted familiarity with RM, ASM, SC, SoG,
GRM as being familiar with the reduction method as a coarser grouping
of the DMFs avoids spurious findings. Similarly, we counted only once if
one was familiar with both AT and A2.0. We provided 10 answer op-
tions for course competencies, and ranked them into four categories at
an ordinal level; recreational level, observer courses, guide courses and
as highest avalanche forecasting. We consider a p-value below 0.05 as
statistically significant.
2.5. Ethics
Participation was voluntary and consideration of privacy and con-
sent was taken into account. All information provided was treated
confidentially. The respondents could contact the first author if they
had questions. The study was approved by the National data security
agency, NSD number 58249.
3. Results
3.1. Demographics
Of the 100 respondents 26 identified themselves as avalanche
control workers or professional rescuers, 51 identified themselves as
avalanche forecaster, − researcher, or - safety consultant, 65 identified
themselves as mountain / ski guide, and 14 identified themselves as
professional skier or snowboarder. Multiple answers were possible.
When it comes to course competencies, 16 reached recreational level,
10 took observer courses, 42 took guide courses, and 31 were at the
level of avalanche forecasters. Regarding the number of DMFs an expert
knows, 5 respondents stated not knowing any of the 10 DMFs we asked
for, half of the respondents knew one (28%) or two (32%) families of
DMFs, and 33 knew three (13%) or more (22%) DMFs. Notably, one
respondent indicated not knowing any DMF but having taken a guide
course. Thus, of the 100 respondents four are not experts by these two
criteria, however, these four participants use at least 32 (32–43) of the
assessed factors, which is more than any of the DMFs has as factors
(Table 1). Accordingly, we did not exclude those participants in the
subsequent analyses.
3.2. Familiarity with – and use of – existing frameworks
Our first research question was: Are avalanche experts familiar with
the most commonly used frameworks in Europe and North America? The
majority of the experts are familiar with several DMFs (Table 3). The
most known are 3× 3 and RM (known by 68%) and A2.0 (known by
61%). The remaining frameworks are known by less than half of the
respondents. This lower percentage may be explained by the relative
limited use outside their countries of origin (Norway, Switzerland and
Canada). 16% list other decision-making frameworks not included in
the survey. One expert said that he did not know any of the frameworks.
Our second research question asked to what extent do experts use
these frameworks in their decision-making in avalanche terrain? There is a
large discrepancy between knowing and using the DMFs (Fig. 1,
Table 3). The 3×3 is taught, but not used so much during their own
off-piste skiing. Intuition is hard to teach, but used during guiding and
off-piste skiing. Notably, SSD is taught, used in guiding, and off-piste
skiing. Indeed, SSD has the highest use-to-know percentage at 77%, i.e.
more than 3 out of 4 that learned this DMF state using it. The second
and third best DMF with respect to use-familiarity are the 3× 3 with
37% and the GRM with 34%. 1 out of 6, or less, state using the other
DMFs. SSD is the only method to add value to slope-specific decisions,
as 68% of the experts using this DMF consider it decisive for slope-
making decisions. Less than a handful of the experts consider the other
DMFs decisive at this stage. Intuition, mentioned as a decision tool by
60 experts, was considered decisive at the slope-scale by 52% of them.
SSD is increasingly used from the planning to the slope-specific decision
stage. 3× 3 (and GRM), on the other hand, is decreasingly used
through these stages, indicating that the overall stage concept has some
value but not particularly for the go / no go decision.
Regarding the decision process itself, the large majority (89%) an-
swered that they use a combination of knowledge-based and analytical
decision-making, i.e. taking detailed observations and carefully
weighting factors. 60% also said that they use intuition (Table 3), but
only 32% stated that they perform risk calculations, i.e. assess the
likelihood of avalanches and potential consequences. It is worth noting
that for decisiveness for single slope decision-making the participants
rely almost solely on SSD (74%) and intuition (52%). Many of the ex-
perts (39%) told us that their evaluation is context or situation-de-
pendent, i.e. if it is a familiar situation they use a rule of thumb, if it is
an unfamiliar situation they use analytical methods. Only 16% use rule-
based decision-making, e.g. when hazard is considerable, go here. 10%
stated habit and 2% deferred to more experienced or higher-up deci-
sion-making or following the decision of a more experienced team
member, respectively.
Why do experts not use the frameworks? 29% stated that the fra-
meworks are simplifications, or have a structure that does not fit the
way they make decisions. 18% also said they stop the user from
thinking on his/her own, and 24% said they are too limiting. 14% of the
experts do not believe in the statistics used in developing the frame-
work, or found the frameworks too complicated. Some of the experts
also mentioned that the DMFs don't seem to work, that they combine or
Table 3
Number of experts reporting familiarity and usage (teaching, guiding, or off-piste skiing) of the DMFs. Multiple answers were possible.






3×3 68 25 (37%) 4 23 18 12
RM 68 9 (13%) 0 2 4 1
ASM 24 4 (17%) 1 2 3 2
SC 42 3 (7%) 0 1 2 1
SoG 43 5 (12%) 0 2 2 1
GRM 35 12 (34%) 2 9 6 1
NT 27 1 (4%) 0 1 1 0
AT 27 3 (11%) 1 2 1 1
A2.0 61 10 (16%) 1 6 6 4
SSD 44 34 (77%) 23 8 26 28
Other 16 10 (63%) 3 5 4 5
Intuition N/A 60 (60%) 31 31 53 52
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are based on the wrong factors or are to limiting. On the positive side, it
was reported that DMFs could help to actively go into a certain mindset,
structure the decision process and prevent the user from overlooking
important information or underpin intuition and gut feeling.
Do the experts teach the methods they know? With exception of the
SSD (22 out of 34) avalanche experts engaged in avalanche education
rarely teach the frameworks that they report to know (Fig. 1). In our
survey we did not ask for any justifications for why the DMFs are not
taught.
3.3. Experts' factor profile
In our third question we asked: Do avalanche experts evaluate the same
factors as the ones used in the frameworks?
The experts use on average 38 factors (SD=5.1, range 21 to 47),
out of 53 identified. This is more than the number of factors consulted
by any of the nine DMFs (Table 1). But would those factors match the
DMF they report to be using? We compared an expert's factor profile to
each of the nine DMF factor profiles. The agreements between DMF
factor profiles and experts' factor profile ranged from as low as 56% for
the AT (27 factors in the DMF) to 73% for the A2.0 (11 factors in the
DMF).
To investigate it further, we next calculated whether an expert use
the same factors as the ones of the DMF s/he has reported to be using. If
the overlap is more than 80% we refer to it as a match. The reason we
report 80% and not 100% as a match is that we want to allow for some
lack of precision and also compensate for the variable number of factors
per DMF (e.g. “forgotten” responses, choosing a similar factor). As
Table 4 (row 3) shows, there were only few matches. In absolute
numbers, the SSD again stands out. Overall, experts do evaluate other
factors than the ones used in the frameworks they state using (See
Table 5).
We grouped the 53 factors into five categories: A) Snow and ava-
lanche factors, B) Snowpack evaluation and stability test factors, C)
Avalanche forecast factors, D) Group factors and group management
factors, E) Terrain factors (Table 2). There was a large agreement
among the experts about snow and avalanche factors. Of the 13 factors
from this category, about 73% of the factors are used by experts
(SD=7%, median= 77%, range 46% - 77%). Around 2/3 of the fac-
tors in the snowpack, avalanche forecast, and terrain categories are
used by the experts. In category D – group factors, experts use on
average only 58% of the factors.
Given that the experts vary in how many factors they use (from 21
to 47) we asked whether experience or competency explains some of
this variation. We performed a linear regression with the number of
factors an expert uses as the outcome variable. The predictors were: 1)
average days in backcountry (ordinal scale, from “up to 30 days per
season” to “more than 120 days per season”), 2) proportion of those
days being in avalanche terrain (0 to 100), 3) number of avalanche
accidents (from “none” to “more than 6”), 4) years of experience, 5)
course competency (range 0 to 3) and 6) number of DMFs familiar with,
scored as 0 if not familiar with any DMF, scored as 1–5 if familiar with
1, 2, 3, 4 or 5 “families” of DMFs, where families are a) the reduction
methods, b) AT/A2.0, c) NT, d) SSD or e) another, not listed DMF.
Course competency, assessed categorically, was transformed into
ordinal with recreational courses scored as 0, observer courses scored as
1, guide courses as 2 and avalanche forecasting scored as 3, i.e. from
very little competence to high competence.
Seen together, these six factors explained 13% of the variance in the
number of factors an expert uses, F(6,92)= 2.301, p= .041, R2=0.13.
Of the six predictors, only the experts' familiarity with DMFs reached
statistical significance (β=−0.222, t=−2.016, p= .047), whereby
knowing five DMFs compared to knowing one DMF reduces the usage
by nearly one factor (Fig. 2).
3.4. Importance of the factors in the different stages of an outing
Next, we asked the experts to evaluate the importance of each factor
at three different stages of an outing: the planning stage, the route se-
lection stage and the slope-specific decision stage. The importance of a
factor could be rated either as decisive, relevant or insignificant. Not all
factors can be assessed at all stages of an outing, e.g. how the snow feels
when moving cannot be judged at the planning stage. We present the
expert evaluation for the factors for each of the five categories. The
overall usage is presented in Table 2.
3.4.1. Snow and avalanche factors
All snow and avalanche factors are considered to be an important
part of experts' avalanche danger assessment and decision-making
(Table 6). Only the factor; unusual, infrequently traveled route scores low
on importance. The opposite of this factor is a heavily tracked slope,
which is considered a go-factor by some DMFs. The other factors range
from 67% - 80% in use. The factor; how snow feels when moving on skis, is
not part of any of the DMFs, except indirectly in the SSD. To the SSD,
being an analytical approach, this factor is a possible source of in-
formation regarding avalanche type, avalanche size and necessary ad-
ditional load for triggering. Notably, this factor is used by 78% of the
experts.
3.4.2. Snowpack evaluation and stability test factors
95 out of the 100 respondents stated that they do perform some kind
of snowpack evaluation, and 98 stated that they do perform a stability
test. 75 experts perform these evaluations during the route selection
and 64 do it also for slope-specific decisions. The factors used by the
majority are the distance of the weak layer from the snow surface
(80%), the hardness of the overlaying snow (78%) and the fracture
character (75%). Among the stability tests, 73 perform the ski cut, 52
the hand shear test, 51 the CT test, and 49 the ECT test. The Small Block
Test of the SSD (34) and Rutschblocktest (14) are less common. As seen
in Fig. 3 the frequency of performing a snowpack evaluation depends
on the avalanche condition, mainly the avalanche problem and type of
weak layer. The experts emphasize the importance of this information
in the route selection and slope-specific phase of an outing. Unlike the
frameworks that primarily use a probabilistic approach, the experts do
perform snowpack evaluation and stability tests.
3.4.3. Avalanche forecast factors
Only 2% of the experts never use information from an avalanche
forecast. 62% use it always and 35% sometimes. The forecast is pri-
marily used during the planning stage (50%), less during route selection
Table 4
Comparison between DMF factor profiles and experts' factor profile.
RM ASM SC SoG GRM NT AT A2.0 SSD
Number of experts using DMF 9 4 3 5 12 1 3 10 34
Experts agree by factor profile 15 7 11 3 8 16 18 26 22
Experts using DMF & agree by factor Profile 2 1 0 0 1 0 1 2 8
Proportion 0.22 0.25 0 0 0.08 0 0. 0.20 0.24
Χ2 0.488 2.074 0.382 0.163 0.002 0.192 0.493 0.208 0.07
P-value 0.783 0.15 0.536 0.687 0.964 0.661 0.483 0.648 0.791
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(30%) and slope specific decision-making (20%).
A forecast consists of several factors. We asked the experts which
factors they use in different stages and the importance of these factors
(Table 6). The avalanche problem (87%) and snowpack information
(81%) are the most frequently used factors. All factors but the travel
advice (21% only) are used by more than 3 out 5 experts. The avalanche
problem is the most decisive factor at all three stages of the outing. For
slope-specific decisions, the avalanche problem is rated as decisive by
twice as many experts as is the exposed elevation and aspect factor, or
the snowpack information. The main message is not considered a de-
cisive factor by many, especially at the route and slope stages. Fur-
thermore, the importance of the factor danger level gradually reduces
through the different stages of an outing, with 24 respondents stating
danger level being insignificant for slope-specific decision-making. The
travel and terrain advice is considered decisive at the slope stage by
only one expert.
For experts the forecast factors avalanche problem, exposed eleva-
tion and aspect, as well as snowpack information are of greater im-
portance to decision-making than the danger level.
3.4.4. Group and group management factors
We asked for importance of group factors during the planning and
the slope-specific phase only. Table 7 shows that safety equipment
(transceiver, probe and shovel) is the most important factor for experts.
Also, group size and skiing skills are important factors to many of the
experts.
When it comes to group management, stopping at safe spots is
practiced by 94 of the experts, 84 give clear directions and 75 opt for
Table 5
Importance of snow and avalanche factors categorized as decisive, relevant or insignificant during the three stages of an outing.
Snow and avalanche factors Planning Route Slope
Decisive Relevant Insignificant Decisive Relevant Insignificant Decisive Relevant Insignificant
Signs of instability 48 21 0 49 10 0
Loading of new snow 16 43 0 39 34 0 47 15 0
Occurrence of wind or rain within the last 48 h 26 41 0 30 33 0 38 17 0
Critical warming 39 32 0 42 21 0 42 12 0
Signs of slab avalanches in the area from today or yesterday 29 22 0 37 29 0 37 18 0
Presence of persistent or deep persistent slab problem(s) 37 28 0 41 28 0 42 12 0
Unusual, infrequently traveled route 8 35 3 11 22 0 14 15 0
Presence of pillows of wind drifted snow or cornices 18 42 0 32 25 0
Deep snow (foot penetration between 20 and 40 cm) 16 45 0 27 30 0
Snow feels when moving on skis 22 39 2 34 24 2
Potential avalanche size 25 30 0 31 23 0 33 20 1
The avalanche sensitivity to triggering 24 26 0 31 34 0 52 15 0
Possible avalanche type (loose snow or slab avalanche/dry or wet) 13 35 1 32 33 1 46 19 0
Fig. 2. Standardized coefficients and 95% confidence of the six predictors for the number of factors an expert uses.
Table 6
Importance of avalanche forecast factors during the three stages of an outing.
Avalanche forecast factors Planning Route Slope
Decisive Relevant Insignificant Decisive Relevant Insignificant Decisive Relevant Insignificant
Danger level 22 43 1 9 44 11 9 31 24
Main message 18 46 1 7 48 5 5 44 12
Exposed elevation and aspect 27 39 0 21 41 2 15 37 12
Avalanche problem 32 53 1 27 54 3 29 40 15
Mountain weather forecast 26 48 1 7 51 15 4 32 37
Snowpack information 20 58 3 15 57 6 14 48 16
Travel and terrain advice 20 1 0 15 4 0 1 11 7
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one-at-a-time exposure. Notably, giving clear direction is more decisive
than stopping at safe spots for experts. Fig. 4 summarizes the im-
portance of these group management factors.
3.4.5. Terrain factors
Terrain is an important factor for nearly all the experts, where the
presence or absence of favorable terrain is used by 94 of the experts and
presence of terrain traps used by 95 of the experts (Table 2). These
terrain factors are more important at the route and slope stages, than at
the planning stage.
The factor slope inclination and danger level plays no major role. Only
10 of the participants rate this factor decisive in planning, and the
factor is seen as even less important in route and slope specific decision
making. As a contrast, the experts seem to focus on the simple division
of avalanche terrain and not being avalanche terrain. This broad cate-
gorization is used by 86 of the experts (Table 2) and seen as decisive or
relevant for a large majority throughout the outing (Table 8). During
the route and slope stage, avoiding exposed routes and convex or un-
supported slopes is rated as relevant and decisive by more than half of
the experts. This might indicate that experts do not look out for these
terrain features during planning.
3.5. Do those with experience of avalanche accidents use different factors?
Our final research question asked whether experts that have experi-
enced avalanche accidents or incidents base their decisions on different
factors compared to the ones which have no experience with avalanche in-
cidents? Avalanche exposure was measured with two items in the
survey. We asked directly whether the experts have triggered an ava-
lanche (yes/no answer option) and we asked for the number of ava-
lanche accidents or incidents, ranging from never, once, 2–3 times, 4–6
times and more than 6 times.
In our sample 16 experts had no avalanche accident, 25 had one, 38
had two or three accidents, 17 stated 4–6 accidents, and 3 experts
stated more than 6 accidents. Furthermore, 44 of the experts stated they
have at least once triggered an avalanche. Thus, our expert panel
differed in the number of avalanche incidents or accidents they have
experienced. Next, we focused on those factors at least half of the ex-
perts stated as decisive. The included factors were a) use of favorable
terrain formations, b) stopping at safe spots, c) group size and skills,
and d) signs of instability. We corrected for multiple comparisons, i.e.
p < .01 is judged as significant.
Regarding the number of accidents, there was no relationship with
the overall number of factors an expert uses (see also section 3.3.). A
more detailed regression with number of accidents as outcome and as
predictors the average number of factors used per category was not
statistically significant (p= .223), and explained only 7% of the var-
iance. The number of avalanche accidents did also not influence how
experts evaluated the importance of factors, all p's > 0.05.
Furthermore, the factor profile was not different between those having
triggered and those not having triggered an avalanche, i.e. we found no
difference a) in the importance of signs of instability (route phase:
χ2= 0.552, p= .457, slope phase: χ2= 3.194, p= .074); or b) the use
of favorable terrain formation (route phase: χ2= 3.138, p= .208; slope
phase: χ2= 5.967, p= .051). Finally, none of the group factors (size,
skills) differed between those with and without avalanche triggering
experience (all p's > 0.05).
4. Discussion
In the current paper we asked avalanche experts about their
knowledge and use of the nine most common avalanche decision-
making frameworks. We mapped the underlying factors of these fra-
meworks and asked the experts to rate them in terms of importance in
different stages of an outing.
4.1. Familiarity and use of existing frameworks
The results show a discrepancy between familiarity with and use of
the frameworks. The experts know the different frameworks, but rarely
use them. The 3×3 method can be regarded as an overarching struc-
ture specifically designed to cover trip planning, route selection and
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
once
several times
one proper test, keep track
depending on cond and avalanche problem
depending on cond and kind of weak layer
many times necessary
depending on test results
different elevations
other
Frequency of performing snow-pack evaluations including stability tests
Fig. 3. Frequency of performing snowpack evaluations and stability tests (fre-
quencies are averaged from the responses to “how often do you perform a)
snowpack evaluations and b) stability test”. Cond= condition.
Table 7
Importance of group and group management factors.
Group and group management factors Planning Slope
Decisive Relevant Insignificant Decisive Relevant Insignificant
Small group 26 66 6 31 54 12
Large group 35 57 5 41 44 10
Very large group 54 39 2 51 35 9
Low skiing skills 58 39 2 60 32 6
Low fitness level 58 36 3 40 42 14
Safety equipment 70 23 6 62 21 15
Avalanche rescue 47 42 10 46 37 15
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100








importance of group management strategies
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Fig. 4. Group management factors.
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slope specific decision-making, and not surprisingly several of the ex-
perts use this approach throughout the decision-making process. For the
other DMFs there is some use in the planning phase of an outing, but in
the most critical phase; slope specific decision-making, use and im-
portance of these frameworks is almost non-existent. Indeed, for single
slope decision-making the experts rely on intuition or the Systematic
Snow cover Diagnosis. For the SSD, usage increases from the planning
to the slope stage. The most obvious explanation is that the SSD uses
factors that are done on site and therefore are not that relevant in the
planning phase. In addition, the SSD builds on factors that experts in
general rate as important and that it uses an analytical approach. This
resembles how experts assess avalanches in practice.
One interesting finding from our first research question was the
discrepancy between knowing and teaching the different frameworks.
65 of our participants are mountain or ski guides and therefore often
responsible for avalanche education. However, even though they know
the different frameworks, very few actually teach them. We find this
striking, particularly since several of these frameworks are targeted at
beginners. The majority of these frameworks are mainly probabilistic,
rule based and considered to be well suited for novices. One of the
reasons provided as an explanation for not using the frameworks was
because the experts find them to be too complicated. This is a troubling
statement when you compare the level of expertise of the expert to the
average user. When taking into account that an outing requires much
more than solely making decisions, like mastering skiing, navigation
and keeping warm, it cast serious doubt about whether novices have the
surplus capacity to engage in deliberate reasoning (Hetland et al.,
2018). The exception in terms of teaching is the SSD, known by about a
third of the participants, many of them also teach the method. A pri-
marily analytical and knowledge-based approach is traditionally seen as
less ideal for novices (McCammon and Haegeli, 2004). Therefore, the
fact that it is almost exclusively this approach the experts teach is
surprising.
4.2. Use and importance of factors
There is little agreement between the factors defining a DMF and the
set of factors an expert rates as important. We found that the factors
used in the reduction methods are not used by experts. The majority of
experts take more factors into account than included in any framework.
In addition, experts emphasize and rate other factors as more important
than the ones used in the frameworks, particularly in the DMFs using a
probabilistic approach (Tables 1 and 2). We address each of those
factors below.
4.2.1. Snow and avalanche factors
Regarding snow and avalanche factors, most DMFs focus on the
most obvious clues like alarm signs but do not include “how snow
feels”. This factor, in addition to the alarm signs is considered to be an
important part of the experts' avalanche danger assessment and deci-
sion-making. How snow feels is hard to quantify, but this factor has
potential in future DMFs as it is directly, and importantly, continuously
observable. Changes in how the snow feels should be quantified.
4.2.2. Snowpack evaluation and stability test factors
Except for the SSD, snowpack evaluation and stability tests are
opted out or play a minor role in all the other DMFs. In contrast, the
experts are concerned about factors regarding snow: processes in the
snow, snow layer properties, snow stability, weather effecting snow and
avalanche problems and their distribution. Experts perform, conditional
on the avalanche problem, stability tests. The results from stability tests
should be part of frugal heuristics (Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier, 2011).
4.2.3. Avalanche forecast factors
To experts, an avalanche forecast is much more than its danger
level. It is a starting point and source of information, an important piece
in the attempt to be well prepared and have the best possible overview
of the current situation. The avalanche problem is consider the single
most important information in the forecast, which is in line with the
findings of another recent study on communication of avalanche fore-
cast to all user groups – from novices to experts (Engeset et al., 2018).
We interpret the experts' answers as follows; experts use different
sources to identify avalanche problems (weather- and avalanche fore-
cast, tests, signs of instability, profiles); they track these problems (signs
of instability, profiles, tests and process thinking); evaluate if the pro-
blem can be handled; apply appropriate mitigation measures given the
current problem.
4.2.4. Group and group management factors
Regarding group and group management factors, there are con-
siderable differences among the DMFs whether a factor is included, its
importance and how it is supposed to be evaluated and used (Landrø
et al., 2019). To the experts, on the other hand, these factors are im-
portant decision-making factors and determining what options and
opportunities one has, given the current conditions. The experts try to
balance snow conditions, group skills and terrain. The experts use and
approach to these factors resembles the “Wer geht wann wohin?” (who
goes when where?), a concept used by Naturfreunde Österreich
(Studeregger et al., 2016). Integrating of various interdependent factors
is challenging, but can be taught step-by-step (Gigerenzer and
Gaissmaier, 2011; Gigerenzer, 2014).
4.2.5. Avalanche experience
We did not find that experience of being avalanched influenced the
factors used. This suggests that experts are aware of the possibilities and
limitations of the factors and see the complexity and the limits of our
knowledge within the field of snow and avalanches. Indeed, the number
of factors used, did also not depend on backcountry experience or
proportion of skiing days in avalanche terrain.
Table 8
Importance of terrain factors during the three different stages of an outing.
Planning Route Slope
Decisive Relevant Insignificant Decisive Relevant Insignificant Decisive Relevant Insignificant
Slope inclination and danger level 10 5 9 4 6 7
Avalanche terrain vs non avalanche terrain 42 31 43 36 46 22
ATES 3 24 5 11 3 4
Favorable terrain formations 41 44 1 55 30 1
Terrain traps 12 29 4 40 47 2 52 29 3
Forest density 5 29 9 5 45 17 9 41 7
Convex or unsupported slopes 9 25 1 21 43 2 40 31 2
Known avalanche paths 6 33 17 6 42 10 13 25 10
Avoid exposed routes 20 42 6 23 50 4 26 31 3
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4.3. Expert approach and a road map for developing better DMFs
Our results raise the question: how does the transition from novice
to expert happen? Where, how and when do experts become experts?
There is probably no single or straight forward answer to this, but what
we have shown is that there is a void between existing frameworks and
how and on what basis experts base their decisions. The combination of
factors they use, indicate that what is taught in avalanche courses is not
sufficient to build up the knowledge needed to progress towards be-
coming an expert. However, avalanche danger assessment and risk
mitigation as done by experts can be summarized by answering the
questions in the following steps:
1. Is it avalanche terrain?
2. Is there an avalanche problem?
3. What are the properties and distribution of the avalanche problem?
4. Is risk mitigation possible?
5. Are the consequences of being wrong acceptable?
The way the experts assess avalanche danger has clear similarities
with the process of conventional avalanche forecasting (LaChapelle,
1980). That is, the assessment is based on inductive logic, minimizing
uncertainty by maximizing prior knowledge. However, this approach
has a different structure than the one found in existing frameworks. The
frameworks have been made with the best intentions. Still, their usage
is limited, especially among experts. So far there are no comprehensive
studies that compare usage among beginners, skilled users and experts,
though one study assessed whether importance of factors in avalanche
bulletins differs by expertise (Engeset et al., 2018). During two winters,
a team from the German mountaineering organization (Deutscher Al-
penverein), investigated the actual behavior of backcountry skiers in
the Alps (Mersch et al., 2007). This investigation showed that the use of
available and well-known, decision-making frameworks was very lim-
ited, irrespective of experience level. Similar findings were made in a
study on group dynamics and decision-making within recreational
groups (Zweifel and Haegeli, 2014). None of the groups in the study
formally used any DMFs, although most groups applied simple heur-
istics based on decision rules promoted in some DMFs. Even if an ul-
timate framework existed, it is still up to the user to actually use it, and
this can of course never be guaranteed.
Three possible ways to improve current methods or to develop new
decision-making frameworks:
1. An analytical approach, based on the factors that experts use. Such
an approach demands that the recreationalists acquire a high level
of competence. It might be perceived as very restrictive at first. As a
user, one has to accept that it will take time before one is able to
exploit the whole potential of this approach.
2. A probabilistic approach. Improved risk calculations can be made,
using accident data, actual terrain usage (tracks) in combination
with high resolution terrain models. The Quantitative Reduction
method, used on the website skitourenguru.ch is an interesting start
(Schmudlach et al., 2018). If combined with up-to-date mobile
phone technology this could be an interesting tool for many back-
country recreationalists.
3. A combination of the two, which could accommodate individual
preferences in decision-making (Stanovich and West, 2000; Zweifel
and Haegeli, 2014; Mækelæ et al., 2018).
Based on our findings we suggest that future initiatives take the
following into account:
• Exploit the avalanche forecasts educational and safety potential by
using forecast elements such as avalanche problems and snowpack
information in addition to danger level, since agreement among
observers on danger level is low (Techel et al., 2016) and danger
level is a relatively unreliable factor.
• Use the same workflow at all user levels. It should adapt to the user's
level of competence, limiting novices and allowing experts to use
their knowledge to handle more challenging situations. This will
allow the user to “grow” with it, and not hamper development,
preventing the transition between novice and expert.
• Involve avalanche danger assessment and decision-making in
phases, where adjustments can be made in light of new information.
• Be based on the factors that the experts use, and not on (over-)
simplifications of factors and rules alone.
• Offer a structure where relevant factors are assessed in a systematic
way.
• Force the user to be transparent, thereby help avoiding thinking
fallacies like several heuristic traps, overconfidence (Kruger and
Dunning, 1999; Krueger and Mueller, 2002; Kahneman et al., 2011),
lack of communication and more.
• Accept uncertainty, and make the user aware of this (Borchers,
2005; Pfuhl et al., 2013).
4.4. Limitations
The survey was not translated to other languages, such as French or
Italian, and also not distributed to the associated avalanche expert
communities. This was primarily due to limited translation capacity.
However, proficiency in English should have sufficed as recent research
has shown that deliberate reasoning is not affected by language
(Mækelæ and Pfuhl, 2019), though the specific terminology may still
favor answering the survey in one's native. Other relevant avalanche
communities in e.g. Spain, Slovakia, Russia, Japan, Chile and New
Zealand were also left out due to limited translation capacity and lack
of key persons who could initiate snow-balling of the survey in their
communities. Furthermore, we did not ask the experts how they com-
bine the different factors, which factors are most reliable, and at how
accurate the factors can be assessed (Pfuhl et al., 2011).
5. Conclusions
Avalanche expertise is not defined by knowing existing decision-
making frameworks, but rather by effectively using a range of decisive
factors at the right stage during an outing. In contrast to many of the
decision-making frameworks, experts perform snowpack evaluations or
stability tests, and consider the avalanche problem and not the danger
level from an avalanche forecast as important in their decision-making
process. The experts also pay attention to group skills and safety equip-
ment, and evaluate the presence or absence of favorable terrain and terrain
traps. Additional factors, not found in the DMFs, are frequently used by
experts. Experts use more factors than found in the DMFs, and their
factors are a mixture from the frameworks. Many experts stated that
they use an analytical approach, while probabilistic approaches are
hardly used. A majority of those familiar with the SSD are using it,
especially for slope-based decisions. Apart from analytical decision-
making, intuition plays a large role in the avalanche danger assessment
of the experts.
The lack of use of the existing frameworks should not lead the
avalanche experts or the scientific community to give up, but rather
propel us towards making improved decision aids to empower people in
their decision-making. Such improved frameworks should facilitate
learning and development of knowledge and skill – while making sure
that they make sound decisions in order to return home alive.
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ABSTRACT 
Risk assessments should be based on relevant factors that can be precisely assessed. In backcountry 
skiing misjudgments of avalanche risk can be fatal. We tested the understanding of avalanche risk 
factors among 1220 backcountry recreationalists with varying level of avalanche education. They 
rated how precisely they could assess 11 factors commonly used by experts, and rated how relevant 
these factors were in assessing avalanche risk. We asked if avalanches become more predictable 
with more knowledge or rather are considered random events. The majority consider avalanches to 
be predictable, and increasingly so with more knowledge and skills. Avalanche education increased 
how precisely a factor can be assessed. Education was particularly important for judging the 
distribution of the weak layers, terrain traps, avalanche size, recognizing avalanche terrain, and 
where to stop at safe spots. Five factors (signs of instability, distinguishing avalanche terrain from 
non-avalanche terrain, inclination, terrain traps, and distribution of weak layers) were judged as 
highly relevant. Relevance ratings were independent of a person’s avalanche education level for all 
risk factors but danger level. Recreationalists rated relevance like experts, thus we recommend 
adopting an analytical approach for recreationalists as well as experts, and discuss possible 
implications for avalanche forecasting and education.  
Keywords: outdoor risk; avalanche prevention; risk management; danger assessment; decision-
making  
1. Introduction
Risk can often be mitigated and reduced if one can correctly assess the factors contributing 
to the risk. Generally, risk assessment and risk mitigation require knowing which factors contribute 
to the risk and being able to assess them precisely. Snow avalanche risk factors vary how well one 
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can assess them, and how relevant they are (Landrø, Hetland, Engeset, & Pfuhl, 2020; Landrø, 
Pfuhl, Engeset, Jackson, & Hetland, 2020). We follow McClung & Scherer (MCClung & Schaerer, 
2006) and refer to precision as the degree of uncertainty associated with the assessment and 
measurement of an avalanche risk factor, and to relevance as the importance of a factor in the 
overall risk assessment.  
The role of knowledge and expertise for judging the relevance and assessing the precision of 
avalanche risk factors, is of interest to risk assessment in general and avalanche risk specifically. If 
recreationalists identify the same factors as relevant as experts do, then avalanche education can 
focus on how to assess these factors. If recreationalists think they can assess most of the factors 
precisely but judge important factors as irrelevant, teaching should focus on explaining the 
relevance of these factors. If recreationalists state that they neither know how to assess the factors 
nor why a factor is relevant, avalanche education must teach the how and why to ensure better 
decision-making and safe skiing.  
If it is possible to identify which factors are predictive of avalanche risk and at the same 
time possible to assess with sufficient precision, these factors should be used in decision tools and 
taught in avalanche education. 
1.1 Avalanche risk assessment 
An avalanche release depends on the interaction between four main factors: terrain, weather, 
snowpack, and a trigger. In terrain steeper than 30 degrees inclination, avalanches can be triggered. 
Once released, an avalanche can run into much gentler terrain, the runout zone. The release areas 
and runout zones are referred to as avalanche terrain. Avalanche terrain is a relevant factor, but in 
the extreme case of not being able to recognize avalanche terrain, knowing that this is a relevant and 
reliable factor for avalanches does not help in judging avalanche risk.  
The trigger is either something that weakens the snowpack (i.e., increasing temperature) or 
something that exerts an additional load on the snowpack (i.e., precipitation) or a combination of 
the two. Often the trigger is a backcountry recreationalist who adds load that exceeds the strength of 
the snowpack (Harvey, Rhyner, Dürr, Schweizer, & Henny, 2018; MCClung & Schaerer, 2006; 
Schweizer & Lütschg, 2000).  
A stable snowpack can support a high additional load (e.g., a group of skiers or a 
snowmobile), whereas a poor stability snowpack may avalanche naturally or with a small additional 
load (e.g., a single skier). Therefore, slope angle and snow stability are key factors in avalanche risk 
assessment and are relevant factors. Natural processes, such as precipitation, radiation, wind, and 
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differences in temperature, contribute to variations of snowpack properties and thus its stability. 
This causes spatial and temporal differences in snowpack stability. Because it is impossible to test 
and analyze all release areas (locations where avalanches could be released), there will always be 
some residual uncertainty associated with stability assessments.  
These four main factors can be divided into a range of underlying factors (Landrø, Pfuhl, et 
al., 2020) varying in their relevance and the precision with which they can be assessed. For 
example, potential avalanche size is a relevant factor, but the size is not directly accessible prior to 
an avalanche release. Even if many avalanche situations are similar, there are still countless possible 
combinations of factors that should or could be assessed, not to mention that snow properties 
change with time and altitude and thus the risk itself changes during an outing.  
1.2. Knowledge-based approach 
Experts do the risk assessments based on knowledge and experience. But what about 
recreationalists? The traditional view has been that recreationalist have too little training and spend 
too little time in avalanche terrain to develop a meaningful knowledge-based approach 
(McCammon, 2004). A knowledge-based approach requires knowledge to see how different factors 
interact, as well as insight into the limitations of this knowledge, i.e., focused information seeking, 
cue monitoring, and responding to changes. Rapid decisions can be made if the conditions are 
deemed as easy, e.g., gentle terrain, low danger level, easy recognizable and manageable avalanche 
problem. In complex situations the risk assessment requires detailed observations and careful 
weighting of the risk factors. The decision-making process becomes slow and typically follows a 
given structure to support and systematize the process. The Systematic Snow-cover Diagnosis 
(Kronthaler, 2019) provides such a structure.  
What complicates decision-making in avalanche terrain is limited or absent feedback, thus 
making it difficult to develop relevant skills through experiential learning. Backcountry 
recreationalists might therefore develop a false sense of confidence in their risk management and 
assessment skills because yet so often wrong or flawed decisions provide positive feedback: no 
avalanche triggered. Further, if one considers avalanches as random events, one may not see any 
benefit in learning about the factors relevant for assessing avalanche risk.  
1.4 Avalanche factors tested in this study 
A previous study identified 53 factors that either are part of a decision-making framework 
(DMF) or used in expert decision-making (Landrø, Pfuhl, et al., 2020). We selected 11 of these 
factors, which emerged as highly relevant among experts or where a well-known factor.  
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The factors inclination and danger level are essential in many DMFs. Inclination is of 
importance for fracture initiation, fracture propagation, and sliding – processes relevant for dry slab 
avalanche release. Without an inclination of minimum 30 degrees, avalanches will usually not 
occur. The danger level (1-low to 5-very high) is derived from a set of definitions and is the most 
prominent part of a public avalanche forecast (Engeset, Pfuhl, Landrø, Mannberg, & Hetland, 
2018). The factors avalanche terrain (release area and runout zone) and non-avalanche terrain and 
expected avalanche size (1 – small to 5 – extremely large) are absent in the commonly used DMFs, 
but are instrumental to experts (Landrø, Hetland, et al., 2020). Stopping at a safe spot is one of 
several standard travel measures and group management techniques. Its sole purpose is to reduce 
overall risk. Signs of instability, such as recent avalanches or collapsing whumpfs, are regarded as 
direct evidence of snow instability and avalanche danger (MCClung & Schaerer, 2006). When 
present, this is easily accessible information, and there should be little uncertainty associated with 
its interpretation. In contrast, weak layer distance from surface, test score from stability tests, and 
distribution of weak layer (in which aspects, elevation bands, and terrain formations the layer can 
be found) are associated with considerable uncertainty in their interpretation. Appropriate use and 
understanding the limitations of these factors require knowledge and practical experience. Terrain 
traps are obstacles or terrain features in the avalanche path that increase the consequences in case of 
an avalanche release. Forest density is a twofold factor, increasing consequence and effecting snow 
stability. Interpretation of the latter is associated with uncertainty and requires knowledge and 
practical experience. 
2. Methods and materials
2.1 Participants
Participants were panelists and attendees at three avalanche seminars organized by the 
Norwegian Avalanche Warning Service (NAWS) at the Norwegian Water Resources and Energy 
Directorate (NVE) and the Center for Avalanche Research and Education (CARE) at UiT The 
Arctic University of Norway. The survey language was in Norwegian. Nine percent had Norwegian 
as second language, but deliberate reasoning is similar in native and second language (Maekelae & 
Pfuhl, 2019). 
2.2 Survey 
Given the time constraints given by the avalanche awareness seminar, we selected 11 factors 
and asked how precisely (1 = not very precisely, 2 = fairly precisely, 3 = very precisely) it may be 
assess and how relevant (1 = insignificant, 2 = relevant, 3 = decisive) the factor is for risk 
assessment. I don’t know this factor was also possible to choose. Participants answered first 
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questions about precision and secondly relevance, or vice versa. The order of the factors was 
constant per seminar. 
With four questions, we investigated whether avalanches are regarded as random or 
predictable (Ulkumen, Fox, & Malle, 2016). We asked about 1) their level of avalanche training; 2) 
skiing skills and exposure to backcountry skiing (range: 0 = beginner to 6 = expert skills); 3) 
avalanche accident involvement; and 4) demographic questions, i.e., age, gender, years of 
backcountry skiing, and the average number of backcountry trips during the last three seasons.  
2.3 Procedure 
Attendees at avalanche seminars were presented the survey in-between talks related to 
decision-making in avalanche terrain, where the factors were visually displayed on a large screen 
(Fig 1) and answering was on mobile phones. Panelists were contacted via email. The survey was 
implemented in Qualtrics where participants gave their informed consent. 
Figure 1: Two images used in the survey illustrating avalanche factors. The left image is a weak layer of buried surface 
hoar. A weak layer is a precondition for fracture initiation and propagation, and therefore a relevant factor. One can 
measure the distance between the weak layer and surface with great precision in one location. However, the distance 
can vary due to wind distributing the overlying snow unevenly in the terrain, affecting the precision with which this 
factor can be assessed. The right image is an example of a dry slab avalanche. It is the most obvious sign of snow 
instability. When present, recent avalanche activity provides relevant information associated with no or little uncertainty 
in its interpretation. Thus, this factor is one that can be assessed with a high level of precision. On the other hand, the 
absence of signs of instability does not necessarily indicate stability. (Photos by Markus Landrø)  
2.4 Analysis 
The answer options regarding avalanche accident and incident experiences were transformed 
into an ordinal scale where 0 = “No, I have not been involved in an avalanche incident or accident”, 
1 = “I have seen an avalanche been triggered”; 2 = “Someone I was traveling with triggered an 
avalanche” & “I triggered an avalanche”; 3 = “Someone I was traveling with got caught, but not 
buried” & “I got caught, but not buried” ; 4= “Someone I was traveling with was buried” & “I have 
been buried in an avalanche” ; 5 = “Someone I was traveling with got injured”; “I got injured”; 
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“Someone I was traveling with died in an avalanche”. If a person selected more than one option, the 
highest rank was used.  
We analyzed each factor separately with regards to precision and relevance with avalanche 
education and avalanche accidents as predictors. To assess whether recreationalists and experts 
judge relevance similarly, we performed Bayesian Association tests with Poisson sampling (Morey 
et al., 2018). 
2.5. Open Science 
Our pre-registered analysis plan, all material and data can be found at: [BLINDED] 
2.6 Ethics 
Participation was voluntary and anonymous. The study was approved by the National data 
security agency, NSD number 233888. 
3. Results
3.1 Demographics
1220 participants (64% male) completed at least 80% of the survey (580 at avalanche 
seminars). 45% had not experienced any avalanche incident, while 3% experienced a severe 
incident. Most respondents had basic avalanche education only and were rarely involved in severe 
accidents. Many of those who experienced severe accidents, had taken advanced avalanche courses 
(Fig 2). Skiing skills, average number of trips, avalanche accidents, and avalanche training level 
were all positively correlated (.386 > r > .492) and internal consistency of those four factors, i.e., ω 
was .735. The more people were backcountry skiing, the more avalanche training they had, and the 
more likely they were to have experienced an accident. 
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Figure 2: Mosaic plot for avalanche education by accidents. When a combination is occurring more often than expected 
(assuming even distribution) it is shaded in blue, when it is less than expected it is shaded in red.  
3.2. Avalanches are not seen as being random 
On a scale from 1 to 7, participants mostly disagreed with avalanches being a random event; 
the mean rating was 3.01 (SD = 1.23); in contrast the mean rating for avalanches being predictable 
was 5.41 (SD = 1.01). Thus, most respondents rated avalanche risk as predictable (F1, 934 = 700.04, 
p < .001, η2 = .245) independent of their avalanche training (F < 1). The more severe avalanche 
accident a participant experienced, the less they regarded avalanches as random (F1, 934 = 5.23, p = 
.022, η2 = .001). The interactions were not significant.  
3.3. Avalanche education/training influences precision rating of avalanche factors 
Overall, we found that education and training improved how well a factor could be assessed 
and interpreted. Exceptions were forest density and stability tests, where education/training did not 
affect the ability to assess the factor nor its relevance (Table 1, Figure 3). Experience with accidents 
played a minor role in assessing the factors. 
Danger level was judged less relevant the more avalanche education a person had. The 
majority (recreationalists 54%, experts 65%) regarded the factor as relevant but not decisive. A test 
of association yielded a Bayes factor (BF01) of 71:1 in favor of no difference in relevance rating 




Assessment of avalanche size improved with education and experience, but avalanche size 
was not rated as very precise to assess. Relevance rating was independent of avalanche education 
and accidents among recreationalists, and similar to experts, BF01 was 286:1. 
Assessment of signs of instability improved with education, and was judged as decisive by 
the majority, irrespective of avalanche education. Relevance rating was similar to that of experts, 
BF01 was 49:1.  
Assessment of the distribution of the weak layer improved with avalanche education but was 
generally not rated as precise to assess. The factor was judged as relevant by 45% and decisive by 
52%, as did experts, BF01 was 106:1. Those with more education rated it more often as decisive. 
Assessing the weak layer distance from snow surface varied but improved with education. 
The majority (62%) rated the factor as relevant, as did experts, BF01 was 25:1.  
57% did not know what a stability test score is. The factor was rated as relevant but not very 
precise to assess. Education did not impact the rating of precision or relevance. Experts rated the 
relevance lower, BF01 was 0.5:1, neither supporting nor rejecting similarity. 
Stopping at a safe spot was rated as relevant by 51% (decisive by 45%), agreeing with 
experts, BF01 was 5:1. The factor was not precise to assess, but education improved the assessment. 
Assessing inclination was high and improved with education but not relevance. There was 
very good agreement about its relevance and agreement with experts, BF01 was 770:1. 
Assessment of avalanche terrain improved considerably with avalanche education, whereas 
relevance was very high irrespective of education, agreeing well with experts, BF01 was 370:1.  
Assessment and relevance of forest density was not affected by education. Relevance was 
high and similar to experts, BF01 was 48:1.  
Assessment of terrain traps but not relevance improved with education. The majority 
judged this factor as decisive, agreeing with experts, BF01 11:1. 
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Figure 3a: Stacked barplots of first 6 factors precision and relevance separate for 6 levels of avalanche 
training/education ranging from none (level 1) to very advanced (level 6). Left column, precision: 1 = not very 
precisely, 2 = fairly precisely, 3 = very precisely. Right column, relevance: 1 = insignificant, 2 = relevant, 3 = decisive. 
109
 
Figure 3b: Stacked barplots of the last 5 factors. For steepness/inclination the answer option “only care if it is about 
30osteep” was excluded (n=170). 
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Table 1: Overview of the influence of avalanche training and severity of accidents on precision and relevance rating for each of the 11 factors. 
Precision Relevance 







l overall model 0.029 overall model 0.124 
education/training -0.092 -2.96 <.001 -0.067 -0.019 education/training -0.236 -7.97 <.001 -0.129 -0.0782








 overall model 0.099 overall model 0.096 
education/training 0.231 7.686 <.001 0.067 0.113 education/training -0.1 -3.163 0.002 -0.068 -0.016







s overall model 0.031 overall model 0.003 
education/training 0.161 5.17 <.001 0.047 0.106 education/training 0.064 2.014 0.044 0.000 0.036 








r overall model 0.065 overall model 0.022 
education/training 0.263 7.7 <.001 0.077 0.13 education/training 0.138 3.917 <.001 0.029 0.088 







overall model 0.048 overall model 0.005 
education/training 0.198 6.35 <.001 0.075 0.142 education/training 0.073 2.26 0.024 0.004 0.059 








s overall model 0.004 overall model 0.003 
education/training 0.063 1.36 0.173 -0.013 0.073 education/training 0.053 1.183 0.237 -0.017 0.068 







overall model 0.054 overall model 0.002 
education/training 0.18 5.85 <.001 0.057 0.114 education/training 0.018 0.559 0.576 -0.016 0.028 









 overall model 0.200 overall model 0.008 
education/training 0.385 13.6 <.001 0.139 0.186 education/training 0.078 2.459 0.014 0.005 0.047 








 overall model 0.004 overall model 0.001 
education/training 0.034 0.974 0.331 -0.017 0.051 education/training -0.025 -0.713 0.476 -0.038 0.018 








p overall model 0.197 overall model 0.003 
education/training 0.357 12.58 <.001 0.145 0.198 education/training 0.047 1.472 0.141 -0.006 0.043 






overall model 0.098 overall model 0.008 
education/training 0.258 7.76 <.001 0.080 0.134 education/training 0.086 2.452 0.014 0.008 0.068 
Experience accidents 0.102 3.06 0.002 0.014 0.065 Experience accidents 0.008 0.238 0.812 -0.025 0.032 
Legend: Lower and upper refer to the 95% Confidence interval of the unstandardized estimate (not reported). Beta is the standardized estimate (effect size) 
and a beta of e.g. .3 means that one higher level in education the precision increases by .3 on a scale from 1 to 3. The first 237 participants received only eight 
not 11 factors. 
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3.4 Relevance and precision across participants 
Next, we asked how consistent the factors are assessed and judged, performing a principal 
component analysis (PCA) with oblimin rotation. The scoring of precision and relevance from ten 
factors, excluding the stability test score, yielded a clear pattern. Rating of the precision and 
relevance of danger level was unrelated to the ratings of the other nine factors, i.e., these two 
variables made up the fourth component. The first component was the precision rating of all 
remaining nine factors. In other words, a participant’s assessment of a factor was similar for all nine 
factors. The second and third component were the relevance scores of four and five factors, 
respectively. Overall, the PCA supported the regression results that precision and relevance are two 
independent dimensions. 
4. Discussion
In this study, we asked 1220 backcountry recreationalist about the degree of precision with 
which an avalanche factor can be assessed and how relevant the factor is for their risk assessment. 
We compared these results with expert judgments (Landrø, Hetland, et al., 2020) and found that 
recreationalist judged the relevance of the tested avalanche factors very similar to experts. For all 
but danger level, experience with avalanche incidents or accidents did not influence the relevance 
judgement. Danger level was also unique as assessing and judging this factor was not related to how 
any of the other factors was rated. The precision rating depended for most of the factors on 
avalanche education, and for some factors also on experience and avalanche accidents, respectively. 
We discuss the findings for each of the factors before we discuss some broader implications for 
avalanche education and forecasting.  
4.1 Understanding of the avalanche factors 
The factor danger level, expressed as a number between 1-low and 5-very high, is not 
physically observable, and is obtained by reading an avalanche forecast or assessed in the field. 
Most of our participants judged the danger level as a factor that is low in precision. The more 
education and accidents the less precise and relevant the factor was rated. Surprisingly, danger level 
is currently not that well defined by the avalanche warnings services. In fact, the European 
Avalanche Warning Services are working on (1) defining the parameters required to define 
avalanche danger and (2) establishing the algorithm needed to derive the avalanche danger from the 
defining properties (EAWS, 2019). In North America, the defining parameters have been identified 
and explained, but the algorithm has not been defined (Statham et al., 2018). For recreationalists 
without any formal avalanche education, the danger level is a relevant factor, but with more training 
and education, the less relevant the factor becomes for one’s risk assessment.  
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Recreationalists judged expected avalanche size as a relevant factor but difficult to estimate. 
Expected avalanche size is determined by several factors, i.e., slab stiffness, weak layer properties, 
destructive potential, length, area, volume, mass, or how far it runs into flatter terrain. All these 
properties are hard to assess in the terrain and may contradict each other when trying to assign a 
size category. Estimating avalanche sizes require training and experience and indeed the more 
training a recreationalist had the higher was the precision rating. The factor showed a decline in 
relevance with more training. This might be due to more knowledgeable recreationists 
distinguishing between avalanches that are large enough to be fatal and those that are small enough 
that they can be skied out. However, size matters in terms of how large a runout area one must 
consider. 
There was a large agreement regarding signs of instability’s high relevance. The ability to 
“see” the signs and understand what causes them increased with the level of avalanche education. 
Still, recreationalist with no formal avalanche education judged danger signs as moderately precise 
to assess. No other factor received such a high precision score. 
Distribution of weak layer scored high on relevance, and relevance and precision increased 
with education. This factor received the lowest scoring among the 11 factors for precision, and is 
generally associated with uncertainty in how to interpret it (MCClung & Schaerer, 2006). 
Weak layer distance from surface was neither rated as precisely to assess nor as decisive. 
Avalanche training did improve the ability to assess the factor. This might be due to an increased 
understanding of snow metamorphosis, a better understanding of snowpack variability, and the 
ability to interpret wind-loading patterns and the consequences this has for avalanche risk.  
Those familiar with test scores from stability tests rated the factor as moderately relevant but 
not very precise to assess. Most stability tests are time-consuming and require knowledge in 
interpreting the results (Techel, Winkler, Walcher, van Herwijnen, & Schweizer, 2020).  
Inclination (steepness) was rated as highly relevant. There are available tools and simple 
methods to assess inclination. However, actively using inclination measurements for avalanche risk 
assessment requires training and experience. Our results confirmed this by more precise 
assessments, the more education. 
Relevance of avalanche terrain and non-avalanche terrain was high. The more education, 
the easier it was to distinguish avalanche from non-avalanche terrain. In addition to release areas 
(terrain steeper than 30 degrees), runout zones must be recognized to assess this factor. High-
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resolution slope (inclination) maps in combination with computer-modeled runout zones (and 
possibly also release areas) available on smartphone apps simplify the assessment process of slope 
angle and avalanche terrain. NVEs smartphone app Varsom Regobs provides maps of slope angles 
above 30 degrees and avalanche runout zones across Norway (Larsen, Hendrikx, Slatten, & 
Engeset, 2020).  
Forest density received the lowest relevance rating. The disparity in the results may reflect 
that forest density is really a twofold factor. Forest could be a terrain trap that will increase the 
severe consequence of an avalanche or forest could have a positive, stabilizing effect on the snow 
cover, which will reduce the possibility of triggering an avalanche. How one interprets the question 
will affect the answer. 
Terrain traps increase the consequence for those getting caught in an avalanche and our 
respondents agreed upon the high relevance of this factor. The skill to identify terrain traps 
increased markedly with education.  
Assessment of safe spots improved with education. This is a risk reduction measure that 
ensures safety in case of an avalanche release triggered by someone else in the group. Expedient use 
of this factor presupposes a high degree of understanding and reading terrain.  
4.2 Implications for avalanche forecasting 
Forecasting services provide the public with information on the current avalanche situation 
on a regional scale, serving as a starting point for the avalanche risk assessment. Forecasts follow 
the information pyramid structure. The avalanche danger level is presented at the top (Engeset et al., 
2018). For many recreationalists, the avalanche forecast was the most critical factor in deciding to 
ski a slope (Furman, Shooter, & Schumann, 2010; Marengo, Monaci, & Miceli, 2017). Since the 
danger level is a description of the overall complexity and severity of the avalanche situation in a 
region the higher the forecasted danger level, the more obvious and widespread are the signs of 
danger. At low danger levels (1-3) the avalanche problem is more important than the danger level, 
while the danger level is sufficient at high avalanche danger (4-5) (Engeset et al., 2018). Indeed, 
experts rated the avalanche problem as the most important forecasted element (Hallandvik, 
Andresen, & Aadland, 2017). 
The weak layer characteristics (its distribution, depth, and type) are important to where and 
how easy it is for a skier to release a dry slab avalanche. Although it is generally considered 
difficult to precisely assess the weak layer distribution, it is an important task for avalanche 
warnings services and their professional observers to discover, monitor and communicate the 
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existence and properties of such layers. As these factors are difficult to precisely assess in the field 
even for experts, the uncertainty and required caution need to be communicated in a clear and 
transparent manner by the warning services. 
“When unstable snow is the problem, terrain is the solution”. Forecasting services should 
provide relevant terrain information, like release and runout areas, or avalanche terrain 
classification, inclination, terrain traps, safe spots/areas, and forest density. Some of these functions 
already exist in the Varsom Regobs app. 
Forecast elements, such as avalanche problems, demand a conceptual understanding and 
avalanche knowledge. This should not discourage the forecasting services from presenting these 
elements in a more appealing and easier understandable way by e.g. using illustrative pictures and 
informative video-clips. We recommend that avalanche warning services have close ties to 
educational institutions to foster comprehension and correct use of the forecast, or even integrate 
educational resources in their forecasting service. 
Publishing real-time field observations, not only the regional avalanche warning, can 
improve risk management. The NAWS provides observations in real-time, such as signs of 
instability, distribution and depth of weak layers, and avalanche size. This increases transparency 
and allows learning about the uncertainty in risk assessment. However, to support the interpretation, 
the competence level of the observers needs to be provided. 
4.3 Benefits of avalanche education 
Education clearly increased the self-rated ability to assess the factors. To have a positive 
accident prevention effect, we believe training must lead to both the development of specific skills 
and the ability to assess one's own skills (Norman et al., 2019). Training involves learning practical 
skills, the ability to detect and monitor cues, and to seek relevant information. In addition to the 
traditional field-based training, avalanche education should include video-based learning. This 
would amplify the field-based training and may compensate for situations when factors are not 
present or too dangerous to approach. Hazard perception skills improve significantly using both 
field-based and video-based training methods (Kuiken & Twisk, 2001). Video-based learning does 
not replace field-based learning. Crucially, instructors must provide adequate feedback and compare 
the students’ rationale with the rationale provided by the instructor or expert (Klein & Borders, 
2016). We also recommend teaching according to the principle Who goes where when? This 
principle could help communicating the need to balance situational task demands with group skills 
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and ability. This highlights the relationship between competence and leeway, i.e., experts being able 
to handle more complex terrain and challenging conditions than beginners. 
To further balance skills with task demands, novel decision-making frameworks should; a) 
ensure that the user can evolve within the same framework, b) force the user to be transparent, c) 
frame decision-making questions so that the burden of proof is on the decision maker, i.e., ask” Why 
is it safe?” rather than” Why is it dangerous?” , which implies assuming a slope being unsafe until 
the assessment indicates the opposite, d) reveal uncertainty by structuring the overall assessment to 
arrive at one of three possible outcomes safe, unsafe, or uncertain / gray zone (the number of gray 
zone situations will decrease with increased competency, thus increasing available leeway), and e) 
offer a structure where all relevant factors are assessed, and f) accept failure as a real-world option. 
Residual risk and the omnipresent possibility of making decisions leading to the release of an 
avalanche, makes it imperative to include the question What are the consequences if I am wrong? 
Table 2 shows the necessary learning objectives (column 2), acquired skills (column 3) that 
should be incorporated in any formal avalanche training, relevance (column 4), at which stage of an 
outing the factor can be used (column 5-7), the effect of training on understanding avalanche risk 
(column 8), and how easy it is to become expedient (column 9). The latter is our suggestion, based 
on weighting the ease of interpretation, level of uncertainty associated and the scope of learning 
tasks. We also recommend which factors are more suitable for video education (column 10). The 
following factors are high in relevance and can be effectively improved by training: Signs of 
instability, slope inclination, stopping at safe points, distribution and depth of weak layer, and 
avalanche size. Signs of instability and most terrain factors are relatively easy to learn, while 
stopping at safe points and avalanche terrain is more advanced and complex. The danger level is in 
a way easy to learn, but also transforms complex snow information and processes into one single 
item. Six of the factors are prime candidates for educational videos. 
4.5 Limitations 
Our study did not use all 53 avalanche risk factors, as we were not interested in knowledge about 
each factor but rather on the role of avalanche education in correctly assessing risk factors. There 
might be differences in self-reported and actual in-field use, addressable in future research.  
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Table 2: A summary with the perspective of assisting development of better education and training frameworks for avalanche risk assessments. We 
always recommend to complement using field-based training and experience. The ratings very high / high (relevance and effect of training), and 
easy / advanced (ease of learning) are in blue / light blue to highlight the most important findings to stakeholders in avalanche education. 













Danger level Understand concept & elements of danger level Consider general severity of situation 
(planning phase) 
- √ Forecast - - - Easy - 




Understand weak layer & slab properties 
Understand fracture initiation & propagation 
Signs of 
instability 




√ √ Very high Easy √ 




Understand concept of snowpack variability Estimate likelihood of triggering High √ Forecast
Snow history
Observations




Interpret wind loading patterns Estimate necessary additional load or 
weakening 
Estimate potential avalanche size 
Distribution of 
weak layer 













Understand snow metamorphosis  
Evaluate snowpack 
Do process thinking  
Understand snowpack distribution & variability 
Test score 
stability tests 




Learn to do tests & interpret test scores Estimate necessary additional load or 
weakening 
Understand the possibilities & limitations Estimate avalanche size 
Understand the concept of distribution  
Inclination Measure inclination (tools) Estimate inclination High √ √ √ High Easy √ 
Use inclination maps Terrain selection 




Use aids (maps, inclinometer, apps) Identify avalanche terrain Very 
high 
√ √ √ Medium Easy √ 
Use guidebooks Terrain selection 
Do route finding, observe terrain 
 
Forest density Imagine consequences Know when to avoid or use to your 
advantage 
- - √ √ n/a n/a - 
Understand effect on snowpack  
Terrain trap Imagine consequences Identify terrain traps Very 
high 




Identify run out zones Identify safe spots High - - √ Very high Advanced √ 
Understand avalanche flow patterns 




In high-stake low probability environment like snow-covered mountains, avalanche risk 
assessment requires both knowing which are the relevant factors and being able to assess those 
factors with sufficient precision. By studying the role of avalanche education on assessing and 
judging avalanche risk factors among backcountry recreationalists, we found a similar judgement 
about which factors are relevant and predictive of avalanches as we previously found among 
experts. The ability to assess the factors with enough precision often depended, and even improved 
with avalanche education. Recreationalists viewed avalanche risk assessment as learnable. This 
supports the view that analytical, knowledge-based decision-making should not be reserved for 
experts, but should be taught beginners as well. We recommend how to optimize education and 
develop better decision-making frameworks, knowing that there will always be residual risk and 
uncertainty, making it impossible to guarantee absolute safety.  
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Abstract. Like many other mountainous countries, Norway
has experienced a rapid increase in both recreational winter
activities and fatalities in avalanche terrain during the past
few decades: during the decade 2008–2017, 64 recreational
avalanche fatalities were recorded in Norway. This is a 106 %
increase from that of the previous decade. In 2013, Nor-
way therefore launched the National Avalanche Warning Ser-
vice (NAWS), which provides avalanche warnings to trans-
port and preparedness authorities and to the public. Previous
studies suggest that avalanche warnings are used extensively
in trip and preparedness planning and have a relatively strong
influence on the decisions people make in order to reduce
risk. However, no evaluation concerning how efficiently the
warnings are communicated and understood has been done to
date in Norway. Avalanche warnings communicate complex
natural phenomena with a variable complexity and level of
uncertainty about both the future and the present. In order to
manage avalanche risk successfully, it is fundamental that the
warning message can be understood and translated into prac-
tice by a wide range of different user groups. Users with little
or no avalanche competence may need simple information to
decide when to stay away from avalanche terrain, while pro-
fessional users may need advanced technical details in order
to make their decisions. To evaluate how different modes of
communication are understood, and how efficiently the infor-
mational content is communicated, we designed and imple-
mented a web-based user survey. The modes of presentation
were based on the Varsom.no 2017 version (Varsom.no being
the national portal for natural hazard warnings in Norway).
We first used a panel of 110 experts from NAWS to answer
the survey, and used their answers to establish the indented
message of the avalanche warning. We thereafter received re-
sponses from 264 users and compared their answers to those
of the NAWS experts for the different modes of communica-
tion. We developed a method, the comprehension effective-
ness score, to test the comprehension. Our empirical anal-
yses suggest that most users find the warning service to be
useful and well suited to their needs. However, the effective-
ness of a warnings seems to be influenced by the competency
of the user and the complexity of the scenarios. We discuss
the findings and make recommendations on how to improve
communication of avalanche warnings.
1 Introduction
Does the Norwegian Avalanche Warning Service effectively
communicate its intended message? Risk communicators
should pursue their intention to assess whether the message
they disseminate is appropriate, understandable and useful
(Charrière and Bogaard, 2016). This is a matter of prime con-
cern during a period of dramatic change in information tech-
nology and information consumption in society. The Inter-
net is rapidly becoming the main source of information, and
Published by Copernicus Publications on behalf of the European Geosciences Union.
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studies show that communication is important: e.g. Brigo et
al. (2016) conclude that Internet campaigns with emotional
content are important to effectively promote awareness pro-
grammes on risk of avalanches and increase public knowl-
edge related to these persistent and serious threats. This study
focuses less on campaigns and more on the avalanche warn-
ings and forecasts published daily by Avalanche Warnings
Services (AWS′).
In this paper we use the terms danger and hazard inter-
changeably. The same applies to the terms forecast, warning
and bulletin.
1.1 Public avalanche warnings
In order to prevent avalanche accidents, AWS′ throughout
the world publish avalanche warnings to the preparedness au-
thorities and the public. The standards for publishing danger
levels and structuring the information in the warnings have
been developed over the years with the aim of providing the
users with a product that is as effective as possible. Most
AWS′ use the systems devised by the European Avalanche
Warning Services (http://www.avalanches.org, last access:
9 September 2018; EAWS, 2017a, Müller et al., 2016) or
the North American AWS′ (https://avalanche.org/, last ac-
cess: 9 September 2018; Statham et al., 2010, 2018). All
AWS′ quantify the danger into five levels (1–5) and use one
or more of these standard elements: (1) a main (flash) mes-
sage, (2) most avalanche-prone terrain (elevation; aspects),
(3) avalanche problems, (4) snow cover and avalanche his-
tory, and (5) avalanche danger assessment and prognosis.
The products from the different AWS′ vary considerably
in degree of detail, use of text, symbols and graphics, de-
gree of advice provided, etc. (Burkeljca, 2013a). However,
most avalanche warnings are typically structured in a stan-
dard journalistic inverted pyramid approach (Scanlan, 2000;
Burkeljca, 2013b), where the most important information
is presented at the top. More detailed and advanced infor-
mation is sequentially presented further down in the pyra-
mid. Accordingly, the standard EAWS approach (see https:
//avalanche.org/, last access: 9 September 2018) presents the
danger level at the top, often accompanied by a flash mes-
sage (a short main message). Secondly, the core zones (the
most avalanche-prone terrain) are pointed out, typically by
describing which elevation intervals and compass directions
(sectors) have the highest danger. At this level, or at the level
below, the current avalanche problems are described, fol-
lowed by a description of the avalanche danger, snow cover
and avalanche history, weather history and prognosis, and fi-
nally observations from the field. The pyramid approach also
reflects what is useful to users at three different levels of
competence (Mitterer et al., 2014): the top level of informa-
tion targets all users, especially beginners with limited ability
to understand and use complex information and users who
want to get the key information quickly, the medium-level
targets users with an intermediate to advanced knowledge of
avalanche and snow assessments, while the detailed bottom
level of information in mainly useful to experts.
The danger level ranges from 1 – low – to 5 – very high
(termed extreme in North America) – and is an expression of
the probability and size of expected avalanches in a given
geographical region over a given period of time. In order
to derive a danger level, the geographical extent should be
above 100 km2 (EAWS, 2017a). It is a generalization over
a larger area, which typically has significant local variabil-
ity (Jamieson et al., 2008; Schweizer et al., 2008; Techel et
al., 2016). The European Avalanche Danger Scale (EADS;
EAWS, 2016) was introduced in 1993 (SLF, 2018) and is
used by all European AWS′ but the Swedish AWS. The
avalanche warning is a prognosis of expected danger over
time, typically a period of 24 h, and is based on an analysis
of the current snow cover and the effects of the weather on
the snow and avalanche conditions during the prognosis pe-
riod. The avalanche problems (Atkins, 2004; Landrø et al.,
2013; Statham et al., 2018) describe the characteristics of
the avalanche danger in more detail: the type of avalanche
(dry or wet, slab or loose), trigger and failure mechanism,
expected terrain locations, predictability and ease of detec-
tion. The level of detail varies between AWS′, as do the num-
ber of categories. Advice for back-country travellers or pre-
paredness authorities is provided by some AWS′, either in
the flash message (what to be aware of or do), as part of the
avalanche problem (specific advice; is the problem manage-
able, and if so, how) or linked to the avalanche danger level
(general advice). The snow cover and avalanche analysis pro-
vides a description of the snow properties and distribution
relevant to avalanche conditions (e.g. snow height, recent
snow fall, surface, wet/dry, critical layers) as well as recently
observed avalanches in the region (e.g. locations, numbers,
sizes, types, failure planes). The avalanche danger assess-
ment provides further details on the avalanche threats, the
distribution within the region, effects of expected weather,
uncertainties, etc.
Introducing the EADS in 1993 as a European standard
(Meister, 1995) improved communication of avalanche dan-
ger, and provided a basis for rule-based management strate-
gies. The danger level is used by many users (Winkler
and Techel, 2014; LWD Steiermark, 2015; Procter et al.,
2014) and affects decision making during back-country tours
(Techel et al., 2015; Furman et al., 2010) and in the work
of risk management authorities. Avalanche warnings provide
important information for back-country tour planning as well
as en route (Winkler and Techel, 2014; LWD Steiermark,
2015; Baker and McGee, 2016).
1.2 Warning and risk communication
The purpose of warnings is to inform people at risk about
the hazard and to promote “correct” and safe behaviour
(Wogalter et al., 1999). To do so, warnings may assess not
only threat and danger, but also exposure and vulnerabil-
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ity (WMO, 2015). Such impact-based warnings have been
shown to be more effective than other types of warnings
and are more and more in demand (DeJoy, 1999). Impact-
based warnings facilitate informed decision making, which
in turn leads to desirable outcomes and prevents unnecessary
costs to society (Pielke Jr. and Carbone, 2002). In the case
of avalanche warnings they provide users with both general
and specific information about the current and expected lev-
els of avalanche danger, the type of avalanche problem at
hand, and behavioural advice. The main aim of the warning
message is to inform the user about the nature and severity
of current and expected threats, and about how he or she can
mitigate the risk or avoid the threats. However, since most re-
gional AWS′ do not provide specific and local descriptions of
the forecasted risk, it may be difficult to effectively reach this
goal. In addition, most AWS′ lack detailed information on the
type of objects and number of individuals who are at risk, and
on the exposure and vulnerability of these. Thus, most AWS′
provide impact-based warnings in a general sense, but not in
terms of impact specific to detailed geographical locations,
people, roads, and so on. An AWS issues regional forecasts,
which describe the general probability and size of avalanches
in a geographical area. These forecasts may describe the gen-
eral impact for recreational activity, roads, buildings, etc., but
will not be able to determine the nature or scale of the impact
on individuals or objects. For example, if an AWS′ issues a
warning at level 5 extreme danger in a mountain area where
no one is recreating, the impact will be nil as nobody is ex-
posed to the danger. At the other end, this warning describes
the impact to people that are at risk, if people choose to travel
in avalanche terrain in extreme danger. So in a way the fore-
cast is impact-based, but it cannot quantify the impact specif-
ically as the AWS′ will not know how many people are ex-
posing themselves to the risk. The warnings advise the users
on how to reduce or avoid being exposed and vulnerable to
the avalanche danger, and thus the risk.
Although risk communication research has been a grow-
ing field since the 1980s (Sivle, 2016), some researchers re-
port that warning practices have not changed much during the
past decades (Kasperson, 2014), and there is sometimes a gap
between the intended message (warning) and the message
received (Gigerenzer et al., 2007). A range of factors con-
tributes to this gap. One such factor is that many people find
it difficult to interpret numbers and probabilities. People’s
ability to make meaning out of numbers and statistics is of-
ten referred to as numeracy (Lipkus and Peters, 2009). Both
large-scale surveys and small-scale experiments show that
many individuals lack this ability (Låg et al., 2014; Kirsch
et al., 2002) and that even well-educated individuals often
display a low level of numeracy (Lipkus et al., 2001). One
approach to mitigate this problem is to use qualitative expla-
nations with words like “likely” and “unlikely”. Even though
people vary in their understanding of such words, users can
conceptualize the concepts by comparing them to risks they
already understand (Gordon-Lubitz, 2003; Edwards and El-
wyn, 2001).
Another reason for a mismatch between the intended and
received messages is that people vary in their motivation to
use, and competence to read, warnings. The level of use and
understanding of the information provided in the warnings
vary between different user groups, and between different
geographical regions (Wogalter et al., 1997). Geographical
differences are driven both by differences in the character-
istics of the user groups present in the area and by differ-
ences in the complexity and amount of supporting informa-
tion provided by the regional AWS′s (Burkeljca, 2013a). Dif-
ferences in the use of warnings may further be driven by
variations in the level of trust in authorities and experts, and
by personal experiences of natural hazards (Wachinger et al.,
2013). Avalanche danger may in fact be so complex that a
novice will not be able to manage the same terrain as ex-
perts, no matter how well the warning is communicated. The
avalanche warnings are communicating a phenomenon that
many users conceive as a low-probability event, since many
users never or seldom experience a release of an avalanche
themselves. This conception may in itself reduce engage-
ment on the users’ side and interest in reading and using the
avalanche warning, and reduce interest in investing in under-
standing the warning. Another challenge is that the warnings
are used in several different ways, which also could lower the
interest.
Taken together, these differences make it difficult for
providers of avalanche warnings to meet the needs of all
groups. The challenge facing providers of avalanche fore-
casts is made even more difficult by the lack of research on
how efficient different ways of presenting the avalanche dan-
ger to different groups are. For example, less competent and
motivated users may need simplified explanations and direct
travel advice in order to be able to use the information. They
may easily be overloaded if the warning contains a lot of de-
tailed information (Maltz, 2000; Liang et al., 2006). For ad-
vanced users, on the other hand, simplified information and
advice may be of limited use. Instead this group may demand
detailed information about the snow cover. It can be challeng-
ing to simultaneously satisfy the needs of both groups.
1.3 The Norwegian Avalanche Warnings Service,
Varsom and RegObs
During the past few decades, Norway, as many other coun-
tries, has experienced a rapid increase in recreational win-
ter activities in avalanche terrain (mainly ski touring, snow-
mobiling and to some extent snowshoeing). The increase in
back-country recreation has unfortunately been associated
with an increase in fatal avalanche accidents. During the
decade 2008–2017, avalanches claimed 64 recreational fa-
talities (61 % occurred in northern Norway and Svalbard);
the corresponding number for the decade 1998–2007 was 31
(NGI, 2018). By contrast, avalanche fatalities in houses and
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during transportation decreased from 7 in 1998–2007 to 2
in 2008–2017 (NGI, 2018). Similar trends are reported from
other parts of the world (e.g. Techel et al., 2016). Another
three fatalities, all recreational, were recorded during the
2018 winter season. Thus Norway had eight fatalities the
last 3 years, which brings the annual fatality figures down
by 50 % as compared to the previous decade.
In other states with significant increase in the use of
avalanche terrain, such as in the US and several European
countries, Avalanche Warnings Services (AWS′) have suc-
ceeded in avoiding an increase in fatalities, although their
warning styles and formats have varied quite a bit. The trend
in the US has been a declining fatality rate: whereas the num-
ber of fatalities has been rather constant, the use of avalanche
terrain has surged (Birkeland, 2016).
In order to halt the undesirable trend in avalanche acci-
dents in Norway, the Norwegian Government in a white pa-
per in 2012 decided to establish the Norwegian Avalanche
Warnings Service (NAWS) in January 2013 (Engeset, 2013).
NAWS publishes regional avalanche warnings for Norway,
including Svalbard, on a daily basis on the web portal http:
//www.varsom.no (last access: 9 September 2018) (Johnsen,
2013). The Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Direc-
torate owns and operates NAWS in collaboration with the
Norwegian Public Roads Authorities and the Norwegian Me-
teorological Institute. The reduction in annual fatalities dur-
ing the previous 3–4 years suggests that NAWS is effective,
as the accident numbers have not increased although the use
of avalanche terrain for ski touring has increased drastically
in Norway, every year during the last decade or so.
In 2017, regional avalanche warnings were issued for
21 regions in Norway (Fig. 1). In addition, warnings were
issued for the rest of the country when the avalanche dan-
ger was expected to reach danger level 4 or 5. An example
of an avalanche warning on Varsom.no is shown in Fig. 2.
The avalanche warning published on Varsom.no includes the
elements described in Fig. 2 and Table 1.
Four elements (danger level and main message, region
map, avalanche problems, and mountain weather progno-
sis) are available in an English version of the warning
on Varsom.no, while two elements are in Norwegian only
(avalanche danger assessment and snow cover history) and
one is partly in English (RegObs-feed with observations).
All text but that of the main message and the avalanche
problems is written manually by the NAWS forecasters.
Sometimes forecasters use parts of the text from the previous
day, especially in the snow cover history. The text in the main
message is produced in the following manner: the forecasters
get a list of text suggestions that are available depending on
the chosen danger level and avalanche problem(s). He/she
may choose to use text from this list and edit it, write the
message from scratch or copy the text from the previous day.
The text in the travelling advice in the avalanche problem
is generated from a list of text suggestions. The selection of
text is based on the combination of the chosen danger level
and avalanche problem. The forecasters may edit the text af-
terwards. NAWS generates text suggestions in the forecast
editing software for the main message and avalanche prob-
lems in order make the text in the warnings easier for the
users to read, ensure that the terms and wordings are as good
and consistent as possible, make sure the time needed to pro-
duce the text is not too high and make translation of the text
to English as good and as easy as possible. NAWS has been
having discussions about the degree to which text is to be
created from scratch by individual forecasters or rather be
pre-defined or suggested from a standard library of sentences
and terms. NAWS uses a hybrid approach to this, and the
creative from-scratch text is mostly found in the main mes-
sage (Norwegian and English; the English version is some-
times an extended version of the Norwegian in order to in-
corporate more detailed information about the snow cover
and avalanche danger), avalanche danger assessment (Nor-
wegian only) and snowpack and avalanche history (Norwe-
gian only). However, creative text may suffer from poor lan-
guage and significant individual differences that are difficult
for the users to understand. Also, much time may be spent
writing text to convey a message that has already be written
in a much better way by someone else. However, the inter-
est and motivation of users may drop if they get the feeling
that too much text is auto-generated or copied and pasted.
NAWS is aware of this effect and continuously makes efforts
to prevent this from happening.
Since the start in 2013, NAWS has continuously worked
to improve both the competence level of observers and fore-
casters, and the system for presenting the forecast. User feed-
back suggested that most users find the warnings useful and
of high quality. However, to date, no formal evaluation has
been done of how effective NAWS is at communicating its
intended message. Such an evaluation is important, as pub-
lic avalanche warnings have only been available in Norway
since 2013 and Norwegian users are less used to using the
warnings to manage risk than users in countries with a longer
history of public avalanche warnings.
In order to improve the avalanche knowledge in the
Norwegian population in general, and the ski touring and
snowmobiling communities in particular, NVE launched the
“Snøskredskolen” (avalanche school) on Varsom.no. The
avalanche school is a tailor-made resource for users of the
avalanche warnings, as all key terms and concepts are ex-
plained and safe travelling advice is provided. It is also a
much used resource for avalanche course providers.
As a system in the Varsom.no portfolio, RegObs provides
data from the field as a basis for making forecasting deci-
sions. RegObs is an open web- and app-based system for re-
porting, storing, querying and sharing observations and as-
sessments from the field with the forecasters and the public.
The observations are public and a live feed of observations
is displayed on Varsom.no, next to the avalanche warning.
As such, RegObs is an integral part of Varsom.no and the
communication of the avalanche warnings. RegObs commu-
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Table 1. A description of the elements included in the avalanche warning on Varsom.no. Figure 2 shows how the elements are shown in
relation to each other on a smartphone web browser.
Element Description
1 Danger level and main message: the danger level is a combination of the probability
and size of expected avalanches in the region during the forecast period. The main message is a flash message
displayed next to the danger level, and is a short statement of what constitutes the hazard and what the advice
to the user is. This text is supposed to be very short and to the point, as if the user did not care to or have the
competence to read the rest of the warning. The English version of the main message may be longer than the
Norwegian, in order to include details about the snow cover that are otherwise accessible in Norwegian only.
2 Avalanche danger assessment: a more detailed description of the avalanche hazard and what is the reason
for it. It often includes a more detailed description of the uncertainty and local variability.
3 Region map: a map of the region, showing its extent and perimeter.
4 Avalanche problem(s) with management/travel advice: the avalanche problems, which at the time were
storm slab, dry loose, wind slab, wet slab, wet loose, persistent slab, and glide avalanches (Landrø et al.,
2013). A number of properties are forecasted for each avalanche problem: expected (destructive) size (1 to 5),
expected additional load (natural, low or high), distribution (isolated, few, some or many steep slopes), release
probability (possible, probable and likely) and core zone. Each avalanche problem has a pre-defined
management and travel advice according to danger level. A main characteristic of the avalanche problem in the
Norwegian warnings is that the properties of the weak layer are specified for slab-type avalanche problems, according
to the Systematic snow cover diagnosis system (Kronthaler et al., 2013). The different avalanche problems have
danger-specific advices for the users: How predictable and easy to detect is the problem in the field? Where in
the terrain is it easy to trigger or be caught by avalanches from this problem? How to reduce the vulnerability
to the problem? What should preparedness stakeholders be aware of?
5 Snow cover (and avalanche) history: this is a mixture of observation and an analysis of the snow cover at
the initial time of the forecast period. It is an important baseline for making a prognosis of how forecasted
weather may affect the avalanche danger during the forecasting period. It includes observations of recent
avalanche.
6 Mountain weather: this is the weather prognosis accessed at the time of writing the warning, and is thus the
basis for prescribing the avalanche danger in combination with the snow cover history.
7 RegObs observations: a real-time feed of observations submitted to and shared by the RegObs system.
Regobs is the national system for sharing field observations in real time (Ekker et al., 2013).
nicates the field observations and assessments that the warn-
ings are based on, in a transparent way. As far as we are
aware, RegObs is the only open-access online real-time dis-
tribution system for avalanche forecasting observations right
now, although previous efforts have provided open access
to accident data (Duclos et al., 2008). As far as the authors
are aware, there is no other completely open-access online
real-time distribution system. Other systems, such as the In-
foEx, the Mountain Information Network and the Mountain
Hub, lack open APIs or restrict access to functionality or data
partly or fully.
1.4 Aims of the study
The current study is part of a larger project, which focuses
on communication of flood, landslide, and avalanche danger
warnings. In this study, we evaluate the efficiency of warn-
ings by the NAWS on the website Varsom.no. Avalanche
warning systems are used in trip and preparedness planning,
and have been shown to have an influence on the decisions
people make in order to reduce risk (e.g. Furman et al., 2010;
Marengo et al., 2017). Mountain guides, course providers,
rescue services and avalanche observers report that people
actively respond to the avalanche warnings on Varsom.no,
and to a large degree choose snow, terrain and time/day for
travelling according to the danger level, avalanche problem
and advice provided by NAWS.
Warnings should therefore ideally be revealing and un-
ambiguous. To assess whether the warnings published by
NAWS fulfil these requirements, we asked the following re-
search questions: (1) which risk factors are considered most
difficult to assess and manage? (2) Which elements in the
warning are considered most and least important? (3) Which
elements are easily misunderstood or considered poorly com-
municated? (4) What kind of information and features are
missing or ignored by users?
We tested whether users interpreted the danger and be-
havioural implications differently depending on whether the
message was described by text, by symbols or by pictures.
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Figure 1. Screen dump from Varsom.no showing the avalanche warning regions in Norway. Daily warnings are published for the regions
coloured according to the danger level. The other regions (grey) are monitored and warnings are only published at danger levels 4 and 5.
Furthermore, we tested how well the warnings were under-
stood, by testing four alternative ways of communicating two
different danger scenarios. We developed a method, the com-
prehension effectiveness score, to test the comprehension.
2 Methods and data collection
We developed a web-based questionnaire and survey to col-
lect data for the study. Questionnaires are useful tools for
acquiring information on public knowledge and perception
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Figure 2. An example of an avalanche warning as issued on Varsom.no in 2017. The numbers refer to the elements analysed in this study.
(1) Danger level and main message, (2) avalanche danger assessment, (3) region map, (4) avalanche problems, (5) snow cover history,
(6) mountain weather prognosis and (7) RegObs-feed with observations. The figure shows the screen dump from a smartphone, with the
middle and right panels showing the screen as the user scrolls down the page. The warning has been translated from Norwegian to English.
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of natural hazards, and can provide valuable information to
emergency management agencies for developing risk man-
agement procedures (Bird, 2009). This chapter presents the
methods, participants and survey design of this study.
2.1 Participants
NAWS personnel participated in the expert survey (personal
invitation only), while all types of users participated in the
user survey (open invitation, anyone could participate). The
user survey participants included all types of users (var-
ious degrees of competence and experience, from begin-
ners/novices to experts; various types of use, from recre-
ational to professional and preparedness), while the NAWS
expert survey included only forecasters and observers, all
trained in the same system.
2.1.1 NAWS expert survey
The aim of the first survey was to derive a set of “correct”
answers to questions on the meaning of the presented warn-
ings. We therefore invited 200 avalanche experts (mainly
avalanche forecasters and observers in the NAWS) to par-
ticipate in the survey during the period 15–26 October 2017;
110 experts provided complete responses. Of these, 67 were
observers, 21 forecasters and 22 were not active in the fore-
casting. The last group consisted of former forecasters and
observers, and of individuals with a professional liaison role
in the forecasting services. Of those providing details about
gender, 25 % of the participants were women and 75 % were
men.
2.1.2 User survey
The purpose of the second survey was to test how well the
NAWS message was understood by non-expert users, and
therefore targeted users, and potential users, of the NAWS.
We recruited participants via social media, Varsom.no and
different user-related web pages.
A total of 485 respondents answered the user survey. Not
all respondents answered questions in all sections, leaving
264 respondents for analysis of Section B (avalanche warn-
ing), 222 respondents for analysis of Section C (text ver-
sus symbols and pictures) and 177 respondents for analysis
of Section D (comprehension). The lower number of user
respondents completing Sections C and D reflects a com-
mon challenge in web-based surveys to engage participants
enough to answer complex and time-consuming questions.
Of those proving details about gender, 17 % of the partici-
pants were women and 83 % were men. The mean age in the
sample was 35 years (min= 19, max= 69); 26 % of the re-
spondents lived in northern Norway, 8 % in Trøndelag, 11 %
at the north-western coast, 24 % at the western coast, 27 % in
the south-east, 1 % on Svalbard, and 2 % answered other.
2.2 Survey design
In order to obtain valid responses and avoid careless respond-
ing, it is important that participants are motivated to take the
survey, understand all questions, feel that they can answer
the questions, and do not lose interest before the end of the
survey (Meade and Craig, 2012). We therefore pretested and
revised all survey items in an iterative process. In the first
stage, NAWS personnel, both forecasters and observers, pro-
vided qualitative feedback on how well the avalanche warn-
ings communicated the message that NAWS would like to
disseminate, and this was taken into account when the ques-
tions and response alternatives were designed. We thereafter
asked a test panel consisting of project members (N = 12) to
provide iterative feedback on the content and structure of the
survey. Based on the feedback from the NAWS personnel and
the test panel, we rephrased several questions and instruc-
tions to improve clarity. We also reduced both the number
of questions and response alternatives. The latter shortened
the completion time of the survey to about 10 min. The sur-
vey was constructed so that it was possible to view and an-
swer all questions using a variety of devices, including smart-
phones. The general structure and purpose of each section of
the NAWS expert survey and user surveys are described be-
low.
The five sections (A–E) were identical in the NAWS expert
survey and the user survey. Sections B–D provided the core
data for the analysis in this paper. An overview of the survey
is provided in Table 2.
The two scenarios in Section D were based on accessing
the warnings (in Norwegian) on Varsom.no at the time of the
survey (autumn 2017). The four alternatives given for each
of the two scenarios in Section D were picked randomly for
each user respondent. We did not counterbalance the order:
all respondents received first the level 2 scenario and then
level 4, but with different alternatives for each scenario.
2.3 NAWS expert survey
As briefly mentioned above, the main purpose of the ex-
pert survey was to derive a template of “correct” answers.
More specifically, we wanted to identify key information el-
ements and define sets of behavioural implications in dif-
ferent avalanche danger scenarios. In other words, we used
the experts to operationalize the intended content of the
avalanche forecasts. To make sure that the operationaliza-
tion was valid, we used a relatively large and heterogeneous
group of avalanche experts.
To limit completion time and mental strain for partici-
pants, we only used two avalanche danger scenarios (level 2
and level 4; see section D in Table 2). Each expert was ran-
domly exposed to one out of four alternative ways to present
the forecast for each danger level (Fig. 3): (1) avalanche dan-
ger level with explanation, (2) avalanche problem with tech-
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nical details, (3) avalanche problem with technical details
only, and (4) avalanche problem with advice only.
After the expert respondent had read the example, we first
asked him or her to rate how well the danger was communi-
cated in the example, on a scale from 0 to 10. We thereafter
asked the expert to identify key information elements and be-
havioural implications of the avalanche forecast. The options
were pre-defined, as described in Table 3. We were specif-
ically interested in identifying the most important message
that the forecast aimed to communicate.
2.4 Communication effectiveness score
In order to establish a communication effectiveness score,
we used the NAWS expert answers to allocate weights to the
different behavioural implications. We allocated a positive
weight of +1 to elements positively identified as important
by more than one out of three experts (33 %), and a weight
of−1 to elements positively identified by less than one out of
five experts (20 %). All other elements were given a weight
of null.
Our reasoning behind using positive and negative weights
to calculate the communication effectiveness score is that
there is no objective correct answer. Accordingly, we use the
NAWS expert answers, where a factor receives+1 if the ma-
jority of experts provide support, 0 for inconclusive support
by the experts, and −1 if a small minority of experts regard
this factor as relevant. The rationale behind this approach was
to give a penalty (a weight of−1) to statements that were se-
lected by few/no NAWS experts and a point to statements
that were selected by many NAWS experts. In the design
phase, we explored using different algorithms for calculating
the scores, for example by using the relative number of ex-
perts selecting the statement as a weight or decimal weights.
However, in order to keep the method and results relatively
easy to understand and interpret, we choose a straightforward
approach.
The expert choices and resulting weights are listed in Ta-
ble 3. As can be seen in Table 3, many experts agreed on the
most important implications, and very few items are there-
fore close to the cut-off value. Nevertheless, to ensure that
our results do not hinge on our chosen levels (33 and 20 %),
we have tested both upward and downward variations of the
cut-off values. The results presented in Sect. 3 are robust to
these variations.
2.5 User survey
The user survey was open to the public during the pe-
riod 1 November–15 December 2017. We published links
to the survey on a relatively wide set of platforms: Var-
som.no, the free online skiing magazine friflyt.no, and on
the Facebook page of the most popular weather service
in Norway, YR.no. The association of snow scooter clubs
(Skuterklubbenes fellesråd) and the Norwegian Hiking Asso-
ciation (DNT) kindly distributed the survey to their members.
Finally, we announced the survey on the Nordic avalanche
conference in Åndalsnes in the beginning of November.
Each participant was asked to answer the full survey (Sec-
tions A–E). In Section D, the users were, just like the experts,
randomly exposed to one out of four alternative ways of pre-
senting the avalanche warning for the level 2 and level 4 sce-
narios, and thereafter to first rank how well the danger was
communicated on a scale from 1 to 10, and to mark the most
important behavioural implications of the warning.
We used the weights in Table 3 to calculate a “communi-
cation effectiveness score” for each participant and each be-
havioural implication. To illustrate, consider a user respon-
dent who ticked the boxes for statements 1–3 after reading
an example of the level 2 scenario. Based on the scores in
Table 3, we would give this user a score of −1 (the sum of
−1+ 1− 1). If the user instead ticked the boxes for state-
ments 3 and 5 after reading an example of the level 4 sce-
nario, we would give him or her a score of +2 (the sum of
+1+ 1). The scores for the level 2 scenario ranged from −4
to +4, and for the level 4 scenario from −6 to +3.
2.6 Web survey or field testing
Our overarching aim for this study was to investigate users’
comprehension of the warning. Ultimately, all public warn-
ings aim at making people take the correct actions at the cor-
rect time. However, there is a large body of evidence demon-
strating that there is a mismatch between what people say and
what they do (e.g. Jerolmack and Khan, 2014). Therefore,
if we studied people’s behaviour and not comprehension we
would not know whether the lack of correct action was due
to lack of comprehension or rather a mismatch between atti-
tudes and behaviour.
Self-reports are by many accounts not a perfect method,
but in this case we found them to be the best approach to test
people’s comprehension. In addition they allow us to col-
lect a substantially larger number of respondents compared
to for example a field study or interviews. A web-based sur-
vey is also relevant, as many decisions are made based on
reading the avalanche warning on the web ahead of getting
into navigation in the terrain. It could be decisions such as to
choose forest rather than alpine for today’s trip, or to delay
the planned trip a few days until the snow stabilizes. How-
ever, it would be very interesting to test what people know
and also what they do. This would call for a different study
altogether, but is a very good idea for future research.
2.7 Ethics
This study registered anonymous information exclusively
and did not collect data that can be used to identify individu-
als. All respondents actively gave their consent for the use of
the data for research and the project.
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Figure 3. Alternatives 1 to 4 used for the two scenarios: (a) level 2 and wind slab (upper panel) and (b) level 4 and wet slabs (lower panel).
The text has been translated from Norwegian into English.
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Table 2. Overview of the survey.
Section Purpose
A Collect background information related to avalanche training and competence, e.g. association with NAWS, if
any, level of avalanche competence and training, activity level in terms of travelling in avalanche terrain, and
level of comprehension of avalanche terrain.
B Understand how respondents evaluate the available elements in the warning and how these are communicated
(which elements are most important, least important, difficult to assess and manage, poorly communicated or
easily misunderstood, and which elements are missing).
C Test how users perceive three different ways of presenting the avalanche danger: text, symbols, and pictures.
D Test the comprehension of two scenarios:
– danger level 2 (wind slab problem), based on the warning for Troms region on 18 April 2017, and
– danger level 4 (wet slab problem), based on the warning for Troms region on 4 April 2017.
For each scenario, the participant was first randomly presented with one out of four alternative ways of
communicating the danger:
1. Avalanche danger level with explanation (general advice associated with the danger level),
2. Avalanche problem with technical details (avalanche rose, probability, distribution, expected size and
type of avalanches) and advice (advice on how to manage the problem including travel advice),
3. Avalanche problem with technical details only, and
4. Avalanche problem with advice only.
We thereafter asked the respondent to interpret and evaluate the warning in terms of (1) behavioural
implications (based on a pre-defined set of options), (2) how well the avalanche warning was presented, and
(3) how the respondent would describe the warning to others, and what travel advice s/he would give to them.
E Collect background information related to demographics, and back-country recreation, e.g. gender, age, home
region, terrain activities, and use of avalanche gear and forecast.
Table 3. Expert survey results (number of respondents selecting the statement, in %) and design weights established for a communication
effectiveness score.
Statement 2 scenario 2 scenario 4 scenario 4 scenario
response weight response weight
1. Unngå alle løsneområder (avoid all release areas) 20 % −1 84 % +1
2. Unngå noen løsneområder (avoid some release areas) 63 % +1 9 % −1
3. Unngå alle utløpsområder (avoid all runout areas) 8 % −1 84 % +1
4. Unngå noen utløpsområder (avoid some runout areas) 39 % +1 11 % −1
5. Unngå skredutsatte veier (avoid avalanche-exposed roads) 6 % −1 75 % +1
6. Kunne mye om snø for å vite hva jeg skal unngå (know a lot about 29 % 0 16 % −1
snow in order to know what to avoid)
7. Grave i snøen for å vite hva jeg skal unngå (dig in the snow in 12 % −1 6 % −1
order to know what to avoid)
8. Vite mye om været siste to dager for å velge terreng (know a lot 45 % +1 13 % −1
about the weather the last two days in order to choose terrain)
9. Forvente store lokale forskjeller (expect large local variability) 71 % +1 16 % −1
3 Results
In this chapter, we present the avalanche-related demo-
graphics of the user respondents (sections A and E), well-
functioning and malfunctioning parts of the 2017 version of
the avalanche warnings on Varsom.no, as perceived by the
participants (Section B), the participants’ evaluation of how
well text, symbols and pictures assist the informational con-
tent in the warnings (data from Section C), the participants’
evaluations of how well different levels of complexity in the
text persuade the informational content in the warnings (data
from Section D), and test results for level of comprehension
at different levels of complexity in the warning texts (also
data from Section D).
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Table 4. Contingency table of user respondents’ experience (num-
ber of tours in avalanche terrain per year) versus competence.
Competence Experience (tours in avalanche
terrain per year)
0 < 5 5–15 > 15 N
None 10 % 48 % 35 % 8 % 40
Competent, no course 6 % 23 % 41 % 30 % 81
Competent, course 0 % 6 % 39 % 55 % 121
Expert 0 % 5 % 14 % 82 % 22
3.1 Demographics
The statistics of the users with respect to competence, expe-
rience, activities and geography are listed below and in Ta-
ble 4.
– 14 % of the user respondents had no or little avalanche
knowledge (labelled “None” in Table 4), 27 % stated
that they had avalanche-related competence but no for-
mal training (“Competent, no course”), 48 % stated
that they had avalanche-related competence and for-
mal training (“Competent, course”), and 10 % were
avalanche instructors or professionals (“Expert”).
– 82 % stated that they had used avalanche gear (e.g.
avalanche beacon, shovel and probe) for several sea-
sons, 7 % for one season only, and 11 % had never used
this type of equipment.
– The majority of users stated that their main activity in
avalanche terrain was alpine ski touring (66 %). Rela-
tively many users also stated that they engaged in off-
piste skiing (32 %), or Nordic mountain skiing (23 %),
while relatively few said that they travel in avalanche
terrain by foot (9 %), on a snowmobile (7 %), or on snow
shoes (3 %). Three percent stated that they engage in
other types of activities in avalanche terrain. Note that
the users could chose multiple activities.
– Concerning the use of NAWS, 76 % of the users an-
swered that they always use the avalanche warnings,
21 % that they use the warnings on a regular basis, and
3 % that they rarely read the forecast.
Many of the respondents have avalanche-related competence
and formal training, and many use the avalanche warnings on
a regular basis. This suggests that the sample of respondents
could be biased towards a population with more avalanche
expertise than average.
3.2 Avalanche warning
A total of 264 user respondents completed the questions in
Section B. In this section, we asked the respondents to iden-
tify risk factors that they perceived difficult to manage or
Figure 4. Factors users and NAWS experts considered difficult to
assess and manage in order to have a safe trip in avalanche terrain.
mitigate, parts of the avalanche warnings that they perceived
difficult to understand, and important information perceived
to be missing in the avalanche warnings. Key results from
the 110 respondents in the NAWS expert survey are also pre-
sented in this chapter for comparison.
3.2.1 Avalanche risk factors considered difficult to
assess and manage
In order to find out what the users consider to be most diffi-
cult to assess and manage, we asked “Which factors are most
difficult to assess and manage in order to complete a safe
trip?” The respondents could choose multiple factors. Avail-
able factors and results are shown in Fig. 4. The results show
the following.
– The vast majority (87 %) of the users perceive the snow
cover to be the single most difficult factor to assess and
manage. This judgement does not depend on the respon-
dent’s experience or competence (χ2 test, p = 0.516
and p = 0.403, respectively); 86 % of the NAWS ex-
perts considered this factor to be the most difficult fac-
tor.
– 34 % of the users perceive other people in the group to
be the most problematic factor. More than every second
NAWS expert (51 %) rated this as the most difficult one.
– Among the users, there is a relatively even distribution
of individuals who perceive terrain traps (28 %) and
weather (25 %) to constitute the other most problematic
factors.
– Steepness is perceived as a problematic factor among
relatively few respondents.
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Figure 5. Factors the users and the NAWS experts considered most
important in the avalanche warning on Varsom.no.
3.2.2 Avalanche risk factors considered most and least
important
In order to find out what the users consider to be the most im-
portant element in the warning, we asked “Which elements
in the avalanche warning are most important?” The respon-
dents could choose multiple answers. Alternatives and results
are presented in Fig. 5. The results show that the users per-
ceive a relatively wide range of elements in the warning to be
important.
– A majority of the users state that the avalanche assess-
ment (69 %), the avalanche problems (67 %) and the
main message (65 %) constitute the three most impor-
tant elements in the warning.
– About half of the users consider the snow cover history
(56 %) and the danger level (48 %) to be important.
– Over a third of the users consider snow and avalanche
observations (37 %), mountain weather (39 %) and
management advice (42 %) to be important.
We find no evidence that the elements chosen as most im-
portant depended on age, gender or experience (linear re-
gression R2 = 0.022, p = 0.224). The NAWS experts rated
the avalanche problems as the most important factor (77 %),
followed by the avalanche assessment (62 %), the main mes-
sage (57 %) and the snow cover history (55 %). The danger
level was considered most important by 39 % only.
In order to find out what the users consider of least im-
portance or use, we asked “Was anything of little use or im-
portance? You may elaborate on the problem being format,
content or other”. A total of 69 participants responded to this
question. Twenty of these provided positive or neutral com-
ments. We summarize the critical feedback, and our interpre-
tation of this feedback, below.
– Seven users stated that they found the mountain weather
to be superfluous, and that they rather used the standard
weather forecast. Thus, clarification in the difference
between the weather forecast and the summary of the
mountain weather, and the link between the mountain
weather history and forecast, and the avalanche forecast,
is recommended.
– Five users stated that the warning contained too many,
and complex details and information. These users were
mainly novices. This may imply that users with less
skills and interest in the topic fail to get the key mes-
sages.
– However, another set of six users considered the level
of detail to be too low. These users stated that the use-
fulness of the warning would be higher if it were less
general, and if the forecast region was smaller. These
answers point to the possibility that general forecasts
for relatively large regions reduce the attention paid to
the warnings.
– Three users found the core zone sector diagram to be
problematic. More specifically, these users found it dif-
ficult to know whether dark sectors represent safe or
unsafe regions. Although only three users commented
on this, their feedback is important since it implies
that some users of NAWS may chose the unsafe sec-
tor because they misunderstand the graphics. See also
Sect. 3.2.3 for related results.
– Finally, four users found the snow and avalanche obser-
vations sometimes to be too complicated or described in
too difficult terms.
3.2.3 Elements easily misunderstood or poorly
communicated
A total of 95 users provided comments on whether the
avalanche warning contains parts that are easily misunder-
stood or poorly communicated. Thirty of the comments were
positive or neutral. We summarize the critical feedback, and
our interpretation of the comments, below.
– Eleven users found the core zone sector diagram to be
easily misunderstood. Like in the case of users who
stated that the core sector diagram to be of little use,
these users stated that they found it difficult to know
which of the sectors (dark or light) that are most danger-
ous. Some users suggested to add a legend or use more
or different colours. These findings corroborate the find-
ings in Sect. 3.2.2.
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Figure 6. Test of what communicates the avalanche problem best in the avalanche warning: (a) text, (b) symbols or (c) pictures.
– Another 11 users perceived the regional warnings to
provide too little detail in terms of spatial or tempo-
ral variability, and that the forecasted regions were
too large. These findings corroborate the findings in
Sect. 3.2.2.
– Eight users found it difficult to understand the danger
level, in terms of the meaning and consequence of it
for the user. This is important, because if users do not
understand the meaning of the danger level, they are
poorly equipped to manage their risk exposure.
– Finally, six users stated that the large amount of infor-
mation provided in the warning made it difficult, espe-
cially for beginners, to decipher the key message. This
corroborates the findings reported in Sect. 3.2.2, where
five users stated that the warning contained too much
detail and information.
The answers from the NAWS expert survey suggest that ex-
perts perceive similar factors to be as problematic as users
do: i.e. the core sector and elevation diagrams, spatial and
temporal variability, danger level, and uncertainty. However,
the NAWS experts also pointed to a few problematic factors
not mentioned by the users: avalanche size (especially the
name “small” used for size 2), probability and distribution.
Note that the EAWS is changing the denominations used for
avalanche sizes during 2018, which will resolve the problem
with communicating size 2 avalanches.
3.2.4 Missing information and features
In the final part of Section B, we asked the respondents
to identify missing information in the avalanche warning.
Sixty-seven respondents provided comments. About 20 of
these stated that no important information was missing. The
elements asked for by the remaining 47 participants were the
following:
– observed weather and snow, and links to more detailed
observations;
– ATES recommendations (Avalanche Terrain Exposure
Scale is a method for classifying the degree of terrain
avalanche-exposure, Statham et al., 2006);
– advice connected to competence levels, and
– more detailed warnings/information. Better visualiza-
tion of important weak layers (depth, type, etc.).
We also asked the participants whether some information
or features are missing in the RegObs application. Eighty-
one users responded to this question, of which about 35 re-
sponded that they did not use the application or were indif-
ferent. The users asked for the following to be included in
future releases:
– weather data,
– a possibility to enter and record snow profiles,
– a possibility to read the avalanche warning (at least the
danger level and avalanche problems) in the application,
– an opportunity to track trips,
– a more user-friendly interface,
– access to avalanches and avalanche paths,
– information about actual elevation in relation to the
avalanche problem elevation range, and
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Table 5. Results from the test of what communicates the avalanche
problem best in the avalanche warning.
Text Symbol Picture Rating
46 % 51 % 38 % Good
40 % 38 % 36 % OK
14 % 11 % 25 % Poor
– easy access to the snow cover history and relevant recent
snow profiles nearby.
Several of these features are being implemented by the time
of publication of this study.
The results from the NAWS expert survey suggested that
these pieces of information in demand:
– more precise description of where in the region or ter-
rain the avalanche problem is expected, and where the
danger level is expected to be lower, and
– a better description of the uncertainty and local variabil-
ity.
3.3 Testing of text versus symbols or pictures
In section C, we asked the respondents to rate how well text,
icons, and pictures communicate the avalanche problem on
a scale from 1= poor, to 3= good. Each respondent evalu-
ated two types of avalanche problems: a wind slab, and a
persistent slab (see Fig. 6). A total of 222 user respondents
completed this section of the survey.
The results show that users preferred text and symbols
to pictures (Table 5): 89 % rated the new EAWS symbols
as good or OK. The users were familiar with the names
of the avalanche problems, which have been presented as
text on Varsom.no during the previous three seasons. The
users were not familiar with the symbols, as they were in-
troduced at Varsom.no for the 2017/2018 season after be-
ing introduced as an EAWS standard in June 2017 (EAWS,
2017b). Pictures have not been used in the warning on Var-
som.no, but a few users may have seen the pictures in the
avalanche school at Varsom.no. Notably, we found that the
symbols were rated more positively the more experienced
a respondent was: χ2203 = 15.26, p = 0.018. The text and
pictures were rated equally irrespective of one’s experience:
p = 0.338 and p = 0.543, respectively.
3.4 Testing of comprehension of the two scenarios
A total of 177 user respondents completed the test for com-
prehension in Section D by responding to one of the four
alternatives for each of the two scenarios. To recap, we
asked the respondents to (1) rate how well they perceived
the avalanche danger to be communicated, (2) what the most
important behavioural implications of the warning were, and
(3) what advice they would give to others based on the warn-
ing message. We measured how well the danger was com-
municated in the warning on a scale from 1 to 10. Of those
who provided answers to this question, 21 % gave a rating
of 10, and 56 % a rating of 8 or higher. Only 14 % gave a rat-
ing of 4 or lower. Mean ratings for the two scenarios (danger
level 2 and level 4) and for each of the four alternatives are
presented in Fig. 7 below (left column). Figure 7 also depicts
the comprehension scores (right column). Higher scores in-
dicate a higher match between the behavioural implications
chosen by the users and the NAWS experts. For the danger
level 2 scenario the minimum score is −4 and the maximum
score is+4, while scores for the danger level 4 scenario range
from −6 to +3.
We next compared the user ranking and comprehension
score in more detail, by (a) comparing the comprehension
score to a score of 0 and (b) investigating whether user rank-
ing or comprehension differs between the four alternatives
with ANCOVAs where a user’s experience was a covariate.
For statistical analysis we used JASP (2018).
3.4.1 Danger level 2 wind slab scenario
For the danger level 2 wind slab scenario, the average user
ranking of the four alternatives ranged from 5.1 to 7.4. The
four alternatives were rated differently: F(3, 172)= 10.124,
p < 0.001, η2 = 0.149. Alternative 2, i.e. an avalanche prob-
lem with technical information and advice, was rated high-
est, and alternative 1, a danger level with an explanation,
least informative. A post hoc Tukey test confirmed it: al-
ternative 1 was rated lower than the other three alternatives
(p′s =< 0.001, smallest effect size Cohen’s d = 0.814). A
user’s competence had no effect on the ranking of the alter-
natives: F(1, 172)= 1.966, p = 0.163, η2 = 0.010. Experi-
ence was also non-significant; a user’s experience had no ef-
fect on the ranking of the alternatives: F(1, 172)= 0.469,
p = 0.494, η2 = 0.002.
Comprehension was good, with all four alternatives yield-
ing overall positive scores, i.e. one-sampled tests for all four
alternatives were significantly different from a score of 0 (al-
ternative 1: p = 0.015, alternatives 2–4: p′s < 0.001). Still,
the comprehension scores were different for the four al-
ternatives: F(3, 172)= 8.188, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.120. Al-
ternative 1, a danger level with an explanation, had the
lowest comprehension score and was significantly differ-
ent from the other three alternatives; post hoc Tukey tests
had the smallest p = 0.021 and the smallest effect size Co-
hen’s d = 0.541. Notably, the higher the competence the bet-
ter the comprehension was: F(1, 172)= 7.777, p = 0.006,
η2 = 0.038. Finally, there was a positive correlation be-
tween user ranking and comprehension: ρ = 0.2, p = 0.008,
95 % CI [.054; .337].
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Figure 7. (a) User rating (left) and comprehension score (right) for the level 2 wind slab scenario; (b) user rating and comprehension score
for the level 2 wet slab scenario.
3.4.2 Danger level 4 wet slab scenario
For the danger level 4 wet slab scenario, the average user
ranking of the four alternatives ranged from 6.7 to 7.7. All
alternatives (danger level, avalanche problem) were ranked
high, and there was no statistically significant difference:
F(3, 172)= 1.787, p = 0.151, η2 = 0.030. Also, a user’s
experience and competence did not influence the ranking
(both F ′s < 1).
Comprehension was good, with all four presentations of
the scenario yielding overall positive scores. All but alter-
native 3 had a significant positive score (alternative 3 only
marginally: p = 0.065, Cohen’s d = 0.262). The four al-
ternatives did differ: F(3, 173)= 4.188, p = 0.007, η2 =
0.067. Alternative 3, an avalanche problem with technical in-
formation only, received a significantly lower comprehension
score than alternative 1 (post hoc Tukey: p = 0.037, Cohen’s
d = 0.607), and alternative 4 (post hoc Tukey p = 0.006,
Cohen’s d = 0.763). A user’s competence had no effect on
comprehension: F(1, 172)= 0.93, p = 0.336, η2 = 0.005.
There was also no relationship between user ranking and
comprehension: ρ =−0.095, p = 0.207.
3.4.3 Comparison
The results show that for the danger level 2 scenario, the
three alternatives with the avalanche problems communicate
more effectively than the one with the danger level. The user
ranking and the calculated comprehension score provide con-
sistent results. For the danger level 4 scenario, on the other
hand, the alternatives with the danger level and avalanche
problem with travel advice score higher than the two other
alternatives. The difference is clearer for the calculated com-
prehension score than for the user ranking. The alternative
with the avalanche problem and technical details seems to
communicate least effectively however, it is also possible that
users become too careful/conservative and rate factors as im-
portant that experts do not, and hence receive a lower score.
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4 Discussion
The purpose of this paper was to evaluate how well the
avalanche warnings, as provided by NAWS, are communi-
cated to the public, and whether some modes of presenting
the warnings are more effective than others in communicat-
ing the intended message. We discuss our main findings be-
low: firstly, we discuss the user results that are reported in
Sect. 3.2 (avalanche warning); secondly we discuss the re-
sults reported in Sect. 3.3 (modes of communication: text
versus symbols and pictures) and finally the results from the
test of comprehension reported in Sect. 3.4.
4.1 The avalanche warning
Our survey responses suggest that users find it most difficult
to assess and manage the snow cover, but that relatively many
individuals also find it challenging to manage group dynam-
ics and terrain traps. The fact that so many (both experts,
experienced users and novices) struggle with an evaluation
of the snow cover and its impact on the avalanche hazard
is not surprising. The snow cover is difficult to assess and
manage, it can vary considerably over both short time peri-
ods and distances (Schweizer et al., 2008). It is created by
a complex and dynamic interaction between the atmosphere,
the old snow cover, and the ground, and the development of
the snow cover over time may create complex structures and
properties. Visual surface clues are few and information on
the internal structure and properties hard to come by. The dif-
ficulty in assessing and managing the snow cover is reflected
in what users perceive as most important in the avalanche
warning: the avalanche assessment, the avalanche problems
and the main message.
A well-functioning avalanche warning needs to translate
the complex dynamics and characteristics of the snow cover
and avalanche hazard into a clear message that novices and
experts find useful and can translate into behavioural impli-
cations. However, although the responses to our survey ques-
tions suggest that most users demand this type of informa-
tion, the responses also show that it is challenging to create a
warning that will fit all needs. While some users would like
to see more detailed information on the type of avalanche
problems and geographical distribution of these problems,
the characteristics of the snow cover (including spatial and
temporal variability), weather patterns, and estimates of un-
certainty in the forecast, other users state that the amount of
information and detail currently available in the warning is
already too high and complex, and that it makes them con-
fused.
Today, the Norwegian avalanche warning describes the
avalanche hazard using both symbolic representations, a
summary of the behavioural implications, and more lengthy
descriptions of the avalanche problem, the snow cover, and
the mountain weather. In addition, users have access to snow
observations via RegObs. The symbolic representation of the
avalanche danger and main message is currently presented at
the top of the page, while more detailed information is avail-
able lower down or to the side.
Our interpretation of the responses given in the survey is
that the avalanche warning should maintain its current struc-
ture, with easy-to-grasp information for all users (novices as
well as experts) at the top level of the warning, and more de-
tailed and complete information for advanced users, e.g. in-
formation about the type of avalanche problem, character,
timing, geographical distribution, and reliability of observa-
tions, at a lower level. On the other hand, most NAWS ex-
perts (77 %) and users (67 %) rated the avalanche problem as
the most important element of the warning. This, in combina-
tion with several users saying that there is too much and too
complex a text (i.e. redundancy), suggests that the avalanche
problems should be communicated high up in the warning.
A more compact presentation with less information would
strengthen the communication efficiency, in particular if the
overlap with the avalanche danger assessment text is reduced.
We also see several other areas for improvement. (1) The
danger level was considered important by many, but by less
than 50 % of the users. This may suggest that this element
may be better off at a less pronounced place on the page.
(2) Many individuals find it difficult to interpret the core sec-
tor and elevation diagrams, mainly in terms of identifying
safe and unsafe sectors. To remedy this problem, it may prove
beneficial to show the danger level and/or avalanche problem
in two to three different elevation bands, as is done by sev-
eral European and Canadian AWS′, or to use bold red colours
(at the risk of confusing it with the red colour used for dan-
ger level 4) and clearer fonts. (3) Information on weather is
at times repeated in several places in the avalanche warn-
ing, e.g. in the weather forecast, the avalanche assessment,
the avalanche problems and the snow cover discussion. To
improve clarity and readability, it may prove beneficial to re-
move redundant information about the weather. (4) To in-
crease the usefulness of snow observations, the interface of
RegObs may need revision.
4.2 Modes of communication: text versus symbols and
pictures
Our empirical analysis shows that most respondents prefer
symbols and text to pictures. The preference for text mes-
sages may partly be explained by the fact that users have be-
come accustomed to this mode of communication: NAWS
has presented the avalanche warnings using text during its
5 years of operation. Another potential explanation is that
the names of the avalanche problems are easily communi-
cated verbally – in interviews in the media, during avalanche
courses and when discussing the avalanche danger before
and during trips. Even though symbols are efficient, text la-
bels are very useful. The EAWS symbols were new to Nor-
wegian users, and the positive rating of these supports the
decision to introduce these symbols as a standard in Europe.
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Unfortunately, it was beyond the scope of this study to test
whether the wording of text messages and the symbolic rep-
resentation of avalanche problems are optimal for commu-
nicating the intended message. To do this, more advanced
testing is needed.
The relatively low rating of pictures may be explained by
the choice of certain pictures, or by the amount of detail
in them. Pictures are bound to be taken at a certain loca-
tion, under certain circumstances, and almost always contain
some amount of irrelevant information. As a consequence,
the main message may become blurred, and some users may
feel that the snow or landscape is not representative of the
avalanche forecast or region. More tests of pictures, or even
video, could be carried out to explore whether these oth-
erwise very effective media could be used to communicate
the avalanche danger, perhaps as a complement to the other
parts of the forecast. NAWS has posted pictures and videos
of the current situation a number of times on Facebook, and
especially the videos have had a large impact measured by
the number of views, likes, comments and shares. This sug-
gests that a more elaborate study on the effect of pictures and
videos should be carried out. However, the costs of obtaining
relevant quality video and pictures may outweigh the bene-
fits.
4.3 Modes of communication: comprehension
We evaluated comprehension of the communicated
avalanche warnings by the use of two methods: we
first asked respondents to rate how well the avalanche hazard
and the associated behavioural implications were com-
municated, and thereafter tested whether different modes
of communication resulted in different “comprehension
scores”. All participants evaluated a danger level 2 scenario
(wind slab) and a danger 4 scenario (wet slab). In each of
these scenarios, the participants were randomly exposed
to one out of four alternative descriptions of the avalanche
hazard and asked to choose the behavioural implications
associated with the warning. The comprehension score was
based on a comparison between the choices made by users
and a template constructed from the answers made by a
panel of NAWS experts.
Our empirical analysis of the subjective rating of the
avalanche warnings shows that most users perceive Var-
som.no to communicate the avalanche hazard in a good way:
51 % of the users rated the communication of the danger in
the level 4 scenarios as 8 or higher, on a scale from 1 to 10
(41 % in the level 2 scenario). These results are consistent
with previous studies on user satisfaction (Kosberg et al.,
2013; Barfod et al., 2014, 2015) and the conclusions in a
recent evaluation of NAWS (Hisdal et al., 2017).
The rating of the different alternatives dependents on the
scenario. For the level 2 (wind slab) scenario, alternative 2
(avalanche problem and technical information and advice)
received the highest rating, slightly higher than alternative 4
(avalanche problem and advice). Alternative 1 (danger level)
was rated the lowest. For the level 4 (wet slab) scenario,
it was alternative 1 that received the highest rating but this
was not significantly different from any of the other alterna-
tives. These results suggest that the users perceive that they
need more detailed information than just a danger level when
given a danger level 2, but are highly satisfied with knowing
the danger level if it is 4. Notably, for danger level 2 a user’s
competence mattered when it came to the rating of the al-
ternatives, but not for danger level 4. This suggests that the
value of more detailed information about the avalanche prob-
lem increase as the user’s competence level increase. Level 4
might be a cut-off for most, in terms of making the deci-
sion not to enter avalanche terrain. The avalanche-related
demographics data from the user respondents (Section A
and E) showed that the more competent the users, the more
tours they undertake in avalanche terrain. However, quite a
few of those without competence or courses are also active
ski touring. Most respondents assessed themselves as being
competent. Hallandvik et al. (2017) showed that novices as-
sessed the terrain for a specific site as less complex than
experts, they weighted information in the avalanche fore-
cast differently, and used different strategies to gather in-
formation about the snowpack on a trip. Thus experience
and competence matter to a certain degree when commu-
nicating avalanche danger. In our study, the sample of re-
spondents may be biased towards experienced and interested
users, which may somehow affect the results (e.g. Haegeli et
al., 2012).
Our results from the test of the level of comprehension for
the level 2 scenario (wind slab) are largely consistent with
participants’ subjective evaluations: participants score signif-
icantly lower on the comprehension score if the only infor-
mation available is a danger level with a standard explanation
(alternative 1). We therefore argue that a simple danger level
is not enough to convey the intended warning message on
lower danger levels. At this level, the users consider how to
travel in avalanche terrain, rather than whether or not to enter
avalanche terrain. Rather, in this situation the warning should
present the avalanche problem with a reasonable level of de-
tail. Our results do not provide a clear answer to the question
of which details are most important in order to communicate
the message; indeed, all three alternatives yielded a higher
comprehension score than alternative 1.
The results from the level 4 scenario (wet slab) are
markedly different from the level 2 scenario, in terms of
both comprehension scores and the match between objective
comprehension and subjective evaluations. In contrast to the
level 2 scenario, users rated all alternatives equally. How-
ever, in this scenario, the comprehension score was signifi-
cantly lower for alternative 3 than it was for alternatives 1
and 4. In other words, leaving out the advice and explana-
tion resulted in a lower comprehension. Note though that all
four alternatives yielded positive scores: most users did se-
lect the same factors as the experts. One possible explanation
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for the observed lower comprehension score for alternative 3
is that the technical information caused confusion rather than
helped the respondents.
Based on the results of our empirical analysis, our rec-
ommendation is that NAWS should carefully assess the im-
portance and priority of details presented with the avalanche
problem in order to shorten and simplify the communication
of the danger to the different user groups. It is important
to consider the redundancy of information. If two or three
avalanche problems are presented in the warning, the redun-
dancy between the details in the problems as well as the main
message and danger assessment may be considerable. NAWS
should consider how to normalize the avalanche warning, in
order to avoid repeating the same information several times.
Our results also points to the importance of communicating
the avalanche problems at a high level in the warning, es-
pecially for warnings on lower danger levels. However, both
the avalanche situation and the snow cover may be very com-
plex across the warning region and forecasting period. The
NAWS warning regions are about 20 times the European av-
erage (Engeset, 2013; Techel et al., 2018), and some have
rather complex topography and weather patterns. Simplicity
may not always be achievable without leaving out important
information for the users.
There are several factors that may have affected the results
presented in this study, and we would like to linger around
them. First, it is important to note that this study targeted
recreational users, and not preparedness authority person-
nel. The needs of novice, advanced, and professional users
are likely to differ. While simple symbols and messages are
likely beneficial for individuals with less avalanche knowl-
edge, technical details can be of great use for advanced users.
Properties such as sector, elevation, size and probability of
release are useful when considering which roads or residen-
tial areas are exposed to the avalanche danger. We therefore
recommend that a more detailed study should be carried out,
in order to investigate what is effective to communicate to
preparedness users. Second, the Norwegian users were only
recently introduced to a national avalanche warning system.
This implies that many users have been in the process of
acquiring knowledge about how to assess avalanche dan-
ger during the period from 2013 to 2018. Other than the
avalanche warnings provided by NAWS, few sources for as-
sessing the avalanche danger are available in Norway. Most
avalanche courses frequently use the avalanche warnings and
avalanche educational resources on Varsom.no. Finally, we
only tested a limited set of alternative communication modes
to the participants. To fully evaluate how to optimally design
the avalanche warning, tests with more variations and scenar-
ios are needed.
5 Conclusions and recommendations
In this study, we investigated how well users perceive the
avalanche warnings on Varsom.no (http://www.varsom.no,
last access: 9 September 2018) to be communicated, and
whether different modes of communication affect the level of
comprehension of the hazard at hand. We also identified ele-
ments in the avalanche warnings that users perceive to be of
greater or lesser importance, easily misunderstood, or miss-
ing.
Based on our empirical analysis of the data, we make the
following conclusions and recommendations.
1. Redesign core zone and elevation graphics/text. Prob-
lem: participants found it difficult to understand
whether the avalanche problems were present or ab-
sent in coloured sectors. Possible solution: use colours,
bolder text and better symbols, and show the danger
level and/or avalanche problem in two to three different
elevation bands, as is done by several European AWS′
and in Canada.
2. Less is more. Problem: the amount of text and detail in
the warning reduced the motivation to read the warn-
ing and made it more difficult for the user to pick up
the main message. Possible solution: minimize repeti-
tive information and reduce complexity.
3. Local information matters. Problem: the avalanche
warnings are produced for relatively large geographical
areas with big spatial variations in the snow cover. Pos-
sible solution: use maps to show the parts of the region
(subregions or elevation intervals) that are most affected
by the avalanche problem(s), or where the avalanche
danger is expected to be one value higher or lower than
the rest of the region. Maps could show which parts
are most affected, by showing the properties creating
the avalanche problems, e.g. heavy precipitation, wind,
or temperature. NAWS could use sub-regions as a way
to provide better information in the textual analysis.
NAWS will probably not have information with the re-
quired detail to present higher-resolution maps of dan-
ger level or avalanche problems yet. Another way could
be to present local weather history, and/or snow obser-
vations from automatic stations, or to present the snow
history by visualizing some manual snow observations
as time series.
4. We need to teach snow dynamics. Problem: a very large
share of respondents state that they find it most difficult
to assess and manage the snow cover. Possible solution:
present the avalanche problem, snow cover analysis and
avalanche danger assessment in a more systematic and
pedagogical manner in order to improve the competence
of the users. It should be noted that even the NAWS ex-
perts considered the snow cover to be the most difficult
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factor, suggesting that it is complex to manage for users
at all levels.
5. We need to teach people dynamics and terrain traps.
Problem: a large share find it difficult to manage others
in the group. Many also find terrain traps problematic.
Possible solution: use the “avalanche school” to educate
users about terrain traps and talk about group dynam-
ics to help users make better choices about whom they
choose to recreate with in avalanche terrain.
6. Avalanche problem is important. Problem: the
avalanche danger level is not enough for making deci-
sions in avalanche terrain, more detailed information
is needed. Possible solution: promote the avalanche
problem, especially at danger levels 2 and 3, which
also are the conditions most fatalities occur. Streamline
the presentation of the avalanche problem according
to danger level and reduce overlap with the avalanche
danger assessment in order to reduce the complexity
for users. Reduce the amount of information to users
at higher danger levels. The danger level was rated as
important, but somewhat difficult to understand. It is a
simple numeric value, but is determined from relatively
complex and subjective factors, and is probably difficult
for users to understand and use.
7. Keep the EAWS symbols. The users considered the new
EAWS standard icons for the avalanche problems to
communicate the danger well, although the users were
not familiar with the icons.
In conclusion, our study has confirmed that the communica-
tion of the avalanche danger on Varsom.no is perceived to be
effective by the users. The results of the testing of the effec-
tiveness of different alternatives for communication of level 2
and level 4 avalanche danger suggested that the avalanche
problems communicated more effectively than the danger
level at lower danger levels. At the higher danger levels,
no significant difference was found between the alternatives.
The results suggest that a simple danger level is not enough
to convey the intended warning message on lower danger lev-
els; rather, the warning should present the avalanche problem
with a reasonable level of detail. At higher danger levels, the
results suggest that leaving out the advice and explanation
resulted in lower comprehension. For danger level 2 a user’s
competence mattered when it came to the rating of the alter-
natives, but not for danger level 4. Many users (67 %) and
most NAWS experts (77 %) rated the avalanche problem as
the most important element of the warning.
Based on the findings in this study, NAWS redesigned
the avalanche warning on Varsom.no: the communication
of the core sectors was improved (displayed in red signal
colour rather than vague grey), a location search function
was added, the display of avalanche problems was moved
up to just below the main message, the redundancy in infor-
mation between the avalanche problem, snow cover analy-
sis and avalanche danger assessment was reduced, the region
map was relocated down to the bottom of the page and the
mountain weather and snow cover analysis was restructured.
Norwegian users, experts and avalanche warnings were
used in this study, but we believe the methods and results
are important to the wider scientific community and AWS′
in other countries. The building blocks and communication
techniques of the avalanche warnings on Varsom.no follow
the standards of EAWS, as Varsom.no and NAWS were de-
veloped in collaboration with a number of AWS′ in Europe
and North America.
Our study sheds light on how effectively key informa-
tion is communicated in avalanche warnings. However, we
recommend more studies on communication and impact of
avalanche warnings, including in-the-field testing, testing of
the use of avalanche problems with regards to people and ter-
rain choices, and further development of methods for quanti-
fying the effectiveness of such communication.
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Abstract 
Linguistic polarity is a natural characteristic of judgments: Is that situation safe/dangerous? How 
difficult/easy was the task? Is that politician honest/dishonest? Across six studies (N = 1599), we 
tested how the qualitative frame of the question eliciting a risk judgment influenced risk 
perception and behavior intention. Using a series of hypothetical scenarios of skiing in avalanche 
terrain, experienced backcountry skiers judged either how safe or how dangerous each scenario 
was and indicated whether they would ski the scenario. Phrasing risk judgments in terms of 
safety elicited lower judged safety values, which in turn resulted in a lower likelihood of 
intending to ski the slope. The frame “safe” did not evoke a more positive assessment than the 
frame “danger” as might be expected under a valence-consistent or communication-driven 
framing effect. This seemingly paradoxical direction of the effect suggests that the question 
frame directed attention in a way that guided selective information sampling. Uncertainty was not 
required for this effect as it was observed when judging objectively safe, uncertain, and 
dangerous scenarios. These findings advance our theoretical understanding of framing effects and 
can inform the development of practices that harness question framing for applied risk perception 
and communication. 
 
Keywords: Framing effect; risk perception; judgment and decision making; attention; avalanche 
terrain  
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Public Significance Statement 
This study demonstrates that risk judgments framed in terms of safety (How safe is it?) result in 
more cautious, conservative judgments than when framed in terms of danger (How dangerous is 
it?), irrespective of the objective risk of the judged object. These findings advance our 
understanding of the framing effect while illustrating its particular relevance for applied risk 
perception practices and for public hazard forecasting and information communication strategies. 
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Should I Judge Safety or Danger? Perceived Risk Depends on the Question Frame 
Framing is a ubiquitous psychological phenomenon that holds much promise for applied 
risk communication and risk perception. A wealth of empirical findings have shown that the way 
in which a problem, situation, object, event, or goal is described affects how people respond to or 
evaluate it (for reviews see e.g., Kühberger, 1998, 2017; Levin et al., 1998; Maule & 
Villejoubert, 2007; Piñon & Gambara, 2005). Framing effects are traditionally regarded as a 
deviation from rational behavior (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). 
Recognizing the potential problems that framing effects can cause, researchers have investigated 
numerous methods for debiasing or diminishing framing effects (Almashat et al., 2008; Garcia-
Retamero & Dhami, 2013; Sieck & Yates, 1997; Simon et al, 2004). Yet not all instances of 
framing effects are considered problematic, harmful, or disadvantageous. The purposeful use of 
framing to promote specific judgments and decisions is an established practice in several fields 
such as media and communications (Block & Keller, 1995; Chong & Druckman, 2007; Scheufele 
& Tewksbury, 2007) and marketing (Biswas, 2009; Biswas & Grau, 2008; Levin & Gaeth, 1988). 
Might the framing effect be similarly harnessed to boost people’s natural decision making 
competencies in order to ensure better, safer risk perceptions? If so, the framing effect has the 
potential for a real and tangible impact on how people judge risk and, ultimately, how they 
behave under risky conditions.  
In this article, we employ decision making in avalanche terrain as an exemplary case for 
investigating risk judgments and behavior in domains of applied risk perception and risk 
communication. Decision making in avalanche terrain represents a paradigmatic case of applied 
risk judgments and decisions. Avalanche terrain is a highly complex and uncertain decision 
environment in which judgment errors can result in severe injury or death. Moreover, it is an 
environment where poor decisions are frequently marked by invalid feedback (cf. Hogarth et al., 
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2015). A mismatch between perceived risk and reality can therefore be present for even the most 
experienced decision makers. Nonetheless, skiing in avalanche terrain is an increasingly popular 
but largely unregulated activity in which people voluntarily engage, most often for purely 
recreational purposes. Decision making in avalanche terrain provides a paradigmatic case for 
investigating decisions under real-life uncertainty among an experienced, highly motivated 
population. Yet the relevance of this research is not limited to backcountry skiing. Frame 
selection and the strategic phrasing of risk judgments are relevant for a range of disciplines and 
contexts including police, fire and other emergency services, military operations, the finance 
sector, work in volatile natural environments such as fisheries, illicit activities such as 
recreational drug use, and for medical diagnoses and treatment decisions. Decision making in 
avalanche terrain offers a convenient exemplary case for investigating the effect of framing on 
risk perception under varying degrees of uncertainty. 
One type of framing that appears to be highly relevant for applied risk perception and risk 
communication is the question frame. Judgments are commonly framed in terms of a single 
dimension of an integral qualitative attribute of what is judged. For example, “How bad is the 
situation?”, “How expensive is a product?”, or “How difficult is an activity?” (as opposed to how 
good, inexpensive, or easy). Polarity is a natural characteristic of language that constrains and 
thereby defines the formulation of many judgments to a single dimension of a bipolar attribute 
(Hilton, 2011). Decision makers therefore naturally employ a single dimension of a qualitative 
reference such as safe or dangerous to frame a risk judgment. 
Using hypothetical scenarios of backcountry skiing in avalanche terrain across six studies 
(N = 1599), we examined how recreational backcountry skiers evaluated these scenarios when 
asked to judge how safe versus how dangerous they are. We also examined how the question 
frames influenced participants’ decision to ski the scenarios. We tested the effect of the question 
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frames on risk perception and behavior intention when judging scenarios of different objective 
risk levels: scenarios of uncertain risk (Studies 1-6), safe scenarios (Studies 5-6), and dangerous 
scenarios (Studies 5-6). Based on the existing framing literature, we can expect to find an effect 
when framing a risk judgment in terms of safety or danger. Beyond that, however, prior research 
has not established the direction of that question framing effect, the prevalence of that effect 
under different conditions of objective risk, or the association of that framing effect with behavior 
intention. How does a qualitative reference frame influence perceived risk? Which of the two 
frames – safe or dangerous – evokes a more conservative, cautious risk judgment? Is uncertainty 
a requirement for an effect or does it persist in the face of credible evidence of safety or danger? 
How does the question framing effect influence behavior, which is ultimately what exposes a 
person to risk? Different accounts of the cognitive processes underlying framing effects make 
conflicting predictions about the direction and prevalence of an effect evoked by a question 
frame. These issues must be resolved in order to determine if it might be possible to harness 
question framing to promote safer risk judgments and decisions. 
Divergent Accounts of Framing and the Direction of the Predicted Effect 
Framing effects are diverse and inspire broad theoretical and applied interest in 
psychology, economics, political science, health sciences, and beyond. Consequently, a variety of 
heterogeneous phenomena that evoke differing cognitive processes and divergent effects are 
classified as framing (for reviews, see e.g., Chong & Druckman, 2007; Kühberger, 1998, 2017; 
Levin et al., 1998; Maule & Villejoubert, 2007). Research on framing in psychology and 
economics has primarily focused on situations in which different but logically equivalent 
descriptions lead to different preferences or evaluations, highlighting a violation of the economic 
principle of invariance (e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). For example, evaluations tend to be 
more favorable when a product is described as 90% fat-free than when described as containing 
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10% fat (e.g., Levin, 1987). This research has traditionally used risky choice framing in which 
the probabilities of the choice options are differently described (e.g., the classic “Asian disease 
problem”; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981), and attribute framing in which a single attribute of the 
target of judgment is differently described (Levin et al., 1998; Piñon & Gambara, 2005). 
Manipulating the qualitative attribute that frames the question eliciting a judgment (i.e., question 
framing) has received much less attention in this line of research and has produced mixed results 
(see e.g., Payne et al., 2013; Comerford & Robinson, 2017). 
Research in the fields of political science and health sciences have applied a broader 
conception of framing in which emphasis on different aspects of an issue leads to different 
opinions, without necessitating logical equivalence between frames (e.g., Cacciatore et al., 2016; 
Chong & Druckman, 2007; Druckman, 2001; Bui et al., 2015; Nelson et al., 1997). For example, 
when asked about government funded financial assistance for people in need, political opinions 
tend to be more favorable toward government spending if preempted with an emphasis on 
humanitarian aspects rather than government expenditures (Druckmann, 2001). This broader 
conception of framing effects is also relevant to survey studies (see Bruine de Bruin, 2011), in 
which questions with presumed synonyms can elicit inconsistent responses (e.g., Bruine de Bruin 
et al., 2012) and questions with presumed antonyms can fail to communicate polar opposites 
(e.g., Holleman, 2006). 
The cognitive processes that a frame activates and the direction of the resulting framing 
effect likely depend on the form and domain in which the frame is achieved. Consequently, 
several cognitive, communicative, and attentional processes have been proposed for framing 
effects achieved inside and outside the lab (for a review, see Keren, 2011). These different 
accounts of framing make somewhat conflicting predictions about how the question frame we 
tested might affect people’s judgment. Does a question about “safety” evoke a more reassuring 
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assessment than a question about “danger” because it triggers a positive connotation or conveys 
the assumption of safety in the question? Alternatively, does a question about “safety” direct a 
decision maker’s attention to the sparsity of evidence of safety under conditions of uncertainty, 
thereby prompting a more conservative evaluation? These different theoretical accounts of 
framing were established and predominantly tested based on risky choice framing and attribute 
framing research. The extent to which they describe and can predict a question framing effect is 
presently unclear (see Comerford & Robinson, 2017). By testing the direction of the framing 
effect evoked when risk judgments are framed in terms of safety and danger, we can infer the 
cognitive processes that are activated. Because the success of any effort to strategically harness 
framing in applied contexts depends on correctly matching the type of frame – and the cognitive 
process that it activates – with the objective for its application, we next review these different 
accounts of framing in the context of our study. 
Valence-driven account of framing effects 
One prominent cognitive account posits that framing information in either a positive or a 
negative way evokes a valence-consistent association that influences the selection and encoding 
of information about the target(s) of judgment (for reviews, Keren, 2011; Levin et al., 1998; 
Piñon & Gambara, 2005; Teigen, 2015). For example, positively framing an action (75% chance 
of success) evokes positive associations resulting in more favorable judgments of that action than 
does negatively framing the same action (25% chance of failure), despite the two frames being 
logically equivalent. Investigating the valence account of framing in the context of question 
frames, Payne and colleagues (2013) found that life expectancy predictions were longer when 
judging the probability to “live to” a certain age than when judging the probability to “die by” 
that age. Subjective probability judgments about longevity and verbal protocols both indicated 
that the “live to” frame evoked more positive thoughts than the “die by” frame did. For our 
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context of risk judgments, assuming that the quality safe has a positive valence and the quality 
dangerous has a negative valence (Hedger et al., 2016), then according to the valence account of 
framing, a risk judgment phrased as How safe is it? should evoke positive associations that may 
result in higher judged safety than a risk judgment phrased as How dangerous is it? However, 
other empirical findings cast doubt on whether valence consistent associations adequately 
account for question framing effects. Although Comerford and Robinson (2017) replicated the 
results of Payne et al (2013), they also found that the response format influenced the direction of 
the question framing effect and, we can assume, the underlying cognitive processes. When 
decision makers reported life expectancy as a point estimate in response to a framed statement “I 
expect to live to/die by age…”, life expectancy was longer under the “die by” frame. These 
surprisingly contradictory results highlight the continuing uncertainty about the cognitive 
processes activated by attribute framing of questions and the direction of the evoked effect. 
Communicative accounts of framing effects 
Another influential account of framing holds that the pragmatics of language and 
communication contribute to framing effects (Hilton, 2011; McKenzie, 2004; McKenzie & 
Nelson, 2003; Sher & McKenzie, 2006). A frame is typically selected by a source (i.e., a speaker) 
communicating information about the target(s) of judgment. Importantly, the speaker’s choice of 
frame and the listener’s inferences about that choice are not arbitrary. Consequently, the choice 
of frame “leaks” implicit information about a target beyond what is explicitly stated. In this way, 
logically equivalent frames might not be informationally equivalent because the choice of frame 
conveys judgment-relevant information, notably the communicator’s perspective on the target of 
judgment. Differently framed questions in survey research are typically also understood 
according to such a communicative theoretical framework that regards the interaction between 
researcher and survey respondent as a form of communication subject to the rules of everyday 
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conversation (Grice, 1975). In our study, the differently framed question that elicits the risk 
judgment could be interpreted as leaking different information about the communicator’s (i.e., the 
researcher’s) perception of the target of judgment. When asked the question “How safe is it?” the 
decision maker may plausibly assume that the communicator asking the question perceives the 
target of judgment to be safe. Otherwise, the communicator would have asked “How dangerous 
is it?” if the target was perceived to be dangerous. Although the cognitive process believed to 
underlie this framing effect differs from the valence account, the communication account of 
framing might similarly predict that the term safe in the question would elicit judgments of 
higher safety than would the term dangerous in the question.  
Attentional accounts of framing 
A final account of framing highlights attentional processes. These assert that a frame cues 
the cognitive system to direct attentional resources toward a certain perspective on the target(s) of 
judgment while suppressing attention toward alternative perspectives (e.g., Keren, 2011; Teigen, 
2015). Judging a target involves cognitive processes that operate in relative terms. All judgments 
are relative to a reference that is the focus of attention, and the nature and location of that 
reference influence the judgment (Keren, 2011). Research in psychology using numerically 
framed single-bound probability judgments found that a frame defines a descriptive state (e.g., 
more than 85%) as the provisional reference point for the judgment (Hohle & Teigen, 2018; 
Teigen et al., 2007). The phrasing of the judgment task directs the decision maker’s attention 
toward evaluating whether the target of judgment meets or fulfills that descriptive state, and the 
decision maker samples different information according to the perspective or reference defined 
by the frame. For example, a weather forecast predicting that the chance of rain is “greater than 
60%” guides attention toward the occurrence whereas a forecast of “less than 70%” guides 
attention toward the non-occurrence of rain. In that way, a decision maker’s judgment in response 
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to a frame is analogous with selectively testing a focal hypothesis defined by that frame (Teigen, 
2015). Research in political science on emphasis framing similarly asserts that framing focuses 
attention on a certain perspective or issue, and consequently that focal issue will have greater 
weight during the judgment process because of its increased accessibility and applicability (Block 
& Keller, 1995; Chong & Druckman, 2007; Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007). 
From the perspective of the attention account of framing, we might expect the use of the 
term safe in the question to focus the decision maker’s attention on sampling evidence to test the 
hypothesis that the scenario is indeed safe. Yet when uncertainty is high and definitive evidence 
is lacking, the decision maker might be expected to conclude that the scenario is not safe because 
of the insufficiency of evidence in support of that hypothesis. The term dangerous in the question 
would similarly focus the decision maker’s attention on searching for evidence of danger. When 
no definitive evidence of danger is found, the decision maker would conclude that the scenario is 
not dangerous because of the insufficiency of evidence in support of that hypothesis. According 
to the attention account of framing, one would expect judging how safe a situation is to elicit 
more cautious, more conservative judgments (i.e., lower judged safety ratings) than judging how 
dangerous a situation is under conditions of uncertainty. Conversely, one would expect judging 
how dangerous a situation is to elicit less cautious, less conservative judgments (i.e., lower 
danger rating or, conversely, higher judged safety ratings) than judging how safe a situation is. 
Importantly, however, it is unclear whether uncertainty is a necessary condition for the cognitive 
process described by the attention account to produce a framing effect. One could reasonably 
assume that there would be no question framing effect when encountering sufficient evidence to 
establish objective safety under the safe frame, or when encountering sufficient evidence to 
establish objective danger under the danger frame. Although the question frame likely directs 
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evidence sampling under all conditions of (un)certainty, this might only result in a framing effect 
under conditions of objective uncertainty. 
Summary and Research Hypotheses 
Three influential accounts of framing make opposing predictions about how the question 
frames we tested might affect the perceived risk of scenarios of backcountry skiing in avalanche 
terrain. It is important to note, however, that none of these accounts were developed in the 
context of qualitatively framing the question that elicits a judgment. Nevertheless, all of these 
accounts have been used to explain different types of question frames, as reviewed above. Our 
study differs from previous research investigating these accounts of framing in that we presented 
participants with highly uncertain visual scenarios in addition to verbal question frames. 
Although both the valence account and the communication account of framing might predict that 
judging how safe a situation is would initially elicit higher judged safety, neither account makes 
strong predictions about how participants subsequently search for information. It is also possible 
that several or all of the cognitive processes proposed by the different accounts of framing are 
activated simultaneously or sequentially upon encountering the question frame, in which case we 
might expect a mixture of effects or no overall effect of framing whatsoever. We test the effect of 
question framing under conditions of objective uncertainty, safety, and danger in order to 
ascertain the direction(s) of the effect(s), and thereby infer the cognitive processes activated by a 
risk judgment framed in terms of safety or danger. 
Based on our review of the abovementioned accounts of framing, we predicted in Studies 
1 to 4 that the framing of the question that elicited the risk judgment would influence the judged 
safety of the scenarios, all of which were of uncertain risk. In line with previous work on valence-
consistent question framing (e.g., Payne et al., 2013), in Studies 1 and 2 we predicted that a risk 
judgment phrased as “How safe is it?” would elicit higher judged safety than a risk judgment 
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phrased as “How dangerous is it?” When the results of Studies 1 and 2 did not confirm this 
valence-consistent hypothesis, we updated the direction of the predicted effect in Studies 3 and 4 
according to the attention account of framing (see, e.g., Keren, 2011). We predicted that the 
question “How safe is it?” would elicit lower judged safety than the question “How dangerous is 
it?” In Studies 5 and 6, we investigated whether the direction of the question framing effect is 
consistent when judging scenarios of different objective risk levels. We tested two competing 
hypotheses: 1) the experimental condition would have the same effect on the judged safety of all 
scenario categories, versus 2) the experimental condition would only influence the judged safety 
of scenarios of uncertain risk and there would be negligible effects for objectively safe and 
dangerous scenarios. Finally, we also predicted for all six studies that the variable judged safety 
would predict behavior intention. In what follows, we report the methods of data collection and 
analysis that were common for all six studies, and specify any aspects that were unique to any 
study. We then report the results of each of the six studies. 
Methods of Data Collection and Analysis for Studies 1 to 6 
Across six studies (N = 1599), we tested how risk perceptions and decisions are 
influenced by the qualitative frame of the question that elicits the risk judgment (i.e., the question 
frame). Using a series of hypothetical scenarios involving backcountry skiing in avalanche 
terrain, participants judged either how safe or how dangerous each scenario was and indicated 
whether they would ski the scenario. We confirm that at the time of writing, the six studies 
reported in this article are all the studies we conducted on the effect of question framing on risk 
judgments and decisions. We report all measurements assessed and all manipulations 
implemented in each study. The studies were approved by the Department of Psychology 
Research Ethics Committee, UiT The Arctic University of Norway. All studies except Study 4 
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were pre-registered. The pre-registrations, data, R script for data processing and analysis, and the 
scenarios used in the studies are available on the Open Science Framework (https://osf.io/sknxf/). 
Participants. Table 1 presents the sample size and information about the sample for each 
of the six studies. Due to a technical failure, we were unable to collect data on participant age, 
gender, or experience measures in Study 1. Each of the six studies was conducted during a public 
seminar on safety and decision-making for backcountry skiers in avalanche terrain, with the 
seminar audience members as participants. Each seminar was at a different location in Norway 
during the winter of 2019 to 2020. The audience members at the six seminars were recreational 
backcountry skiers with varying degrees of experience judging avalanche risk during ski tours in 
avalanche terrain. Consequently, there was a self-selection for experienced participants in all six 
studies. Table 2 presents descriptive statistics on participants’ experience with the judgment tasks 
and the activity presented in the scenarios. The seminar in which we conducted Study 1 had a 
nominal entry fee of NOK 50 (approximately 6 USD) whereas the other five seminars were free 
to attend. Participation was voluntary and all participants indicated their informed consent to 
participate. All six studies were conducted in Norwegian. 
We did not conduct a priori power analysis to determine target sample size for any study. 
The audience size at a seminar determined the possible number of participants in the study 
conducted at that event. We recruited as many participants as possible during each seminar and 
did not continue data collection for the respective study beyond that seminar, but otherwise had 
no control over the final sample size of each study. We set a minimum sample size for each study 
of approximately 60% of the anticipated audience size for that seminar. Participation exceeded 
60% of the actual audience size for all six studies and we met the estimated minimum number of 
participants for Studies 1 to 5. Although more than 60% of the audience participated in Study 6, 
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Participants in Studies 1 to 6, including sample sizes, division of participants by experimental 
condition, and data on participants’ gender and age. Gender self-identification categories are 
male (M), female (F), other (O), withheld (W), and data not available (NA). Gender and age data 
are unavailable for Study 1. 










Safe Danger  M F O W NA  
1 735 351 384  - - - - 735 - - - 
2 197 102 95  131 53 2 1 10 37 10.95 18-62 
3 255 132 122  156 99 0 0 0 38 11.40 18-65 
4 173 86 87  90 81 2 0 0 37 11.79 18-73 
5 168 66 102  94 74 0 0 0 32 10.17 18-67 
6 71 32 39  35 34 2 0 0 29 8.91 19-53 
 
Table 2 
Participant experience with the judgment tasks for Studies 1 to 6, including average number of 
years skiing in avalanche terrain (M Years , response scale from 0 to 40 years), average number of 
days in avalanche terrain per season (M Days , response scale from 0 to 100 days), and median 
level of self-reported avalanche safety training (M Training , reported on 7-point scale with “1 – 
None” and “7 – Expert level qualifications” at the scale ends). 
Study N M Years M Days M Training 
1 735 - - - 
2 197 8.51 12.02 3 
3 255 11.77 14.38 2 
4 173 9.54 15.03 2 
5 168 7.87 8.36 3 
6 71 8.10 28.17 3 
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Design. All six studies used the same experimental design, measures, and procedures 
described here. We used a between-subject design with two experimental conditions—the Safe 
Group or the Danger Group—for the qualitative attribute that framed the risk judgments. All 
judgment tasks were programmed in Qualtrics. One seminar leader conducted Studies 1, 2 and 6, 
another seminar leader conducted Studies 3 and 5, and a third seminar leader conducted Study 4. 
Each seminar began with a presentation of the information resources that are publicly available 
online from the Norwegian Avalanche Warning Service. After that, the seminar leader announced 
the study explaining that researchers were investigating information use for avalanche risk 
judgments. The seminar leader then projected the link to the online study for participants to 
access via their internet connected mobile devices. Upon accessing the study, participants were 
randomly assigned by the software to one of the two experimental conditions after indicating 
their informed consent to participate. 
Materials. Participants judged a series of hypothetical scenarios of backcountry skiing in 
avalanche terrain. Each scenario consisted of a photograph of a person skiing a snow-covered 
slope (one scenario photo included three people). We hold the rights of use for all photos. In the 
upper right corner of each photograph were icons indicating the slope angle, the prevailing 
regional avalanche problem(s), and the forecasted regional avalanche danger level (5-point scale) 
for that scenario. The icons used are standardized icons defined by the European Avalanche 
Warning Services (EAWS) and used by the Norwegian Avalanche Warning Service in daily 
regional avalanche danger forecasts throughout the country. These icons provide valuable 
objective information for judging the degree of risk. 
We developed three categories of scenarios: scenarios of uncertain risk, safe scenarios, 
and dangerous scenarios, as defined by avalanche experts. An avalanche expert selected 
photographs from a personal library and assigned icons to those photographs to create scenarios 
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of differing risk level. The combination of visual evidence in the photograph and the information 
conveyed by the icons established the objective risk level of each scenario. Uncertain scenarios 
lacked definitive evidence of safety or danger because the available evidence in the photo and the 
icons were ambiguous and/or conflicting. For example, although the icons on the steepness of the 
slope and the prevailing avalanche problems together indicate an increased probability of an 
avalanche, the icon indicating a danger level of two (on a five-point scale) and the terrain features 
depicted in the photograph indicate a reduced probability of avalanche. The risk level of that 
scenario would be objectively uncertain given the conflicting evidence. By contrast, the 
photographs and icons in the safe and dangerous scenarios conveyed sufficient evidence to 
ascertain the objective safety or danger of the scenario. For example, although an icon indicates 
the prevailing regional avalanche problem, no signs indicative of the presence of that problem are 
evident in the photograph. Additional icons in that scenario indicate a low regional danger 
forecast and a low slope angle. That scenario is objectively safe because all the evidence align to 
indicate that an avalanche is extremely unlikely. The objective uncertainty of the uncertain 
scenarios, the objective safety of the safe scenarios, and objective danger of the dangerous 
scenarios were established by the avalanche expert who designed the scenarios, and 
independently confirmed by a second avalanche expert. All scenarios used in the six studies are 
available on the Open Science Framework at https://osf.io/sknxf/. 
Participants in Studies 1 to 4 judged six uncertain scenarios. We used the same six 
uncertain scenarios for all four studies, changing their order of presentation between studies to 
account for any possible order effect. Participants in Studies 5 and 6 judged ten scenarios: four 
scenarios of uncertain risk, three safe scenarios, and three dangerous scenarios. We used the same 
set of ten scenarios for both studies. The four uncertain scenarios used in Studies 5 and 6 were 
selected from among the six uncertain scenarios previously used in Studies 1 to 4. The three safe 
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scenarios and the three dangerous scenarios used in Studies 5 and 6 were new. We anticipated the 
possibility of an effect from the order in which the categories of scenarios were judged. We 
therefore reversed the order of presentation between Studies 5 and 6. In Study 5, we first 
presented the three dangerous scenarios followed by the four uncertain scenarios, and lastly the 
three safe scenarios. In Study 6, we first presented the three safe scenarios, then the four 
uncertain scenarios, and finally the three dangerous scenarios. Although we reversed the order of 
the scenario categories in Study 6, the order of the scenarios within each category was the same 
in both studies. 
Measures. The scenarios were sequentially projected onto the auditorium screen for all 
participants in the audience to see. All questions were displayed exclusively in Qualtrics on 
participants’ personal mobile devices. Participants in the Safe Group judged the scenarios by 
answering the question “How safe is it?” responding on a 7-point scale labeled “Not at all safe” 
and “Completely safe” at the extreme points. Participants in the Danger Group judged the same 
scenarios by answering the question “How dangerous is it?” responding on a 7-point scale 
labeled “Not at all dangerous” and “Completely dangerous” at the extreme points. Upon 
completing each risk judgment, participants in both experimental groups were asked the question 
“Would you ski this slope?” with the three response options “No”, “I cannot say” or “Yes”. 
Participants had approximately one minute per scenario to answer the risk judgment and the 
behavior intention questions before the next scenario was projected. Participants were instructed 
not to discuss with their neighbors during the study and the seminar leaders confirmed that all 
auditoriums were silent during data collection. Participants were not required to answer the 
questions to proceed to the next scenario. Upon completing the scenarios, participants answered 
questions about their age, gender, and nationality. Finally, participants reported their skiing 
ability, avalanche training, years of backcountry skiing experience, average number of 
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backcountry skiing days per season, and past exposure to avalanche incidents. However, due to a 
technical failure, these covariates were not measured at all locations and are therefore not 
considered in our analysis. 
Data preparation and analysis: We used R (R Core Team, 2017) for all data preparation 
and analyses. We reverse coded the risk judgment scores of participants in the Danger Group to 
make them comparable to the risk judgments of participants in the Safe Group. We henceforth 
refer to the judged risk as judged safety for both experimental conditions. There were missing 
values of judged safety (Study 1 = 2.3%; Study 2 = 5.1%; Study 3 = 1.0%; Study 4 = .5%; Study 
5 = .1%; Study 6 = .6%) and behavior intention (Study 1 = 2.4%; Study 2 = 4.6%; Study 3 = 
1.2%; Study 4 = .4%; Study 5 = .1%; Study 6 = 0%) within the data. We deemed those values to 
be missing at random. Mixed model analyses can handle missing values without requiring the 
exclusion of participants for whom only partial data was collected (Baayen et al., 2008). We 
therefore did not impute any data for missing values. For Studies 5 and 6, we subset the data by 
scenario category. We treated judged safety and behavior intention as ordinal variables. To 
examine whether the experimental condition influenced the odds of each value of judged safety, 
we used the ordinal package (Christensen, 2019) to implement cumulative link mixed models via 
Laplace approximations for the hypothesized model with judged safety as the outcome variable 
and the experimental condition as the predictor variable. We included intercepts for participants 
and scenarios as random effects to account for by-subject and by-scenario variability. We 
calculated Chi-square values (χ2) with likelihood-ratio tests comparing the model that included 
the predictor variable(s) under investigation as the fixed effect (and participants and scenarios as 
random effects) against an equivalent model that excluded that predictor variable(s). To examine 
predictors of behavior, we estimated ordinal mixed models via Laplace approximations to 
analyze whether the predictor variables experimental condition, judged safety or their interaction 
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predicted the odds of the outcome variable self-reported behavior intention. We defined the 
response order of behavior intention as “No” < “I cannot say” <  “Yes”. We treated the predictor 
judged safety as an interval variable for all analyses involving behavior intention as the outcome 
variable. We included intercepts for participants and scenarios as random effects, thereby 
accounting for by-subject and by-scenario variability. We calculated Chi-square values (χ2) with 
likelihood-ratio tests using the method described above. 
Results 
Studies 1 to 4: Single Reference Judgments of Uncertain Scenarios 
         Table 3 presents the proportions of judged safety values per experimental condition for 
Studies 1 to 4, with mode values clearly marked. The experimental condition influenced judged 
safety in all studies: Study 1, χ2(1) = 30.49, p < .001; Study 2, χ2(1) = 12.25, p < .001; Study 3, 
χ2(1) = 19.65, p < .001; and Study 4, χ2(1) = 8.14, p = .004. The log-odds coefficients and odds 
ratios for the main effect experimental condition for each study are presented in Table 4. 
Participants in the Danger Group who judged “How dangerous is it?” were at least 1.6 times 
more likely to judge a scenario to be safer than participants in the Safe Group who judged “How 
safe is it?”. The probabilities of each value of judged safety per experimental condition are 
presented in Figure 1. In all four studies, judged safety was higher when judged in terms of how 
dangerous the scenario was than when judged in terms of how safe the scenario was. 
         Table 3 presents the proportions of behavior intention values per experimental condition 
for Studies 1 to 4, with mode response clearly marked. Judged safety predicted behavior intention 
in all four studies: Study 1, χ2(1) = 1995.60, p < .001, Study 2, χ2(1) = 451.93, p < .001, Study 3, 
χ2(1) = 609.66, p < .001, and Study 4, χ2(1) = 388.44, p < .001. The experimental condition alone, 
as a main effect, marginally predicted behavior in Study 2, b = -.37, SE = .20,  χ2(1) = 3.56, p = 
.059, although that effect is mediated by the main effect judged safety (see Table 5). Otherwise, 
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the experimental condition alone did not predict behavior in Studies 1, 3 or 4. The addition of the 
main effect experimental condition to the model with the main effect judged safety predicted 
behavior intention in Study 1, χ2(1) = 17.76, p < .001, and Study 3, χ2(1) = 11.51, p < .001, and 
marginally predicted behavior in Study 4, χ2(1) = 2.69, p = .101. The log-odds coefficients and 
odds ratios for the influence of the main effects judged safety and experimental condition on 
behavior intentions are presented in Table 5. Figure 2 illustrates the probability of each behavior 
per judged safety value per experimental condition. An interaction between the experimental 
condition and judged safety did not predict behavior intention in any of the four studies: Study 1, 
χ2(1) =1.56 , p = .211, Study 2, χ2(1) = 1.05, p = .305, Study 3, χ2(1) = .02, p = .896, or Study 4,  
χ2(1) = .00, p = .949. Overall we found that as the value of judged safety increased, the 
probability that participants in both experimental groups would ski the slope in the scenario 
increased. If participants in both experimental conditions judged safety to be equal, the 
probability that participants in the Safe Group would ski a slope was higher than that of 
participants in the Danger Group. However, based on the magnitude of the log-odds coefficients 
and the odds ratios, judged safety had the greatest predictive power of behavior intention. 
Consequently, participants in the Safe Group were qualitatively less inclined to indicate that they 
would ski a slope because they were more likely to judge safety as lower. 
To further investigate the robustness and scope of these measured effects, we conducted 
two additional studies using a broader set of scenarios with different levels of objective risk. 
Participants in Studies 1 to 4 judged scenarios that were all of uncertain risk. Is it possible that 
the high degree of uncertainty in some way influenced or accounted for the observed effect? Is 
uncertainty a prerequisite for the effect or does the question framing effect extend to situations 
that are objectively safe or dangerous? These are important questions because in a real world 
context, people encounter a range of situations of different objective risk with varying degrees of 
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uncertainty. Understanding the contexts to which the observed question framing effect extends 
will inform strategies for its potential application. We therefore conducted Studies 5 and 6 using 
scenarios in three categories of objective risk—uncertain scenarios, safe scenarios, and dangerous 
scenarios—to examine if the effect observed in Studies 1 to 4 is present under varying degrees of 




Percentage of judged safety values (values 1 to 7) and percentage of behavior (No = No, I would 
not ski the slope, UD = Undecided, I cannot say, and Yes = Yes, I would ski the slope) per 
experimental condition for Studies 1-4. The mode judged safety value and the mode behavior per 
experimental condition is marked by bold font. 
Frame Judged safety score  Behavior 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  No UD Yes 
Study 1            
Safe 17.7 21.2 22.0 17.4 14.2 5.7 1.8  49.7 7.9 42.4 
Danger 12.7 15.5 23.1 22.5 17.9 7.3 1.0  49.9 5.5 44.6 
Study 2            
Safe 24.0 27.0 20.6 13.5 9.9 4.1 .9  56.6 8.9 34.5 
Danger 18.9 17.5 22.0 21.0 14.1 6.1 .4  52.2 4.2 43.6 
Study 3            
Safe 22.9 19.8 21.6 20.1 12.0 2.4 1.2  47.1 6.1 46.8 
Danger 11.8 17.0 24.0 25.3 17.5 3.7 .7  45.9 7.7 46.4 
Study 4            
Safe 25.2 26.6 24.1 16.1 5.6 2.0 .4  61.8 6.6 31.6 




Coefficients of the model (judged safety ~ experimental condition) predicting whether the 
experimental condition influences judged safety for Studies 1-4 
 bDanger frame (SE) 95% CI for Odds Ratios (OR) p-value 
  Lower OR Upper 
Study 1 .47 (.08) 1.36 1.60 1.89 < .001 
Study 2 .63 (.18) 1.33 1.89 2.68 < .001 
Study 3 .72 (.16) 1.50 2.04 2.79 < .001 




Probabilities of judged safety values by experimental condition, with 95% confidence intervals, 





Coefficients of the model (behavior ~ judged safety + experimental condition) predicting whether 
the terms judged safety and experimental condition influences behavior intention in Studies 1-4  
 b (SE)  95% CI for Odds Ratios (OR) p-value 
   Lower OR Upper  
Study 1       
Judged safety 1.67 (.06)  4.76 5.34 5.98 < .001 
Safe frame .57 (.14)  1.36 1.78 2.32 < .001 
Study 2       
Judged safety 1.60 (.11)  3.98 4.98 6.23 < .001 
Safe frame .15 (.26)  .69 1.17 1.96 .562 
Study 3       
Judged safety 1.77 (.11)  4.78 5.90 7.29 < .001 
Safe frame .86 (.25)  1.43 2.36 3.88 < .001 
Study 4       
Judged safety 1.71 (.13)  4.30 5.54 7.13 < .001 





Probabilities, with 95% confidence intervals, of skiing the scenario slope by judged safety values 




Studies 5 and 6: Single Reference Judgments of Uncertain, Safe and Dangerous Scenarios
Table 6 presents the proportions of judged safety values per experimental condition for 
each category of scenarios in Studies 5 and 6, with the mode values clearly marked. In Study 5, 
the experimental condition influenced judged safety—presented according to the order in which 
participants judged the categories of scenarios—for dangerous scenarios, χ2(1) = 52.59, p < .001, 
and scenarios of uncertain risk,  χ2(1) = 10.28, p = .001, but did not influence the judged safety 
for safe scenarios,  χ2(1) = .55, p = .457, which participants judged last. In Study 6, the 
experimental condition influenced judged safety—presented according to the order in which 
participants judged the categories of scenarios—of safe scenarios, χ2(1) = 12.45, p < .001, did not 
influence the judged safety of scenarios of uncertain safety,  χ2(1) = 2.29, p = .130, and 
influenced the judged safety of dangerous scenarios,  χ2(1) = 85.37, p < .001. The log-odds 
coefficients and odds ratios for the main effect experimental condition per scenario category are 
presented in Table 7. The probabilities of each value of judged safety per scenario category by 
experimental condition are presented in Figure 3. Apart from the safe scenarios that were judged 
last in Study 5 and the uncertain scenarios that were judged second in Study 6 for which there 
was no effect, participants in the Danger Group were more likely to judge all categories of 
scenarios to be safer than participants in the Safe Group. Study 5 and Study 6 replicated the result 
that framing the risk judgment in terms of safety was more likely to result in lower judged safety 
whereas framing the risk judgment in terms of danger was more likely to result in higher judged 
safety. 
Table 6 presents the proportions of behavior intention values per experimental condition 
for Studies 5 and 6, with the mode response clearly marked. The main effect judged safety 
predicted behavior intention for safe scenarios in Study 5, χ2(1) = 112.21, p < .001, and Study 6, 
χ2(1) = 113.67, p < .001; for uncertain scenarios in Study 5, χ2(1) = 322.23, p < .001, and Study 6, 
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χ2(1) = 133.74, p < .001; and for dangerous scenarios in Study 5, χ2(1) = 28.32, p < .001, and 
Study 6, χ2(1) = 3.14, p < .076. The experimental condition alone, as a main effect, predicted 
behavior for safe scenarios in Study 6, χ2(1) = 8.47, p < .003; an effect that is mediated by the 
main effect judged safety (see Table 8). Otherwise, the experimental condition alone did not 
predict behavior intention in either Study 5 or Study 6. The addition of the main effect 
experimental condition to the model with the main effect judged safety predicted behavior 
intention for uncertain scenarios in Study 5,  χ2(2) = 6.41, p = .011, and an interaction between 
judged safety and the experimental condition predicted behavior for the safe scenarios in Study 5, 
χ2(1) = 6.78, p = .009. However, the experimental condition had no influence on behavior for the 
safe scenarios or the uncertain scenarios in Study 6 beyond what was predicted by judged safety. 
The log-odds coefficients and odds ratios for the influence of the main effect judged safety 
together with the main effect experimental condition (and their interaction, if relevant) on 
behavior intentions are presented in Table 8. As the value of judged safety increased, the 
probability that participants in both experimental groups would ski the slope increased for safe 
scenarios and scenarios of uncertain risk. Studies 5 and 6 replicated the result that judged safety 
had the greatest predictive power of behavior intention. Participants in the Safe Group were 
therefore qualitatively less inclined to indicate that they would ski a slope because they were 
more likely to judge safety as lower. As for dangerous scenarios, there were too few measures of 
judged safety values greater than 4 in Study 5 and greater than 3 in Study 6 to reliably test for an 
interaction effect between judged safety and experimental condition. This is indicated by the 
range of the 95% CI in Figure 4. Participants in both experimental groups in Studies 5 and 6 were 





Percentage of judged safety values (values 1 to 7) and percentage of behavior (No = No, I would 
not ski the slope, UD = Undecided, I cannot say, and Yes = Yes, I would ski the slope) per 
experimental condition (column Group) and per scenario category (column Scenario, S = safe, 
UR = uncertain risk, and AD = dangerous) for Studies 5 and 6. The mode judged safety value 
and the mode behavior per experimental condition and per scenario category is marked by bold 
font. 
Frame Scenario Judged safety score  Behavior 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  No UD Yes 
Study 5             
Safe Safe 1.0 3.1 6.6 11.7 22.3 34.5 20.8  8.6 2.0 89.4 
Danger Safe .0 1.0 6.8 10.8 23.9 37.9 19.6  5.6 2.9 91.5 
Safe Uncertain 11.7 27.6 29.6 19.7 9.8 .8 .8  59.1 9.1 31.8 
Danger Uncertain 8.6 15.9 26.5 30.4 14.7 3.4 .5  57.1 7.6 35.3 
Safe Dangerous 66.2 25.8 6.0 2.0 .0 .0 .0  96.0 2.5 1.5 
Danger Dangerous 37.2 24.5 15.7 13.4 6.9 1.6 .7  95.1 .3 4.6 
Study 6             
Safe Safe 3.2 7.4 14.9 18.1 28.7 14.9 12.8  16.7 13.5 69.8 
Danger Safe .8 2.6 6.8 9.4 29.1 29.9 21.4  10.2 2.6 87.2 
Safe Uncertain 26.0 32.3 23.6 9.4 5.5 2.4 .8  68.7 13.3 18.0 
Danger Uncertain 21.9 22.0 31.6 14.2 10.3 .0 .0  69.2 10.3 20.5 
Safe Dangerous 92.7 6.3 1.0 .0 .0 .0 .0  96.9 2.1 1.0 





Coefficients of the model (judged safety ~ experimental condition) predicting whether the 
experimental condition influences judged safety per scenario category for Studies 5 and 6. 
 bDanger frame (SE) 95% CI for Odds Ratios (OR) p-value 
  Lower OR Upper 
Study 5      
Safe scenarios .20 (.27) .72 1.22 2.08 .457 
Uncertain scenarios .88 (.27) 1.42 2.42 4.15 .001 
Dangerous scenarios 1.97 (.28) 4.14 7.17 12.42 < .001 
Study 6      
Safe scenarios 1.62 (.46) 2.07 5.08 12.45 < .001 
Uncertain scenarios .43 (.28) .88 1.53 2.66 .130 




Figure 3  
Probabilities of judged safety values per experimental condition and per scenario category, with 





Coefficients of the model predicting whether the terms judged safety and experimental condition 
influences behavior intention per scenario category in Studies 5 and 6 
 b (SE) Odds Ratios (OR) 95% CI p-value 
  Lower OR Upper  
Study 5, safe scenarios 
Judged safety 1.36 (.28) 2.25 3.90 6.75 < .001 
Safe frame -4.71 (2.23) .00 .00 .71 .034 
Judged safety * safe frame 1.28 (.59) 1.14 3.60 11.39 .029 
Study 5, uncertain scenarios 
Judged safety 2.18 (.19) 6.11 8.88 12.91 < .001 
Safe frame .89 (.35) 1.22 2.44 4.88  .012 
Study 6, safe scenarios 
Judged safety 2.02 (.46) 3.09 7.56 18.46 < .001 
Safe frame .11 (.55) .37 1.11 3.33 .849 
Study 6, uncertain scenarios 
Judged safety 1.79 (.25) 3.68 6.00 9.78 < .001 







Probabilities, with 95% confidence intervals, of skiing the scenario slope by judged safety values 





Results from six studies demonstrate that risk perception is influenced by the frame of the 
question that elicits the risk judgment. Framing a risk judgment in terms of safety (“How safe is 
it?”) was more likely to result in lower judged safety than framing that risk judgment in terms of 
danger (“How dangerous is it?”). The results of Studies 5 and 6 indicate that uncertainty is not a 
prerequisite for this framing effect. The question frame had a consistent direction of effect when 
judging safe scenarios, uncertain scenarios, and dangerous scenarios, suggesting that, in 
principle, the effect from framing risk judgments in terms of safety or danger applies in all 
situations of objective risk. 
Question Frames Guide Attention during Information Sampling 
A question frame elicits a judgment that is relative to the reference defined by the frame. 
This process can be thought of as analogous to testing the hypothesis defined by the frame. The 
question “How safe is it?” defines safe as the provisional reference point for the risk judgment, 
whereas the question “How dangerous is it?” defines dangerous as the provisional reference 
point for the risk judgment. This has the effect of focusing the decision maker’s attention on 
selectively sampling evidence to evaluate whether the target of judgment meets or fulfills the 
descriptive state defined by the question frame rather than judging the degree of risk according to 
the two complementary poles completely safe and completely dangerous. Participants presented 
the safe frame judged whether the available evidence was sufficient to establish whether a 
scenario was indeed safe. Participants presented the danger frame judged the available evidence 
with a focus on ascertaining whether the same scenario was indeed dangerous. To ask how safe a 
scenario is or to ask how dangerous it is are therefore not informationally equivalent frames, 
despite being complementary dimensions of the bipolar attribute risk. Each question focuses the 
decision maker’s attention on selectively sampling different evidence in relation to different 
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reference points (Chong & Druckman, 2007; Druckman, 2001; Keren, 2011; Teigen, 2015), 
effectively making each question a different judgment task. This is particularly relevant in a 
decision environment such as avalanche terrain where information cues rarely have logically 
equivalent opposites. There is an asymmetry of relevant evidence between the frames. Although 
the presence of one sign indicates increased danger and the greater probability of an avalanche, 
that sign may have no logically equivalent opposite. Moreover, the absence of that sign is not 
necessarily an indication of increased safety. 
Participants in our studies sampled different evidence in relation to the reference point 
defined by the question frame and reported their judgment on a scale similarly defined by that 
reference point. As illustrated in Figure 5, participants searched for evidence of safety if safe 
framed the question eliciting the risk judgment, or searched for evidence of danger if danger 
framed the question. Yet under conditions of high uncertainty, there was insufficient evidence to 
definitively establish or reject the descriptive state that either reference point emphasized. The 
evidence in favor of either reference point was ambiguous and therefore participants judging 
safety concluded that a scenario was not definitively safe, whereas participants judging danger 
similarly concluded that the same scenario was not entirely dangerous. Under both frames, 
participants adjusted their reported judgment according to the perceived (in)sufficiency of 
evidence for their respective reference point defined by the question frame. Those adjustments 
were made in relation to the limits, also defined by the question frame, of their respective 
reporting scales. However, the available evidence and consequently the adjustment on the 
response scale differed between the framing conditions. As a result, participants who were 
presented the safe frame judged the scenarios to be relatively more dangerous (alternatively, 
relatively less safe), while participants who were presented the danger frame judged the same 
scenarios to be relatively safer (alternatively, relatively less dangerous). 
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Interestingly, we observed this effect when participants judged dangerous and safe 
scenarios. Despite the availability of what avalanche experts consider to be definitive evidence of 
the objective safety and danger of the scenarios, participants who faced the safe frame did not 
accept the reference point safe for safe scenarios, and consequently judged them to be relatively 
less safe than participants who faced the danger frame did. Similarly, when judging dangerous 
scenarios, those who faced the danger frame did not accept the reference danger defined by that 
frame, and consequently judged dangerous scenarios to be relatively less dangerous (i.e., more 
safe) than participants under the safe frame. Objective uncertainty was not a requirement for the 
question frame to evoke selective evidence sampling relative to the reference point defined by the 
frame. Although a framing effect was not measured for judgments of safe scenarios in Study 5 
and uncertain scenarios in Study 6, we suspect this to be the result of the order in which 
participants judged the scenarios. When judging scenarios of different objective risk levels, 
participants might have judged a given scenario in relation to the sufficiency of evidence and the 
judged safety/danger of the previous scenario(s). We also suspect that an order effect was the 
cause of the different magnitude of measured effects between scenarios categories in Studies 5 
and 6. Examining the role of presentation order more directly may be an interesting direction for 
future work, but a challenge would be to ensure that such an investigation is ecologically valid. It 
is unlikely that a person would judge vastly different conditions in close temporal proximity. 
Thus the order effects we observed here may have been, to some extent, an artifact of overly stark 
contrasts between objective risk levels. 
The Possibility of Other Cognitive Processes during Question Frames 
The direction of the question framing effect we observed across six studies runs counter 
to what might be expected based on alternative accounts of framing that assume a valence or 
communication driven mechanism. In particular, both the valence account and the 
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communication account of framing would be consistent with judged safety being higher when 
judging “How safe is it?” Earlier research found on the direction of the question framing effect 
and the underlying cognitive processes found conflicting results. Payne and colleagues (2013) 
found credible evidence of a question framing effect consistent with the valence account of 
framing. Although Comerford and Robinson (2017) replicated the results of Payne and 
colleagues when testing the same judgment task, when they replaced the reporting format from a 
probabilistic estimate to a point estimate, their results indicated a framing effect in the opposite 
direction. 
This apparent mismatch between the predictions of other framing accounts and our 
findings may be linked to the specific framing paradigm we used. In addition to specifying a 
verbal question frame (how safe vs. dangerous is it?), the judgment task we used involved 
sampling information beyond what was described by the question frame. This process of 
information sampling is not a common element in most judgment tasks used in other research on 
framing, and the cognitive processes underlying framing effects likely depend on the method by 
which the frame is achieved. Kreiner and Gamliel (2018), for instance, found evidence that 
attention mechanisms contribute to attribute framing but recognized that their experimental 
design prevented them from ruling out the potential contribution of valence mechanisms to the 
overall framing effect. Similarly, in our paradigm, attentional mechanisms may have played a 
dominant role because we included an information-sampling component and because the frame 
was achieved by the phrasing of a question (rather than a statement). Yet we cannot rule out that 
valence-driven and communicative mechanisms also played a role in the results of our study. 
Participants’ initial prior when prompted with the question How safe is it? may well have leaned 
toward the valence of that frame, but was then revised in the process of gathering insufficient 
evidence to support this initial hypothesis. Thus, framing may be an aggregation of different 
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forces resulting from distinct cognitive processes that are evoked by the judgment task and the 
manner in which the frame is achieved. An interesting avenue for future research is to use 





A conceptualization of the decision making processes under each experimental framing 
condition. The person on the left represents the Safe Group judging risk in response to the 
question “How safe is it?” The person on the right represents the Danger Group judging risk in 
response to the question “How dangerous is it?” The thought bubbles illustrate the assumed 
cognitive process up to the behavior decisions expressed in the speech bubbles. The icons in the 
top left and the “35°”are examples of the information provided in the scenarios. They represent 
the forecasted regional avalanche danger rating (3), the avalanche problem, and the slope angle. 
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The Indirect Influence of Question Framing on Behavior Decisions 
Beyond the effect of question framing on judged safety, the results from all six studies 
indicate that judged safety influenced participants’ hypothetical behavior intention. The 
probability that participants would ski the slope monotonically increased with an increase in 
judged safety. The only exception to this clear result concerned the judgments of dangerous 
scenarios, for which participants were effectively unanimous that irrespective of judged safety 
they would not ski the slope (see Figure 4). However, it is very rare for dangerous slopes to be so 
clearly marked as dangerous, as they were in our studies, by evidence of an active avalanche on 
that particular slope. Typical of a wicked learning environment (Hogarth et al., 2015), a 
dangerous slope commonly resembles an uncertain slope until someone travels on it triggering an 
avalanche, thus providing clear but rare evidence of the objective risk level, albeit a little too late. 
Indecision was a response option for the measure of behavior intention, and a small 
proportion of responses (ranging from .3 to 13.5% across all studies and scenario categories) 
indicated that participants were undecided about their intended action. The likelihood of such 
indecision was highest when scenarios were perceived to be neither completely safe nor 
completely dangerous, with judged safety values in the middle range of the response scale. This 
establishes that the judged safety response scale captured the equivalent poles of the bipolar 
attribute of judgment, despite only one of those poles framing the judgment task. However, it is 
important to point out that indecision is not a true response option in a real-world situation; either 
skiing the slope or not skiing the slope are only ever observed. 
Behavior is what exposes people to risk. That judged safety influenced behavior intention 
is particularly important for our examination of question framing and the possibility of 
harnessing that framing effect to promote safer risk judgments and decisions. Although there was 
no overall effect of framing on hypothetical behavioral intent, it is important to emphasize the 
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process by which question framing influenced behavior. Question framing was found to influence 
judged safety, and judged safety was in turn found to be a powerful determinant of behavior 
decisions. Since behavior is the immediate cause of risk exposure, any factor that can directly or 
indirectly influence behavior can potentially be utilized to reduce the frequency of accidents and 
fatalities. Phrasing the risk judgment in terms of how safe the slope is resulted in lower values of 
judged safety, which in turn resulted in a lower likelihood of deciding to ski the slope. This 
suggests that judging how safe a risk is will result in the safest behavior with respect to the 
potential risk. The safe frame was found to indirectly result in more cautious behavior via the 
direct effect of framing on judged safety. We illustrate the indirect influence of question framing 
on behavior intention via the effect on judged safety in Figure 5. This illustration is intended to 
make clear both the presumed cognitive processes and the potential applied relevance of question 
framing to the widest possible audience. By selectively phrasing the question that elicits a risk 
judgment, a decision maker’s attention can be directed in a way that strategically influences the 
perception of risk with the effect of making one behavior outcome more likely.  
Interestingly, at any given level of judged safety—if participants in the two experimental 
groups judged safety to be the same—those prompted with the safe frame indicated that they 
were more likely to ski the slope than were participants prompted with the danger frame. To 
understand this apparently contradictory effect, consider the conditions under which judged 
safety will be equal between the two framing conditions. Due to the question framing effect, the 
judged safety of a given scenario was more likely lower under the safe frame and higher under 
the danger frame. That framing effect must be offset or overcome in order for judged safety 
between the two framing conditions to be equal. We can therefore assume that when judged 
safety under the two frames was equal, the perceived evidence basis for the judgments were not 
equivalent. The intention to ski may have been higher under the safe frame because that decision 
184
maker perceived more evidence of safety (more in terms of validity, relevance, weight, or even 
volume of evidence), and/or the intention to ski may be lower under the danger frame because 
that decision maker perceived similarly more evidence of danger. The behavior decisions under 
each frame are based on an asymmetry of evidence, an asymmetry that was necessary to offset 
the framing effect in order for judged safety to be equal. Although we appear to find more risk 
acceptance under the safe frame when judged safety between the experimental conditions is 
equal, the behavior decisions under the safe frame are potentially made on a more valid, relevant 
sample of evidence. Importantly, however, this finding must be placed in the context that judged 
safety was the strongest predictor of behavior intention. Participants who judged how safe a 
scenario is were more likely to judge safety as lower, and the likelihood of skiing a slope 
decreased as judged safety decreased. The safe frame was found to indirectly result in more 
cautious behavior via the direct effect of framing on judged safety. 
Implications for Applied Risk Judgments and Risk Communication 
 Backcountry skiing in avalanche terrain exemplifies a crucial challenge in applied risk 
communication and risk perception: people desire to engage in an activity despite knowing the 
inherent risk of serious injury or death. Avalanche accidents are overwhelmingly the result of 
human error. In 90% of fatal avalanche accidents, the victim or someone in the victim’s party 
triggered the avalanche (McClung & Schaerer, 2006), implying that people’s risk perception and 
decisions are critical factors in avalanche fatalities. Information on the conditions in avalanche 
terrain such as the complex conditions of the snowpack, its metamorphosis over time, and the 
effects of terrain and weather, together with the knowledge of how to use this information are 
essential for judging avalanche risk. In an attempt to reduce the number of accidents and 
fatalities, stakeholders such as national avalanche warning services and education providers have 
done much work to provide detailed avalanche forecasts and improve public knowledge of the 
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dangers and best practices for safety in avalanche terrain (for a review, see e.g., Engeset et al, 
2018). Yet despite these efforts, avalanches continue to claim the lives of a troubling number of 
participants in this increasingly popular and unregulated activity. The dissemination of 
information—which as a stand-alone activity is a failed strategy for changing how people 
perceive risk and behave (Kelly & Barker, 2016; Simis et al, 2016)—has been insufficient for 
ensuring avalanche safety among backcountry skiers. Might question framing serve as a 
complementary strategy to promote more cautious risk perception and behavior? 
Decision makers, avalanche warning services, and education providers have substantial 
control over the formulation of questions about the risks assessed during a backcountry ski tour. 
Our findings illustrate how the language used to formulate risk judgments and its influence on the 
cognitive processes has the potential for a real and tangible impact on how people perceive risk 
and, ultimately, behave in the face of risk. Selectively framing risk judgments might serve as one 
effective component of a multifaceted strategy to promote more cautious and conservative 
decisions in avalanche terrain and other domains involving risks. These findings have potential 
real-world application in teaching methods, tools, and strategies for reducing accidents and 
fatalities. At the public and institutional level such as a national or regional avalanche forecasting 
service, the frame used when presenting information about conditions in avalanche terrain might 
influence how users (i.e. the general public) both perceive the current risk and, more critically, 
how they decide to act. At the individual or group level, communication between members of a 
group travelling in avalanche terrain, while typically presented with little thought toward 
framing, could be positively impacted by increased awareness of the framing effect. Specifically, 
if a group member is presenting route options or tour alternatives, the way in which information 
and questions are framed could influence other group members’ perceptions of the current risk 
and the decisions that are made or communicated by members of the group. 
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Despite the apparent promise, there are several important considerations and potential 
limitations for the application of question framing to increase skier safety in avalanche terrain, or 
to promote certain judgments and decisions within any other discipline or context. It is currently 
an open question whether people can prompt themselves to frame questions about risky situations 
in a way that promotes safer judgments, highlighting an interesting avenue for future research. It 
is unlikely that how a decision maker internally represents the problem or judgment is entirely 
determined by externally presented information and/or the formulation of the judgment task 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). Decision makers clearly use their own experience and knowledge 
when modelling the world in order to judge the probabilities of potential outcomes (e.g., Wulff et 
al., 2019), and they may automatically do so with a familiar, default reference when not prompted 
with a question frame. Another important consideration is whether actual behavior in the 
mountains, when judging a slope to really ski while facing the real risk of avalanche, would be 
affected differently than hypothetical behavioral intent measured in an auditorium using fictional 
scenarios. Behavior often deviates from intention (Sheeran & Webb, 2016). Moreover, contextual 
cues only encountered in the natural decision environment can reduce an anticipated framing 
effect (Bless et al., 1998). A third consideration is that we may fail to see the same framing effect 
outside of the experimental setting. Unlike a natural setting, participants in our study had limited 
time to judge the risk and decide their behavior intention for each scenario. Although there is 
conflicting evidence as to whether more thought reduces framing effects (for example, see 
LeBoeuf & Shafir, 2003; Martiny-Huenger et al, 2020), we may fail to see the same effect in a 
natural environment where decision makers have more time for reflection and where the potential 
consequence of error is considerably greater. A fourth consideration is the necessity to establish 
whether people’s natural decision making process is to first judge risk in terms of safety or 
danger before then deciding behavior. The risk judgment itself may be a contrivance of the 
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experimental design. Outside of an experimental setting, the behavior decision may encompass 
the risk judgment. Finally, any application of these findings should be tested in an applied setting 
before prescribing them for use in practice. 
Research on framing effects informs policies and practices in other applied domains such 
as health (e.g., Garcia-Retamero & Cokely, 2011; Garcia-Retamero & Galesic, 2010; Peters et 
al., 2011; Rothman & Salovey, 1997) and finance (Kirchler et al, 2005; Weber et al., 2000). Our 
findings highlight a promising direction for the strategic application of question framing for 
increased safety in various domains of applied risk perception and communication. The aim of 
public risk management is to optimize the decision matrix to enable users to maximize their 
personal enjoyment and benefit while minimizing both individual and collective public risk. 
Critically, as in avalanche terrain, one wants to minimize the probability that a “go” decision is 
made under objectively “no-go” conditions. We do not believe that the framing of risk judgment 
questions alone will be sufficient to ensure safe behavior among all decision makers and or in all 
risky domains. It is no substitute for the availability of valid evidence of the objective risk, and 
the necessary knowledge and experience to understand and apply that information. However, the 
adoption of a procedure strategy such as that afforded by framing risk judgment questions may 
boost an individual’s overall competency for risk judgments or behavioral decisions. Various 
disciplines can conceivably harness the questions framing effect to make desired judgments and 
behaviors more likely. Risk management strategies, tools and education should recognize and 
account for this effect, and leverage these emergent findings to reduce the potential for accidents 
and fatalities. 
Conclusion 
 The present research makes several contributions to the existing literature on framing 
effects. First, our research establishes the direction of the framing effect when a risk judgment is 
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framed in terms of safety or danger. Risk judgments framed in terms of safety (How safe is it?) 
result in more cautious, conservative judgments than when framed in terms of danger (How 
dangerous is it?). Second, uncertainty was not a requirement for that effect. There was a framing 
effect when judging risk under varying degrees of uncertainty, be it under conditions of objective 
safety, uncertainty, or danger. These findings suggest that the question frame directed attention in 
a way that guided selective evidence sampling, rather than indicating a valence-consistent or 
communication-driven framing effect. Finally, our findings demonstrate the indirect influence of 
the question frame on behavior intention. The adoption of a procedure strategy such as that 
afforded by framing risk judgment questions can boost people’s natural decision making 
competencies in order to ensure safer risk perceptions and behavior. These findings have the 
potential to inform the development of policies and practices that harness question framing in 
domains of applied risk perception and risk communication.  
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front lines 
Should We Judge Danger or Safety 
in Avalanche Terrain? 
Matthew 8 Stephensen, Markus Landr0, Jordy Hendrikx 
MINDY AND KELSEY HIKE UP THE VALLEY, weaving 
their way through thinning forest and steepening terrain to 
the top of a small rise where they stop. They are entering 
avalanche terrain and it is time to decide if they should 
continue on their planned route. Ahead of them is a long, 
steep climb up a broad face to reach the more gradual 
ridgeline that they intend to follow to the summit. They dig a 
snow pit but do not find any sign of the persistent weak layer 
mentioned in the regional avalanche forecast. The snowfall 
has been light but steady and the winds variable over the 
past 48 hours. Although no cornices are visible on the 
ridgeline, spindrift indicates the wind is starting to pick up. 
They have not seen any obvious avalanche clues. They stand 
there, pondering the uncertainty of the conditions. 
Kelsey breaks the silence: "It looks good. I don't believe it's 
dangerous," she remarks. "I think we should continue.� 
Mindy wrinkles her brow: "Really? It doesn't look safe to 
me," she counters. "We should tum back." 
Why might two recreationists with similar training, 
competency, and experience make opposite decisions when 
judging the same evidence about the conditions? To try 
to answer that question, we must consider the cognitive 
mechanisms involved in the decision making process. 
QUESTION FRAMING 
When we judge risk, we are judging the attribute of an object, 
action, or situation. Attributes are commonly understood 
in terms of their multiple dimensions. For example, the 
attribute 'speed' is often understood in terms of two 
dimensions: fast and slow. Those two dimensions are like two 
sides of a coin, distinct but indivisible. They provide opposing 
but complementary perspectives. 
We tend to focus on a single dimension when making a 
judgment. For example, when judging speed, we commonly 
ask, "Is it fast?" or alternatively, "Is it slow?" rather than 
formulating a judgment using both dimensions. It is a 
natural process of language and thought to frame judgments 
with only one qualitative dimension of the judged attribute. 
Similarly, when moving through avalanche terrain, we 
might also use a single qualitative dimension to frame 
avalanche risk judgements such as "How safe are the 
conditions?" or"How dangerous are the conditions?� 
What we wanted to know is: does the choice of frame 
have an effect on perceived risk and behavioural decisions? 
If so, can we strategically employ that frame to increase the 
likelihood of more cautious, conservative judgments and 
decisions in avalanche terrain? 
Ill the avalanche journal spring //2021 
Our research found that frames influence perceived 
avalanche risk and behaviour intention. In a series of studies, 
we examined how backcountry skiers judged hypothetical 
scenarios of skiing in avalanche terrain (presented in the 
form of a photo and basic regional avalanche advisory 
information) when asked to judge safety or danger. We found 
that risk judgments framed in terms of safety ("How safe is 
it?') resulted in more cautious, conservative judgments and a 
lower likelihood of skiing than judgments framed in terms of 
danger ("How dangerous is it?'). 
This happens because the frames "safe� or"dangerous" 
direct the decision maker's attention during the judgement 
process. Judging "How safe is it?" defines safe as the reference 
point for the risk judgment. This focuses attention on 
finding and evaluating evidence of safety. Under conditions 
of uncertainty when there is no definitive indication of 
safety, such as in our example with Mindy and Kelsey, safety 
is judged as lower due to the lack of supporting evidence. 
Lower safety implies the unspecified opposite dimension­
higher danger-resulting in a lower likelihood of deciding to 
ski a slope. 
Conversely, when judging the danger ("How dangerous is 
it?') of the same scenarios, danger is judged to be lower (and 
consequently safety is perceived to be higher) because of the 
lack of definitive evidence of danger, resulting in a higher 
likelihood of deciding to ski a slope. 
By asking backcountry travellers to judge how safe the 
conditions are, we exploit the lack of definitive evidence of 
safety to actually promote more cautious judgements and 
behaviour. Failing to find evidence of danger should not be 
considered an indication of safety. Yet failing to find evidence 
of safety must be considered an indication that it is not safe. 
STRATEGICALLY FRAMING RISK PERCEPTION IN 
AVALANCHE TERRAIN 
Decision making in avalanche terrain is seldom free of 
uncertainty. How we formulate risk judgments can have 
a real impact on how people perceive risk and, ultimately, 
when and how they decide to act. How then might we 
harness the power of framing in the avalanche industry? 
The use of framing to promote specific judgments and 
decisions is an established practice in fields such as media 
and marketing. We can similarly employ framing to promote 
safer risk perceptions and behaviour in avalanche terrain. 
Guides, avalanche warning services, and avalanche safety 
educators have substantial control over the phrasing of 
questions about the risks they assess for a backcountry trip. 
Framing can be systematically applied to numerous risk 
judgments and decisions, whether it be deciding to ski a 
specific line or deciding to open or close specific terrain. 
Communication between members of a group travelling in 
avalanche terrain could be positively impacted by increased 
awareness of the framing effect. How information and 
questions are framed could influence other group members' 
perceptions of the current risk and the decisions made or 
communicated between members of the group. For example, 
when a guide or group leader notices changes in the 
conditions, they can advantageously frame their question to 
the group to focus attention on those changes in relation to 
the basis for any earlier judgments of safety. 
Let's say the basis for the decision to ascend a slope is that 
the old snowpack is stable with fresh, 
non-wind loaded powder snow on top. 
After some climbing, the snow surface 
shows signs of wind effect. Focusing on 
establishing safety forces the group to 
reassess the conditions relative to the 
previous evidence of safety (non-wind 
affected snow) and the possibility that 
conditions have changed (evidence of 
wind slabs). The group must evaluate if 
the evidence previously indicating safety 
is no longer present or if new evidence 
of safety is available. The group must 
therefore reconsider its arguments and 
possibly change its decision. 
Asking "How safe is this slope'" 
increases attention paid towards 
evidence of safety-not just the 
absence of signs of danger-making 
the group more critically aware of any 
changes in conditions while guiding the 
decision toward a more conservative, 
transparent, and possibly safer outcome. 
Framing risk judgments alone is 
insufficient to ensure safer behaviour 
among all backcountry recreationists. 
It is no substitute for the training, 
knowledge, and experience to 
understand and apply information 
about the conditions. Nonetheless, 
adopting a strategy for framing risk 
judgments can increase the likelihood of 
more cautious, conservative behaviour. 
There is often so much uncertainty 
when making decisions in avalanche 
terrain that we must utilize any tool 
or method that can help, even if just a 
little. Critically, one wants to minimize 
the chance that a "go" decision is made 
under objectively "no-go" conditions. If 
the way a question is framed influences 
the decision of whether to ride or not, then avalanche 
risk management strategies, tools, and education should 
recognize and account for this effect and incorporate framing 
risk judgments into routine practices to reduce the potential 
for avalanche accidents. 
The next time there is uncertainty about the current 
avalanche conditions, stop and think about the way you 
frame the question, and how it could influence your decision. 
Think about how you might be able to harness framing to 
provide that extra margin of safety in times of uncertainty. 
A peer-reviewed article that provides a detailed account 
of our research on question framing is forthcoming in the 
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied. That article can be 
accessed at doi.org/10.1037 /xap0000354. RI 
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Bei Skitouren im Lawinengelände ist es (überlebens-) wichtig,
die Lawinengefahr richtig zu beurteilen und dann gute Ent-
scheidungen zu treffen. Es gibt verschiedene Grundlagen – 
in diesem Text auch kurz als Strategien bezeichnet –, die uns
dabei helfen sollen, die bestmögliche Entscheidung zu treffen. 
Es gibt sehr gut beschriebene und exakt geregelte Ansätze,
aber auch weniger formale Strategien. In mehreren Ländern
gibt es nationale Fachforen oder Institutionen, wie z.B. das
Kernteam Lawinenausbildung (KAT) in der Schweiz oder die 
Canadian Avalanche Association (CAA) in Kanada, die solche
Strategien evaluieren, empfehlen und in einigen Fällen auch
herausgeben. Weitere Organisationen, die bestimmend dafür
sind, welche Strategien unterrichtet werden, sind die natio-
nalen Bergführerverbände und Alpenvereine. 
































































































Markus Landrø hat sich für seine Linie am Nibbi (Hemsedal, 
Norwegen) entschieden. Foto: Sindre Thoresen Lønnes
198
27
von Markus Landrø und Gerit Pfuhl
In unserer Arbeit haben wir die am häufigsten verwendeten Strate-
gien in Europa und Nordamerika untersucht. Sie sind in zahlreichen
Büchern und Artikeln bestens beschrieben, sodass wir auf eine Vor-
stellung oder einen Vergleich an dieser Stelle verzichten. 




  Stop or Go
  NivoTest
  Grafische Reduktionsmethode
  Systematische Schneedeckendiagnose
  Avaluator 2.0 
  ALPTRUTh (Kanada) 
  After Ski Methode (Norwegen)
In diesen zehn Strategien basieren die Entscheidungen typischer-
weise auf einer Beurteilung von vier Arten von Faktoren:
1. physikalische Faktoren (z.B. Hangneigung)
2. regionale Gefahrenstufe des Lawinenwarndienstes
3. im Gelände beobachtete Instabilitätserscheinungen, d.h. Alarm-
zeichen (z.B. kürzlich abgegangene Lawinen, Wumm-Geräusche, …)
4. soziale Faktoren (z.B. Gruppengröße, ...)
Für jede der zehn Strategien haben wir alle jeweils relevanten Fakto-
ren identifiziert und konnten dabei über 50 unterschiedliche nach-
weisen. Viele davon werden von mehreren Ansätzen geteilt, aber die
Strategien unterscheiden sich zum Teil in Art, Bedeutung und Anzahl
der einbezogenen Faktoren.
Alle Faktoren können thematisch gruppiert werden in Faktoren für …
  die Schnee- und Lawinenbildung
  die Schneedeckenuntersuchungen
  Stabilitätstests
  den Lawinenlagebericht
  die Gruppe
  das Gruppenmanagement
  das Gelände
Beispiele für Faktoren, die zum Thema Gelände gehören, sind: Mes-
sen von Steilheit in 5°-Intervallen ab 30° und die Unterscheidung
zwischen Lawinen- und nicht Lawinengelände. Beispiele für Fakto-
ren, die zum Thema Gruppenmanagement gehören, sind: 30 m Ent-
lastungsabstand im Aufstieg und Einzelfahren ab 35° in der Abfahrt.
Fragestellung
Wir wollten wissen, ob Experten diese Strategien kennen und ver-
wenden. Wir wollten auch wissen, ob sie in den verschiedenen Pha-


































































































































urteilen und für wichtig halten, die in den Strategien gelehrt und 
angewendet werden. Im Rahmen einer Online-Umfrage haben wir
gezielt Experten angeschrieben. Diese, d.h. die Teilnehmer unserer
Studie, sind sowohl Bergführer, Lawinenprognostiker und Lawinen-
forscher, als auch professionelle Skifahrer und Snowboarder. Diese
beiden Expertengruppen schienen uns deswegen interessant, da sie
einen anderen Ansatz in der Lawinenbeurteilung und Entschei-
dungsfindung haben könnten. 
Die Umfrage wurde auf Englisch, Deutsch und Norwegisch durchge-
führt, wodurch wir Antworten von Expertengruppen aus verschiede-
nen Ländern erhielten, die sich in ihren Traditionen und Ansätzen
zur Entscheidungsfindung im Lawinengelände unterscheiden. Die
Umfrage wurde nicht auf Französisch oder Italienisch übersetzt und
deshalb auch nicht an Experten in diesen Ländern verteilt. Dies ist 
in erster Linie auf die begrenzte Übersetzungskapazität zurückzufüh-
ren, deshalb konnten auch andere relevante Länder und deren Ex-
perten nicht berücksichtigt werden. 
Zuerst haben wir „unsere“ Experten zur Anwendung und Bedeutung
aller von uns identifizierten Faktoren befragt, bevor wir Fragen zur
Kenntnis und Anwendung der zehn Strategien stellten. Auf diese
Weise mussten die Experten darüber nachdenken, welche Faktoren
sie tatsächlich in ihrer Entscheidungsfindung verwenden und welche
in den verschiedenen Phasen einer Tour wichtig sind – sie konnten
sich also nicht einfach auf die Faktoren berufen, die fixer Bestandteil
einer Strategie sind.
Ergebnisse
Im Folgenden präsentieren wir einen Auszug aus unseren Umfrage-
erkenntnissen. Wir konzentrieren uns dabei auf den Teil über „Wis-
sen und Anwendung bestehender Strategien“ und auf den einen
Faktor, der in den meisten Strategien entscheidend ist: die Gefah-
renstufe.
Die Experten
Im Zeitraum von drei Monaten, die unsere Online-Studie lief, beant-
worteten 100 Experten den Fragebogen:
  Die Experten kamen zu gleichen Teilen aus Skandinavien, dem
deutschsprachigen Teil der Alpen und Nordamerika. 
  Die Mehrheit waren Männer, 10 % waren Frauen. 
  Im Durchschnitt hatten die befragten Experten 28 Jahre Erfahrung
mit Skitouren und verbrachten pro Saison 50 Tage auf Skitouren. 
  Die meisten Teilnehmer hatten deutlich mehr, einige wenige 
jedoch weniger Tourentage.
  Pro Saison waren im Schnitt 73 % dieser Skitage im Lawinenge-
lände. 
Analytisches und implizites Wissen
Die oben erwähnten zehn Strategien lassen sich in analytische/wis-
sensbasierte und probabilistische/regelbasierte Ansätze unterteilen.
Alle Strategien in unserer Studie haben Komponenten aus beiden
Ansätzen, die im Entscheidungsprozess gemeinsam genutzt werden
sollten. Weiterhin haben wir auch angegebene Entscheidungen ba-
e
sierend auf Intuition mit einbezogen, auch wenn diese kein Be-
standteil einer dieser Strategien sind. 
  Von den befragten Experten gaben 89 % an, dass sie eine wis-
sensbasierte, analytische Entscheidungsfindung anwenden, bei 
der detaillierte Beobachtungen und eine sorgfältige Beurteilung 
der Faktoren unerlässlich sind.
  Weiterhin sagten die Experten aber auch, dass sie sich auf ihre 
Intuition verlassen: 79 % vertrauen ihrer Intuition, die sie als Bauch-
gefühl und basierend auf langjähriger Erfahrung beschreiben. 
  Eine kleinere Gruppe (32 %) gab an, das Risiko zu kalkulieren: 
Sie berechnen die Wahrscheinlichkeit von Lawinen und potenziellen 
Folgen. 
  39 % gaben an, sich situationsabhängig zu entscheiden: In ver-
trauten Situationen wird eine Faustregel verwendet, aber falls die 
Situation eher unbekannt ist, verwenden sie analytische Methoden. 
  16 % gaben an, sich auf die probabilistische/regelbasierte Ent-
scheidungsfindung zu stützen. 
Kenntnis und Anwendung von vorhandenen Strategien
Wir haben die Experten gefragt, mit welcher der vorhandenen Stra-
tegien sie vertraut sind, wobei Mehrfachnennungen möglich waren
(Abb. 1): 
  Das 3x3 von Munter war zu 68 % bekannt. Diese Methode ist ein
integrierter Bestandteil der Reduktionsmethode (RM) – auch zu 
68 % bekannt – und wird in Kombination mit mehreren anderen
Strategien gelehrt. 
  Der kanadische Avaluator 2.0 (A2.0) ist bei 61 % der befragten 
Experten bekannt. 
  Für die anderen Strategien beträgt der Bekanntheitsgrad: Gra-
fische Reduktionsmethode (GRM) 35 %, Snow-Card (SC) 42 %; 
Stop or Go (SoG) 43 % und Systematische Schneedeckendiagnose
(SSD) 44 %. 
  Die After-Ski-Methode (ASM) mit 24 % sowie NivoTest (NT) und
AlpTruth (AT) mit jeweils 27 % waren am wenigsten bekannt, was
sich durch die sehr begrenzte Anwendung außerhalb ihrer Her-
kunftsländer (Norwegen, Schweiz und Kanada) erklärt. 16% listeten
weitere Strategien und Ansätze auf, die nicht in dieser Studie enthal-
ten sind. Nur ein Experte sagte, dass er keine der Strategien kannte. 
Abb. 1 zeigt den Unterschied zwischen der Kenntnis und der Anwen-
dung der Strategien. Bemerkenswert ist, dass die SSD von einem ho-
hen Anteil der Personen, die sie kennen, auch tatsächlich genutzt
wird (77 % der 44 Personen) – keine andere Strategie wird so häufig
von den befragten Experten angewendet. 
Die Zahlen für die anderen Strategien sind klein und erlauben es
nicht, eindeutige Rückschlüsse zu ziehen. Unsere Ergebnisse deuten
jedoch darauf hin, dass die Strategien vorrangig in Ausbildungskur-
sen zur Anwendung kommen.
Tatsächlich gehören viele unserer befragten Experten einer Gruppe
an, die typischerweise solche „Lawinenkurse“ unterrichten (z.B.
Bergführer, Skiführer). Aber nur sehr wenige vermitteln dort auch
eine der Strategien - mit Ausnahme jener (22 von 34), welche die
SSD verwenden. Diese begrenzte Vermittlung der Strategien in Aus-
bildungen ist auffällig, insbesondere da mehrere davon speziell für
Anfänger entwickelt wurden. Die meisten der Strategien sind haupt-
sächlich probabilistisch/regelbasiert und gelten als gut geeignet für
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Einsteiger, verlangen sie doch vergleichsweise wenig Wissen oder
Können für die korrekte Anwendung und sind dankbar zu unterrich-
ten. Die SSD hingegen ist hauptsächlich analytisch/wissensbasiert
und gilt traditionell als weniger geeignet für Anfänger.
Verwendung von Strategien in verschiedenen Phasen einer
Skitour
Auch wenn man das 3x3 von Munter nicht benutzt, ist es üblich, 
eine Skitour in verschiedene Phasen aufzuteilen. Diese können als
Entscheidungsprozess verstanden werden, der von der Tourenpla-
nung (regional) über die Routenwahl (lokal) bis hin zur Einzelhang-
entscheidung (zonal) reicht. Die Idee dabei ist, dass es nützlich ist,
die Lawinenbeurteilung und den Entscheidungsprozess mehrmals
durchzuführen. Dies bietet dann mehrere Möglichkeiten durch-
dachte Entscheidungen zu treffen und gefasste Pläne durch neue 
Informationen zu ändern. Somit reduzieren wir das Risiko einer La-
winenauslösung. Laut Munter ist eine Kombination aus seinem 3x3
und RM eine Voraussetzung, um das gewünschte Risikoniveau zu 
erreichen. 23 Experten bestätigten, dass sie das 3x3 bei der Touren-
planung verwenden, aber die Wichtigkeit in den weiteren Phasen
abnimmt. Mit Ausnahme von 3x3 und SSD ist die Verwendung von
Strategien in verschiedenen Phasen sehr begrenzt. Unsere Ergeb-
nisse deuten jedoch darauf hin, dass diejenigen, die A2.0 und GRM
nutzen, sie bei der Tourenplanung und Routenwahl verwenden. Im
Gegensatz zu den anderen Strategien erhöht sich der Einsatz der
SSD von acht Experten in der Tourenplanung auf 26 in der Routen-
wahl und 29 im Einzelhang entscheidend. Dies ist verständlich, da
die in der SSD enthaltenen Faktoren im Gelände beobachtet und 
beurteilt werden müssen, während die anderen Strategien Fakto-
ren beinhalten, die bereits vor Beginn einer Skitour ermittelt und
verwendet werden können.
Ist eine Strategie oder ein Faktor entscheidend, relevant oder
eher unbedeutend?
Eine unserer Fragen war: „Wie wichtig/nützlich sind diese Methoden


























Abb. 1 Kenntnis und Anwendung der Strategien in absoluten
Zahlen (von 100 Befragten) und Anwendung in relativen Zahlen.
Mehrere Antworten waren möglich.
25 (37 %)









Diese Frage stellten wir, nachdem die analytischen oder probabi-
listischen Ansätze befragt wurden, und hier zeigte sich, dass Ex-
perten sich auf ihre Intuition verlassen. Diejenigen, die SSD ken-
nen, vertrauen ihr auch am Einzelhang.
Gründe für oder gegen die Nutzung der Strategien 
36 % gaben an, dass die Strategien „einen anderen Ansatz verwen-
den“ und 29 % gaben an, dass die Strategien „einer Struktur folgen,
die nicht zu meiner Art von Entscheidungsfindung passt“. 
Warum verwenden Experten die Strategien nicht? Fast 1/3 gab an,
dass die Strategien die Entwicklung und das Lernen einschränken
(29 %) und den Benutzer vom eigenen Denken abhalten (18 %). 
Neben der technischen Beherrschung von Ski oder Snowboard er-
fordert das Skitourengehen weitere Fertigkeiten, wie z.B. Orientie-
rung, sich warm und trocken zu halten, usw. und nur ein Teil davon
ist eben auch die Fähigkeit zur Beurteilung der Lawinengefahr. 
14 Experten sagten, dass die Nutzung der Strategien zu kompliziert
ist, wenn sie draußen in den Bergen sind und es schwierig ist, die
verwendeten Faktoren zu beurteilen. 
Dies stellt dann allerdings in Frage, inwiefern diese Strategien nun
für Anfänger geeignet sind, die sich neben der Lawinengefahrenbe-
urteilung meist auch noch die zahlreichen anderen notwendigen 
Fähigkeiten zum Bewegen im winterlichen Gelände aneignen müs-
sen. Noch beunruhigender war, dass 14 Experten angaben, dass sie
nicht an die den Strategien zugrunde liegenden Statistiken glauben.
Fünf behaupteten, dass Strategien nicht zu funktionieren scheinen,
neun, dass Strategien die falschen Faktoren kombinieren und acht,
dass sie auf den falschen Faktoren basieren. 
Sechs der Experten stimmten der Aussage zu „Zu oft sagt die 
Methode Nein, und die Leute fahren dann trotzdem und nichts 
passiert“, was zeigt, dass die Strategien den Anwender zu stark 
einschränken. Dies deutet darauf hin, dass diese Experten der 
Meinung sind, dass die Genauigkeit der Strategien begrenzt 
oder dass die Sicherheitsmarge zu groß ist.
Natürlich haben wir auch gefragt, warum „ihre“ benutzte Strategie
wichtig ist. Hier antworten viele: 
  Es hilft, aktiv in eine bestimmte Denkweise einzusteigen. 
  Es hilft, den Entscheidungsprozess zu strukturieren. 
  Es verhindert, dass wichtige Informationen übersehen werden. 
Es unterstützt Intuition und Bauchgefühl.
Es ist also deutlich, dass auch Experten etwas schätzen und verwen-
den, was Rahmen und Struktur bietet und somit den Entscheidungs-
findungsprozess unterstützt.  
Der Lawinenlagebericht und die Gefahrenstufe.
Bei der Auswahl des Tourenzieles oder bei der Planung einer Skitour
ist ein Lawinenlagebericht eine nützliche Informationsquelle. Nur 
2 % der Experten gaben an, nie die Informationen aus einem Lawi-
nenlagebericht zu nutzen. 63 % benutzen den Bericht immer und 
35 % manchmal. Der Lawinenlagebericht wird hauptsächlich bei der
Planung verwendet (50 %), weniger bei der Routenwahl (30 %) und
bei Entscheidungen am Einzelhang (20 %). 
Ein Lawinenlagebericht besteht aus mehreren Elementen. Wir haben
die Experten gefragt, welche Elemente sie in verschiedenen Phasen
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verwenden und welche Bedeutung diese Elemente haben (Abb. 2). 
Die Gefahrenstufe gilt traditionell als das wichtigste Element in 
einem Lawinenlagebericht, sowohl für die weltweiten Lawinenwarn-
dienste als auch für die European Avalanche Warning Services
(EAWS). Mit Ausnahme von NT und SSD ist die Gefahrenstufe ent-
weder ein gleichwertiger (AT und A2.0) oder der prominenteste 
Faktor und Ausgangspunkt im Entscheidungsprozess. 
Es hat sich allerdings gezeigt, dass für viele Experten die Verwen-
dung und die Bedeutung des Faktors „Gefahrenstufe“ in den ver-
schiedenen Phasen einer Skitour abnimmt.: 1/3 gab an, dass die 
Gefahrenstufe für Entscheidungen am Einzelhang unbedeutend ist. 
Dies lässt sich einerseits durch das Gefahrenstufen-Konzept selbst,
d.h. die Art und Weise, wie die Gefahrenstufe bestimmt wird und an-
dererseits durch ihre Verwendung in einigen Strategien nachvoll-
ziehbar erklären – und ist in der Literatur der letzten Jahre nachzu-
lesen:
  Die Gefahrenstufe ist weder für kleinräumige oder hängespezifi-
sche Beschreibungen geeignet, noch wurde sie zu diesem Zweck
entwickelt (Nairz, 2010). 
Abb. 2 Wichtigkeit der Elemente im Lawinenlagebericht. Der Lawinenlagebericht mit seinen Elementen „Lawinenproblem“ 
































































































Gefahrenstufe Hauptbotschaft Gefahrenstellen Lawinenproblem Bergwetter Schneedecken-
Info
Empfehlungen
 entscheidend      relevant      unbedeutend
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  In Wirklichkeit ändert sich das Gefahrenniveau kontinuierlich,
nicht schrittweise wie auf der Skala. Die Schritte implizieren eine 
bestimmte Gefahrenstufenbandbreite (Mitterer, 2015). 
  Fehlende Einheitlichkeit in der Bestimmung der Gefahrenstufe
(Müller, 2016). 
  Unsicherheit im Zusammenhang mit dem Lawinenlagebericht
(Prognose) und systematischen Verifikationsverfahren bezüglich 
Gefahrenstufe (Schweizer, 2010; Schweizer, Kronholm, & Wiesinger,
2003; Techel, Dürr, Schweizer, 2016).
  Da uns die Gesamtzahl der Skitourengeher fehlt, ist die Verwen-
dung von einer Gefahrenstufe als ein zentraler Faktor in der Risiko-
berechnung zusammen mit Lawinenunfalldaten problematisch
(Kronthaler, 2001; McCammon & Hägeli, 2005). 
  Bei der unfallbasierten Risikoberechnung werden nicht alle Fälle
berücksichtigt, in denen ein Experte aufgrund ihrer/seiner Lawinen-
beurteilung einen bestimmten Hang nicht befahren hat. In einer Kal-
kulation hätte dies als Ereignis zählen sollen.
  Das Lawinenproblem hat keinen direkten Einfluss auf die Bestim-
mung von Gefahrenstufen, z.B. Berechnungen von Techel und Wink-
ler (2015) zeigen, dass das relative Risiko bei gleicher Gefahrenstufe
in Situationen mit Altschnee-Schichten 50 % höher ist als bei ande-
ren Lawinenproblemen.
Unsere Ergebnisse signalisieren, dass wir in Zukunft weniger Wert
auf die Gefahrenstufe legen sollten, sondern mehr auf das aktuelle
Lawinenproblem und die Schneedeckeninformationen. Diese Ein-
schätzung wird durch eine aktuelle Studie über die Kommunikati-
onswirksamkeit von Lawinenwarnungen (Engeset et al., 2018) unter-
mauert, an der auch Anfänger und weniger qualifizierte Anwender
teilnahmen.  
Schlussfolgerung
Die Experten kennen die Strategien, wenden sie aber nicht konse-
quent an. Eine Ausnahme bildet hier die Kenntnis und Anwendung
der Systematischen Schneedeckendiagnose. 
Nur sehr wenige der Experten verwenden einen probabilistischen
Ansatz, bei dem das Lawinenrisiko aus Kombinationen von Wahr-
scheinlichkeiten berechnet wird. Die Mehrheit der Experten wenden
bei ihren Entscheidungen einen analytischen, wissensbasierten An-
satz an. 
Experten beobachten und beurteilen Alarmsignale und sind selbst
aktiv bei der Suche und Verifizierung der aktuellen Lawinenpro-
bleme. Sie führen z.B. Stabilitätstests durch, um ein Problem zu 
erfassen bzw. zu beobachten und versuchen dabei zu analysieren, 
wie wahrscheinlich eine Lawine ist, welche Zusatzlast notwendig
und mit welcher Lawinengröße zu rechnen ist.
Die Ausbildung von Anfängern sollte möglicherweise nicht allein
durch Vereinfachungen und Regeln erfolgen. Die Betonung der Kom-
plexität der Lawinenprobleme und der Umgang mit diesen sollte
frühzeitig gelehrt werden. Darüber hinaus sollten es zukünftige Stra-
tegien dem Benutzer ermöglichen, mit seiner Erfahrung zu wachsen
s
und eine Weiterentwicklung nicht behindern. Vielmehr sollten sie
den Übergang vom Anfänger über den Könner bis zum Experten 
unterstützen und fördern.
Alle Strategien erfordern neue Beurteilungsdurchgänge, wenn man
neue Informationen – wie z.B. Alarmsignale – erhält. Außer der 
Sys-tematischen Schneedeckendiagnose bieten die Strategien 
keine Struktur, wie man solche klaren Informationen wie frische 
Lawinen oder Wumm-Geräusche vollumfänglich analysiert und 
interpretiert, und weniger offensichtliche Informationen, wie z.B. 
Altschnee-Schichten, werden leicht übersehen. 
Die Gefahrenstufe ist ein guter Indikator für die Verhältnisse, denen
man mit hoher Wahrscheinlichkeit im Gelände begegnen wird. Der
Lawinenlagebericht enthält jedoch weit mehr als nur die Gefahren-
stufe. Die Information über Lawinenprobleme und die Schneedecke
sollten in zukünftigen Strategien eine größere Rolle spielen, um ihr
Ausbildungs- und Sicherheitspotenzial zu nutzen. 
Anerkennung
Wir bedanken uns für die Zeit und den Aufwand, den die befragten
Experten für unsere Befragung aufgewendet haben. Wir danken
auch allen, die zur Entwicklung von Strategien beigetragen haben,
um uns alle bei der Entscheidung zu helfen, ob wir in einen Hang
einfahren sollen – oder besser nicht.
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